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I. Introduction 
The availability and variety of financial instruments has grown 
tremendously over the past decade. It is likely that this trend will 
continue. The tax law has struggled to keep up with the development of 
new financial instruments, responding to such instruments on an ad hoc and 
piecemeal basis. Unfortunately, the lack of a uniform theory guiding the 
development of the taxation of such instruments has led to rules that are 
often haphazard , incomplete, and inconsistent. 
246 Texas Law Review [Vol. 71:243 
The shortcomings in the present tax treatment of fin ancial 
instruments have high social costs. Uncertain rules increase compliance 
costs, provide opportunity for abuse, and discourage the legitimate 
development and use of financial instruments. Rules that are inconsistent 
with the underlying economics of a transaction distort behavior, lead to an 
inefficient allocation of resources, and have the potential of placing United 
States financial institutions at a competitive disadvantage in the world 
market. 
Most, if not all, of these problems could be solved by abandoning 
our current realization system and adopting mark-to-market accounting for 
financial instruments. 1 While there has been some movement in this 
direction, it is unlikely that Congress (or the financial community) will 
accept wholesale use of mark-to-market accounting. 2 Absent mark-to-
market accounting for financial instruments, there is a need to develop a 
general framework for determining the timing of income with respect to 
financial instruments within the overall confines of realization-based 
accounting. In this Article, I propose such a framework. 
In Part II, I set out my assumptions as to the basic normative goals 
of the federal income tax. In particular, I assume that the tax system is to 
be judged by standards of efficiency and equity. In Part III, using a series 
of simple examples concerning the toss of a coin, I show how a pure 
realization tax accounting system performs poorly against such standards. 
In particular, equity and efficiency norms are violated by the deferral of 
taxation implicit in a realization system because deferral lowers the 
effective tax rate on financial transactions and, in addition, provides a 
valuable timing option. Deferral also offers the opportunity for tax 
straddles. 3 
Part IV provides an overview of current provisions in the tax law 
designed to deal with the problems inherent in a realization-based system 
and discusses the weakness of such solutions. 
In Part V, I propose a set of uniform rules to account for financial 
instruments. In particular, I recommend (1) that such instruments be 
divided into their component parts and (2) that each component accrue 
income for tax purposes based on its expected future value. I refer to this 
approach as expected value taxation. 
1. A realization system is one in which gain and loss is not recognized until there is a realizati on 
event, such as a sale or exchange of the instrument. A mark-to-market system is one in which gain 
and loss are recognized on a periodic basis , such as annually, without regard to the existence of a 
realization event. See infra text accompanying notes 7-12. 
2. Mark-to-market accounting for tax purposes has been accepted in certain circumstances. See 
infra note 9. 
3. See infra text accompanying note 17. 
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In order to explore expected value taxation, in Part VI, I apply this 
approach to a series of increasingly complex wagers. In Part VII, I apply 
expected value taxation to a selection of typical financial instruments. In 
Part VIII, I discuss the weaknesses of my proposed approach, in particular 
the difficulties caused by the information requirements of expected value 
taxation. 
II. Normative Framework for the Analysis 
The expected value approach to the taxation of financial instruments 
is premised on two assumptions. First, the approach assumes that the 
appropriate tax base is income4 and that the appropriate effective tax rate 
is the statutory rate given the level of income. More particularly, I adopt 
the Haig-Simons definition of income, which can be stated as the sum of 
the value of the taxpayer's consumption plus her change in wealth over the 
period of measurement. 5 Absent other considerations, under the Haig-
Simons definition of income, financial products, as with all other assets and 
liabilities, would be valued periodically, and the holder would be taxable 
on the change in value over the period.6 I refer to such an approach as 
"mark-to-market" or "full accrual. " 7 The desirability of any particular 
4. If, for example, the income tax were to be replaced by a consumption or expenditure tax, there 
would be no need to measure income with respect to financial instruments. Any investment in such 
instruments would be deductible from the tax base, and any realized returns from such instruments not 
reinvested would be includable in the tax base. Fluctuations in value would properly have no relevance 
until such values were realized and converted to consumption. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, 
Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979); William D. Andrews, 
A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV . 1113 (1974) . Our current 
system is, of course, actually a hybrid, having characteristics of both an income and a consumption tax. 
See Henry J. Aaron et al., Introduction to UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-
CONSUMPTION TAX 1, 1 (Henry 1. Aaron et a!. eds ., 1988) (hereinafter UNEASY COMPROMISE] ("In 
practice, all tax systems are mixed or 'hybrid' systems that contain both income tax and consumption 
tax features."). 
5. See Robert M . Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TA.X I, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921) ("Income is the money value of the net accretion to 
one's economic power between two points of time."); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME 
TAXATION 50 (1938) (stating that personal income includes "the change in value of the store of 
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question") . 
6. The precise assessment period is also a relevant variable. In theory, continuous assessment 
would be optimal. See Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Nom1s and Implementation, 
99 YALE L.J. 1817, 1830-31 (1990) (arguing that continuous assessment taxation is superior to periodic 
assessment taxation). In light of administrative considerations and the general use of the annual 
assessment period, I assume that the annual assessment period is the appropriate norm. 
7. More precisely, under a mark-to-market system, the holder of the instrument would be taxable 
on the change in value of the instrument over the period, plus any cash and the value of any property 
received, minus any cash and the value of any property paid. For example, assume that at the 
beginning of the period an instrument was worth $100 and that at the end of the period the instrument 
was worth $150. Assume also that during the period the holder of the instrument had received $15 and 
had been obligated to pay $25. In that case, the holder's income for the period would be $40 (($150 
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approach to the taxation of financial instruments is, accordingly, measured 
against this norm. Deviations from the norm must be justified on the basis 
of other considerations, such as equity, efficiency, and administrability. 8 
Second, the expected value approach assumes that the financial 
instruments in question will not in fact be taxed under such a full accrual 
system. Thus, the expected value approach should be judged not against 
the ideal of full accrual, but rather against other alternatives . The 
assumption that financial products will not generally be taxed on a full 
accrual basis is not meant to be an endorsement of this position. The tax 
iaw has already accepted mark-to-market accounting for certain assets and 
in certain contexts. 9 The question, therefore, is not whether mark-to-
market accounting can or should be used, but rather where the line should 
be drawn. 10 Drawing the line to include all actively traded assets appears 
attractive and warrants further study. 11 
- $100) + $15- $25 = $40) . 
8. Considerations of equity , efficiency, and administrability often conflict. In the final analysis, 
tax policy involves an analysis of the extent to which any particular rule or set of rules deviates from 
th~se norms and a weighing of the social costs of such deviations. See generally Boris I. Bittker, 
Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out lnequiries?, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 19, 20-29 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980) (noting the 
conflict between the normative efficiency and equity standards). 
9. A very recent example of mark-to-market accounting being used as an acceptable method of 
accounting is in the proposed regulations governing notional principal contracts that permit dealers and 
traders in such contracts to elect mark-to-market accounting for their contracts and for all hedges of 
the contracts. Prop . Treas. Reg . § 1.446-4,56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31361 (1991). For a description of 
notional principal contracts, see infra notes 296-97 and accompanying text. Section 1256(a) has , since 
1982, provided that certain financial contracts including reguiated futures contracts and certain foreign 
currency contracts are to be taxed on a mark-to-market basis . I.R.C . § 1256(a) (1988). Treasury 
Regulation § 1.471-5 has permitted securities dealers to use mark-to-market accounting for their 
inventories since at least !958. Treas. Reg . § 1.471-5 (as amended in 1987). It offers securities 
dealers three methods of inventory valuation: cost, market, and lower of cost or market. !d. As an 
apparent quid pro quo for adopting mark-to-market accounting for notional principal contracts, 
securities dealers are required to forsake the use of lower of cost or market on their securities and 
commodity inventories. Prop . Treas. Reg.§ l.446-4(a)(3), 56 Fed. Reg . 31350, 31361 (1991) . The 
recent tax bill contained at least two additional mark-to-market provisions. See the Tax Fairness and 
Economic Growth Act (the "Bill"), H.R. 4210, 102d Cong ., 2d Sess. (1992), passed by the House and 
Senate, then vetoed by the President on March 20, 1992. Section 3204 of the Bill added new code 
§ 475 which generally would have required dealers in securities to account for their securities inventory 
on a mark-to-market basis. Section 4402 of the Bill added, inter alia, new code§ 1291 which would 
have required certain owners of marketable stock in passive foreign corporations to recognize gains and 
losses (to the extent of previously recognized gains) on a mark-to-market basis. New code§§ 475 and 
1291 were again included in §§ 3001 and 4402, respectively, of the Revenue Bill of 1992, H.R . 11, 
!02d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), passed by the House on October 5, 1992, passed by the Senate on 
October 8, 1992, and vetoed by the President on November 5, 1992. While these new mark-to-market 
provisions were twice vetoed, it is likely that they will eventually become law. 
10. See David J. Shakow, Taxarion Wirlwut Realization: A Proposal for Accnwl Taxarion , 134 
U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986) , for a proposal of a broader use of a full accrual system. 
II. The definition of "actively traded" would of course have to be fleshed out. See Prop. Treas. 
Reg . § I .I 092(d)-1, 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31361 (1991 ) for a recent attempt to define "ac tively trad ed" 
for purposes of the straddle rules. 
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At the opposite extreme of a full accrual system is a pure realization 
system. Under a pure realization system, gains and losses on financial 
assets would be taxable only at the time of a realization event such as the 
termination of the taxpayer's investment in the asset. 12 
A pure realization system raises a number of problems. First, to 
the extent that taxation of gains and losses are deferred, the effective tax 
rate on such gains and losses is less than the statutory rate. 13 This 
problem, which I will refer to as pure deferral, may be anticipated or 
unanticipated. By anticipated deferral , I mean situations where, as of the 
commencement of the transaction, there is an expected gain or loss from 
the transaction, the taxation of which will be deferred . By unanticipated 
deferral, I mean situations where on an a priori basis the expected value of 
any deferral is zero, 14 while on an ex post basis there is in fact deferral 
of gain or loss. 15 
12 . The precise definition of a realization event is un-:lear and is beyond the scope of this Article. 
In general, gain or loss is realized on the sale or other disposition of property. Treas. Reg. § I. I 00 I-
l(a) (as amended in 1972). A disposition generally includes an exchange for other property so long 
as the other property differs materially in kind or extent. /d.; see Cottage Savings Ass'n v. 
Commissioner, I I I S. Ct. 1503, 1508 (1991) (stating that a realization event for the "disposition of 
property" only occurs if the properties exchanged are "materially different"). Frequently , despite a 
realization event, the recognition of gain or loss is deferred. See, e.g., l.R.C. § 1031 (Supp. II 1990) 
(deferring recognition for a like-kind exchange); id. § 1032 (1988) (deferring recognition for an 
exchange of stock for property); id. § 1033 (1988) (deferring recognition for involuntary conversions); 
id. § 1034 (West Supp . 1992) (deferring recognition for a rollover of gain on the sale of a principal 
residence). 
13 . This point is easily demonstrated . Consider an investment that has yielded a gain of $500 . 
Assuming a 30% tax rate, the appropriate tax on the gain is $150. If the payment of the tax is deferred 
for one year, the present value of the tax liability (assuming a 10% discount rate) drops to $136. In 
present value terms, this is equivalent to an effective tax rate of only 27%. The longer the period of 
deferral, the lower the equivalent effective tax rate. Similarly, the higher the discount rate, the lower 
the equivalent effective tax rate. For example, a deferral of 20 years with a discount rate of 15% 
would imply an effective tax rate of only 2%. The general formula is: 
,Fr. . TR eJJectzve tax rate = , 
(1 + r)n 
where TR = nominal tax rate, r = discount rate, and n = number of years. 
The "tax" on a loss is, of course, negative rather than positive. In other words, it is a tax 
savings, not a tax cost. If a $500 loss is deferred one year and the marginal rate is 30% the present 
value of the $150 tax savings is only $I 36. That is equivalent to the current tax savings at a 27% tax 
rate. Because 27% is less than 30%, the taxpayer has a lower effective tax rate on the loss and a 
smalkr tax savings. Therefore, the overall tax burden on the taxpayer has increased. 
I 4. When I refer to the expected value of deferral as zero, I mean to include both situations where 
there is no expected gain (or loss) and situations where there is expected gain (or loss), but it is 
expected that there will be no deferral of tax liability on such gain (or loss). These are sufficient but 
not necessary conditions for the expected value of deferral to be zero. For example, the expected value 
of deferral could be zero in a transaction in which there is expected to be deferral of both gain and loss, 
but the present value of the deferral of the gain is equal to the present value of the defe rral of the loss. 
I 5. The significance of deferral from a tax policy perspective may well depend on whether it was 
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A second problem with a pure realization system is that, to the 
extent that taxpayers have the ability to selectively recognize losses while 
continuing to defer gains, the value of deferral is increased. I refer to this 
phenomenon as the timing option. 16 
Third, under a realization system taxpayers may be able to engage 
in transactions that in the aggregate produce no gain or loss , but that can 
be disassociated into two or more parts, one or more of which produces 
gain and one or more of which produces loss. This type of transaction is 
known as a tax straddle. 17 
Although the problems of pure deferral, the timing option, and the 
tax straddle are closely related, it is analytically useful to separate them 
because it enables a clearer understanding of the weaknesses of a 
realization approach and facilitates the development of alternative solutions. 
In the next section, I further develop the concepts of pure deferral, the 
timing option, and the tax straddle using a series of simple examples. 
III. Timing Problems Caused by a Realization System 
This Part presents five examples of simple transactions involving 
bets and deferred or accelerated payments. The examples are used to 
demonstrate how, under a pure realization system, such transactions 
provide opportunities for deferral, use of the timing option, and creation 
of tax straddles. Finally, the efficiency and equity consequences of these 
opportunities are discussed . 
A. Anticipated Deferral 
1. Example 1: Diva pays David $100 today, and, in ex-
change, David promises to pay Diva $121 in two years. 
In Example 1, the value of Diva's right to payment is expected to 
increase over the entire two-year period. 18 If the tax system fails to 
anticipated or unanticipated. See infra subpart III(A) for a more complete discussion of anticipated and 
unanticipated deferral. 
16 . See Strnad, supra note 6, at 1879 (defining the timing option as "the ability to take losses early 
and defer any later matching gains"). Strnad cites George M. Constantinides, Capital Market 
Equilibrium with Personal Tax, 51 ECONOMETRICA 611 (1983), as the source of the phrase " timing 
option ." Strnad, supra note 6, at 1879 . See infra subpart III(B) for an explanation of the timing 
option. 
17. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMOD!TlES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPUL<\TION & OTHER 
CLAIMS§ 14.01 (1987) . See infra subpart III(C) fo r a more detailed discussion of tax straddles. 
18 . The value of the right to receive future payments is equal to the present value of the furure 
payment. In general, the present value of a future payment is equal to: 
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account for this income as it is earned , the effective tax rate will be less 
than the statutory rate on Diva's gain and on David 's loss. Assuming that 
the value of David's obligation to pay $121 in two years increases on a 
constant yield basis, 19 it wi ll be worth $100 at the time Diva pays David , 
$110 in one year, and $121 at the end of the second year. D iva's income 
is , therefore, $10 in the first year and $11 in the second year. Under a 
pure realization system, however , Diva will be taxed on her $2 1 of gain 
only at the end of the second year. She will therefore defer payment of tax 
on $10 of income for one year. 20 Moreover, David and Diva know there 
PV 
FV 
(1 +r( 
where PV is the present value, FV is the amount of the future payment, r is the discount rate, and ti s 
the time remaining until payment. Therefore, as long as it is assumed that the di scou nt rate is constant 
ri sk , the value of the fu ture payment increases as the time to payment decreases . See generally 
RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 29-41 (4th ed . 
199 1) (expla ining the calculation of present values). Example 1 is , of course, equival ent to a zero-
coupon bond. 
19 . By "constant-yield basis," I mean that the discount rate stays constant over the entire term of 
the ob ligation . 
20 . Such deferral is equivalent to a reduction in the effective tax rate. See supra note 13 . 
This analysis assumes that both the pure realization and the fu ll acc n1al system measure 
income on a taxable year basis. It ignores the effect of estimated tax liab ility . More importantly, thi s 
analysis ignores the effect of inflation. Assuming inflation, much of Diva's gain and David's loss is 
pure inflationary gain o r loss. Under a perfectly indexed ta x system, such ga in or loss would not be 
taxed. Given that the current system determines ga in and loss without regard to inflation, the effective 
tax rate on capital transactions can be well in excess of the statutory rate. For example, consider a 
$100 investment held for one year and then sold for $105. Assume that the rate of inflation is fiv e 
percent. In that case, the real gain on the transaction is zero, while the nominal gain is five do llars. 
If nominal ga ins are subject to tax at a rate of 20%, the tax liab ility on the transaction would be one 
dollar. As measured against the real gain of zero, the one dollar tax liability, or for that matter any 
tax liability, represents an infinite effective tax rate. 
Inflation is a se rious problem under both a full accrual system and a pure realizati on system. 
In either case, the appropriate solution is basis indexation . While basis indexation has been consid ered 
at variou s times, it has always been rejected, primarily for admini strative rea sons. See , e. g ., DAVID 
F . BRADFORD, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX. REFORM 75 (2d ed. 1984) (arguing 
that "inflation adjustment would introduce additional complexity "); 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP' T, TAX. 
REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 152-72, 178-200 (198 4) [hereinafter 
TREASURY I] (proposing a comprehensive indexation scheme, including depreciable property, capital 
assets, inventories , and indebtedness); U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, THE PRESIDENT'S T A..X PROPOSALS TO 
THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 164-77 (1985) (eliminating proposa ls in 
TREASURY I for indexation of depreciable assets and indebtedness wh ile maintaining proposals to index 
capital assets and inventories). A proposal for indexing was passed by the House as part of the capital 
gains provision in the 1989 Act. H.R. 3299, JOist Cong., 1st Sess. § 11961 (! 989) (adding new 
§ I 022 of the Code providing for indexing of basis in certain circumstances). Representative Archer 
introduced a similar bill in the i02d Congress. H.R. 246, 102d Cong ., l st Sess. (1991 ) . 
Because inflation and deferral work in opposite di rections, deferral has been pointed to as an 
ad hoc solution to inflation. See Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steur!e, Indexing 1he Ta.x System for 
Inflation , in UNEASY COi\!PROMISE, supra note 4, at 347, 356 (arguing that "almost all fo rms of capital 
income receive some form of . .. ad hoc indexing under current law "). The implication of this 
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will be deferral before they enter into the transaction. In other words, the 
deferral is anticipated. By contrast, under a full accmal system, both 
parties would be taxed as the value of the contract changed over the two-
year period. 
2. Example 2: Diva promises to pay David $121 in two 
years , and David promises to pay Diva either $142 or $100 at 
the same time depending on the toss of a coin. The coin toss 
occurs at the end of the two years. 
There is no deferral, either anticipated or unanticipated, in Example 
2 2; Until the toss of the coin the bet is worth nothing. 22 It is only once 
the coin is tossed that the value of the bet changes. The payoff, however, 
is made immediately, and there is no opponunity for deferral. Under 
either a full accrual or a pure realization approach, Diva would be taxed 
at the same time. 23 
3. Example 3: Diva pays David $100 today, and David 
promises to pay Diva $142 or $100 in two years depending on 
the toss of a coin at the end of the two years. 
In Example 3,24 there is ex ante anticipated deferral of income, 
despite the fact that ex post there may be a loss , not income, from the 
argument is that, given inflation, deferral is not a problem. The relationship between deferral and 
inflation is very loose, grossly overcompensating some taxpayers and grossly undercompensati ng 
others. Moreover, such arguments fail to recognize the various manifestations of deferral, including 
unanticipated deferral, the timing option, and straddles. For these reasons I believe it is unwise to rely 
on the failure to index the tax system for inflation as a solution for problems caused by deferral. 
On the other hand, to the extent the realization requirement is weakened and the tax code 
moves towards full accrual accounting, the problem of inflation does become more significant and 
begi ns to demand a solution. From a revenue point of view, the increased revenue that is likely to flow 
from the adoption of accrual accounting could be used to pay for the likely revenue loss from 
indexation. 
21. In Example 2, the parties have entered into a current agreement for a future wager. It is 
essentially a forward contract. T o see this more clearly, consider a commodity X; the price of X can 
take on only two values, $100 or $142. A cash-settlement forward contract to purchase X in two years 
at a price of $121 would have exactly the same payoff as the payoff in the coin toss in Example 2. See 
infra text accompanying notes 258-60 for a discussion of forward contracts, including cash-settlement 
forward contracts. 
22. I define the value of the bet to be the expected present value of the payoff from the bet. In 
Example 2, there is a 50% chance that Diva will have to pay $21 in two years and a 50% chance that 
she will receive $21 at the same time. The expected payoff in two years is, therefore , zero. The 
present value of the expected payment of zero is also zero. 
23. Under a full accrual approach, the taxation would be triggered by the outcome of the coin toss, 
while under a pure realization approach, the taxation would be triggered by the payment (i.e., the 
realization event). Because these two events are contemporaneous, taxation would occur at the same 
time under either approach. 
24. Example 3 is merely a combination of Examples I and 2, a loan and a forward wager. 
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transaction. The expected payment by David to Diva is $121 at the end of 
two years. 25 In exchange for this expected payment, Diva pays $100 
currently. · Diva thus has expected income of $21 accruing over the two-
year period . At th at time, Diva will have additional income of $21 (if she 
wins) or a loss of $21 (if she loses) . 
Another way to see that Diva has an anticipated (and actual ) 
deferral of income, even though she may ultimately have no income on the 
transaction , is to consider what would happen if she sold her right 
immediately prior to the coin toss . Immediately prior to the toss , the value 
of her right to receive payment should be approximately $121. 26 Because 
she paid only $100 for this right, she has income of $21 , regardless of the 
outcome of the subsequent coin toss . The new holder of the bet would 
then have a gain or loss of $21 , depending on the outcome of the toss. 
The result should be no different if Diva does not sell her rights: her bet 
is still worth $121 immediately prior to the toss . Thus, in an economic 
sense, she has income of $21 as of that moment. Her subsequent loss or 
doubling of her income should not obscure the fact that she has already 
earned the first $21 _27 Under a realization-based system, Diva would not 
be taxed on her expected income prior to the end of the transaction. Under 
an accrual system, she would be taxed over the term of the transaction as 
the expected income accrued. 
4. Example 2A: The facts are the same as Example 2 but the 
coin toss occurs immediately after Diva and David enter into 
the agreement. Payment is still made at the end of two years. 
5. Example 3A: The facts are the same as Example 3 but the 
coin toss occurs immediately after Diva and David enter into 
the agreement. Payment is still made at the end of two years. 
Examples 2A and 3A differ from Examples 2 and 3, respectively, 
in that the coin toss occurs immediately after the bet is made, rather than 
at the end of the two-year period. Consider first Example 2A , an example 
of unanticipated deferral. 28 As of the time of the bet, the expected 
25. The expected payment is determined by multiplying each payoff by its probabili ty. See supra 
note 22. In this example, there are two possible payoffs, $100 and $142 , each with a probability of 
50 %. The expected payoff is thus $121. 
26 . The exact value of her right would , of course, depend on the market. Assuming that there 
was a large enough market fo r such bets, the market price should be driven to $121, the expected 
payoff. All of the examples assume that there are no transaction costs. 
27. The fa ct that there is anticipated deferral in Example 3 should come as no surprise given the 
observation that Example 3 is merely a combination of Exa mples 1 and 2 . In Example 1 Diva has 
anticipated deferral and in Exa mple 2 Diva has no offsetting acceleration of income, therefore it mu st 
be the case tha t Diva has anticipated defe rral in Exa mple 3 . 
28. Whereas Exa mple 3 is made up of a loan followed by a wager, Exampl e 2A is essentially a 
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income from the bet, as in Example 2, is zero . Once the coin is tossed, 
however, the situation changes . Assume that Diva wins the coin toss. She 
has economic income as of the ti me of the toss by virtue of David's 
obligation to make a net payment of $21 in two years. The amount of the 
economic income can be determined by discounting the future payment. 
Assuming a discount rate of ten percent, the present value of the future 
payment and, therefore, the amount of current economic income would be 
$ 17 .36. 29 In addition, Diva wou ld have addi tional interest income of 
$3.64 accruing over the two-year period leading up to the payoff. In a full 
accrual system, Diva would be taxed on the $1 7.36 of income at the time 
of the coin toss and would accrue the remaining $3.64 over the two-year 
period. In a pure realization system, she would be taxed on the entire $21 
at the end of the two years. 30 As a result of the deferral, the effective tax 
rate on her gain is reduced. 
An essential characteristic of Example 2A is that it is not possible 
to determine whether the deferral will be in favor of the taxpayer or against 
the taxpayer at the time the transaction is entered into. If the taxpayer 
wins the wager, she will have income, the taxation of which will be 
deferred. If she loses the wager, she will have a loss, the taxation of 
which will also be deferred. In expected value terms , the amount of 
deferral is zero. 31 
Example 3A is the most complicated. As with Example 3, Diva has 
expected income of $21 over the two-year period. To see this resu lt, 
consider Diva's position. If the coin toss is in her favor, she will own 
David's promise to pay $142 in two years , which will be worth ap-
proximately $117.36. 32 She will thus have immediate income of 
$17.3633 and additional "interest" income of $24.64 over the two 
years. 34 If she loses, she will be owed only $100, which will be worth 
$82.64. 35 She will thus have an immediate loss of $17.36 and will earn 
$17 .36 in interest income over the two years. 36 Therefore, whether she 
wager followed by a loan. 
29. $17.36 is $21.00 discounted at 10% for two years. 
30. At this stage, it is assumed that there is no realization event prior to the time of payment at 
the end of the two-year period . For the results when this assu mption is relaxed, see the discussion of 
the effect of the timing option, infra subpart III (B) . 
31 . Because the expected income is zero, the expected deferral must also be zero. See supra note 
14. This result is the key difference between Example 2A and Examples I and 3. 
32. $117.36 is $142 discounted at 10% for two years . 
33. $17 .36 = $117.36- $100.00 (present value- cost). 
34 . $24.64 = $142.00- $117.36 (future value - present value). I use the term "interest income" 
to distinguish income from the passage of time as opposed to income from the outcome of the wager. 
I do not mean to suggest that a portion of the income should or should not be characterized as income 
for fed eral income ta x purposes. Questions of character are generally beyond the scope of this Article. 
35. $82.64 is $100 discounted at 10 % for two years . 
36 . $17.36 = $100.00- $82.64 (cost- present value). 
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wins or loses , she will earn interest income. The expected amount of 
interest income she will earn is $21, exactly the same as in Exampl e 3. In 
addition to the expected deferral of $2 1, Diva will also have actual deferral 
of the $17. 36 gain or loss. The expected amount of th is later gain or loss 
is, however , zero. Accord ingly, there is no expected deferral with respect 
to such gain or loss. In summary, Example 3A invol ves both anticipated 
and unanticipated deferr al. 
B. The Timing Option 
The timing option refers to the taxpayer's ability to selectively 
recognize gains and losses. 37 Under a full realization system, the timing 
option exists because the taxpayer generally has the ability to force a 
realization event with respect to a loss by disposing of the property while 
deferring realization of gain by continuing to hold the property. 38 Under 
a lull accrual system, there is no timing option because both gain and loss 
are recognized each period without regard to a realization event or other 
action of the taxpayer. 
37. See supra note 16 (defining the timing option). The importance of the timing option is well 
known to tax practitioners. In addition, its imp ortance has also been recog nized in the academic 
literature. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, I11e General171eory ojTa.x Avoidance, 38 NAT'L TAX J . 
325, 325 (1985) [hereinafter Stiglitz, I11e General I11eory] (stating that the "[p ]ostponement of taxes" 
is the first "basic principle[] of tax avoidance," and explaining that the "present discounted value of 
a postponed tax is much less than that of a tax currently paid"); Joseph E. Stiglitz , Some Aspecrs oj rhe 
Taxation of Capiral Gains , 21 J. PUB. EcoN. 257, 259 (1983) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Some Aspecrs] 
(listing investment strategies that , assuming a perfect capital market and the absence of anti -abuse rules, 
would enable an individual to avoid paying any income tax under a realization-based system); Strnad, 
sup ra note 6, at 1825-30 (discu ssing the impac t of timing on a simple hypothetical transacti on) . 
38. This Article generally focuses on reducing the effective rate of taxation by deferring gains and 
accelerating losses. It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that for some taxpayers it 
may be important to accelerate gains and defer losses . For exa mple, a taxpayer with exp iring net 
operating losses would wish to extend the use of the losses by realizing current income and deferred 
gain, thereby using the current expiring losses and creating new losses with a fresh carryover period. 
Thus, for some taxpayers, deferral has value when it is loss, rather than gain, that is bei ng deferred. 
This consideration is equally true for all of the manifestations of deferral discussed in this Article. 
One of the problems with many of the conventional approaches to the timing rules is that they 
lose sight of the fact that acceleration of income is a two-edged sword. See , e.g., Virginia Iron Coal 
& Coke Co . v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 195 (noting that the taxpayer argued that the option premium 
should be taxable in the year paid, not in the year when the option expired unexercised), aff'd, 99 F .2d 
919 (4th Cir. 1938) , cert. denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939); Martin D. Ginsburg, 17ze National Office 
Mission, 27 TAX NOTES 99 , 100 (1985) (" [E]very stick crafted to beat on the head of a taxp ayer will, 
sooner or later, metamorphose into a large green snake and bite the Commissioner on the hind part. 
Nothing, you see, works one way in the tax fi eld. Those folk out there are exceedingly ingenious . 
If, in aid of particular mayhem, you espouse an interpretation too narrow or too broad or just plain 
skewed, before you can turn around the tax bar wi ll do you in .") . In part, the recognition of this 
symmetry lies behind the balanced app roach taken with respect to notionai principa l contracts in Prop. 
T reas. Reg.§ 1.446-33 , 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31354 (1991 ), and its predecessor, I. R. S. Notice 89-21, 
1989-1 C.B. 65i. 
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The effect of the timing option is to lower the effective tax rate on 
gains relative to the effective tax rate on losses and, therefore, the expected 
effective tax rate on the transaction as a whole. 39 Consider Example 3A. 
Immediately after the coin toss, Diva has either a gain or loss of $17.36. 
Assume th at she has a loss and immediately disposes of the asset. 
Assuming a thirty percent tax rate, she will have an immediate tax savings 
of $5 .21 and her effective tax rate on the loss will be thirty percent , the 
full statutory rate. By contrast, assume that she has a gain and holds onto 
the bet until the end of the two-year period. In that case, her tax 
obligation of $5.21 on the gain will be deferred two years. 40 In present 
value terms, her obligation will cost her only $4.31.41 The effective tax 
rate on her gain is, therefore, only twenty-five percent. 42 In other words, 
the effective tax rate on a gain is only eighty-three percent of the effective 
rate on a loss. 43 
The timing option is also present in Example 2A. Consider Diva, 
who has promised to pay $121 in exchange for either $100 or $142 . Once 
39. The timing option is available only if the party with the loss is able to recognize the loss 
without adverse tax consequences to the party with the gain as would be the case if, fo r example: (I) 
the loser was able to recognize her Joss without a corresponding recognition event for the winner; (2) 
the winner was non-taxable; or (3) the winner was already taxed on the gain because of its method of 
accounting (e.g., mark-to-market). If the recognition of a loss by the loser forces a taxable recognition 
by the winner, a potential investor will exp ect that gain as well as Joss will be recognized immediately 
after the coin toss, and there will be, in effect, no timing option. 
A number of different tax rules have the effect of requiring gain recognition by the winner 
as a price for Joss recognition by the loser. These rules include I.R.C. § 46J(h) (1988). See infra 
notes !55-56 and accompanying text (explaining the addition of the requirement of economic 
performance to the all events test for determining when an item of deduction may be accrued). Another 
such rule is Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(6)(ii) , 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31360 (1991) (stating that both 
parties to such a notional principal contract recognize gain or Joss upon the assignment of the contract). 
Both of these rules rely on the presence of a taxable counterparty for their effectiveness. The rule in 
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(6)(ii) is weakened by the availability of a mark-to-market election under 
Prop. Treas . Reg.§ 1.446-4,56 Fed. Reg. 31361 (199 1). See infra note 223 (stating that a mark-to-
market election allows either party to recognize a loss without imposing a tax cost on the other party). 
40. If she holds on to the bet for two years, she will have an additional gain of $3.64 as the value 
of the bet increases from $17.36 to $21. She will have a tax liability of $1.09 on the add itiona l gain. 
Similarly, in the case where she loses the coin toss, if she borrows $17.36 to fund her current loss, she 
will have an additional deductible interest expense of $3.64 over the two-year period . 
41. $4.31 is the present value of $5.31 discounted at 10% for two years. 
42. 25% = $4.31 7 $17.36. 
43. 83% = 25% 7 30%. In general, the effective gain rate as a percentage of the Joss rate 
depends on the discount rate and the number of years a gain is deferred relative to a loss. The formula 
IS: 
Gain Rate 
Loss Rate (1 +r)" 
where r is the discount rate and n is the number of yea rs of deferral. In this example the discount 
rate is I 0% and the number of years of deferral is two. Therefore, the ga in rste as a percentage of 
the Joss rate is 83% (83 % = I 7 (I + .10)2). 
1992] Taxat ion of Financial Instruments 257 
the coin is tossed, she knows with certainty whether she has a gain or a 
loss. If she has a gain, she can choose to defer the gain for two years. If 
she has a loss, she can take it immediately. The timing option is not, 
however, available in Examples 1, 2, or 3. Example 2 has no deferral , 
either anticipated or unanticipated, and, as a result, there can be no timing 
option. Examples 1 and 3 both have anticipated deferral, but no unan-
ticipated deferral. 44 While anticipated deferral has the effect of lowering 
the effective tax rate, it does not present the timing option. 45 
C. Straddles 
The problem with the timing option from a taxpayer's point of view 
is that it is merely an option , rather than a certainty. The fact that it is an 
option does not mean that it is unimportant, without value, or without cost 
to the system, but merely serves to limit its value. If, however, a taxpayer 
can place herself on both sides of a transaction, she can convert the option 
into a certainty, thus ensuring a realizable loss where there is no loss on 
the overall transaction. For example, consider a taxpayer who engages in 
two transactions similar to the transaction described in Example 2A. In the 
first transaction, the taxpayer bets on the coin coming up heads. In the 
second, the taxpayer bets on tails. Regardless of the coin toss, the 
taxpayer will have an equal gain and loss, enabling the current realization 
of a loss and the deferred realization of a gain without any risk of 
economic loss. 46 In essence, the taxpayer has converted the timing option 
into a certain deferral. 
44. The statement that Examples I and 3 have no unanticipated deferral is not strictly true. 
Consider Example 1, the exchange of $100 today for $121 in two years. I have assumed that the 
income from the exchange accrues along an expected path during the two-year period . Assume, 
however, that immediately after the $100 payment is made, interest rates drop to one percent. As a 
result, the right to receive $121 in two years would immediately be worth approximately $119 and the 
remaining $2 in income would accrue over the remaining two years. To the extent that this actual 
accrual path exceeded the expected accrual path, there would be unanticipated deferral in addition to 
the anticipated deferral. 
45. As Example 3A shows, anticipated deferral and the timing option are not P.lutually exclusive. 
See supra text accompanying note 36. In other words, a transaction can have both anticipated deferral 
and the timing option. The point is only that anticipated deferral does not itself present the timing 
option. The transaction must have unanticipated deferral for the timing option to exist. Paradoxically, 
a reduction in anticipated deferral due to the accrual of expected income can have the side effect of 
creating unanticipated deferral and, therefore, the timing option. See infra note 181 (demonstrating that 
accruing expected income can create an opportunity to take advantage of a taxable loss that would 
otherwise not exist). 
46 . See infra text accompanying notes 161-72. 
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D. Efficiency Consequences 
There are both efficiency and equity consequences to deferral, the 
timing option, and tax straddles. This subpart focuses on the efficiency 
consequences. As discussed above, anticipated deferral lowers the effect ive 
tax rate on a transaction.~7 The reduced effective tax rate distorts 
investment decisions in two ways: by encouraging overinvestment in the 
transaction relative to other transactions and by encouraging investment by 
high-bracket taxpayers relat ive to low-bracket taxpayers. The first effect 
occurs because the after-tax yield on the transaction will be higher than 
similar transactions where the yield is taxed currently. The second effect 
occurs because as the tax benefit becomes capitalized in the price of the 
investment, the pre-tax yield on the investment drops. As the pre-tax yield 
on the investment drops, it becomes less attractive to lower-bracket taxpay-
ers.48 Thus , the existence of investments for which there is expected 
deferral leads to an inefficient allocation of resources. 49 
The efficiency consequences of unanticipated deferral differ from 
the efficiency consequences of anticipated deferral. First, consider unan-
ticipated deferral assuming that there is no timing option. 50 In the 
absence of the timing option, the effect of unanticipated deferral is to lower 
the effective tax rate on losses and gains equally. Reducing the effective 
tax rate has the effect of increasing the variance of returns from the 
transaction, without affecting the mean return. 51 In other words, it 
increases the risk of the transaction relative to a fully taxed investment. 52 
Consider again Example 2A in which Diva promises to pay David 
$121 in two years in exchange for David's payment to Diva of either $100 
47. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15. 
48. Capitalization of tax benefits occurs in a variety of contexts. The classic example is tax-
exempt municipal bonds. In theory, because of their tax-free returns, the price of municipal i.Jonds is 
bid up until, for the marginal investor, the after-tax yield on municipal bonds is equal to the after-tax 
yield on al ternative investments . As a result, the pre-tax yield is below the pre-tax yield on comparable 
corporate investments. This, in tum, provides a disincentive for tax-exempt and low-bracket taxpayers 
to invest in municipal bonds. To the extent that municipal bond yields are less than taxable yields, the 
value of the tax benefit is passed from the holder of the bond to the issuer. If the tax-free yield is equal 
to the after-tax yield on corporate bonds, all of the tax benefit is being captured by the issuer and the 
holder receives no benefit. See Bittker, supra note 8, at 22-23. Historically, the benefit of the tax-
exemption has generally been split between the municipalities and high-bracket holders. See MICHAEL 
J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES266 (2d ed. 1988). 
49. An additional source of inefficiency may come from the effect of taxation of alternative 
financial instruments on the choice of the financial structure of a business entity. 
50. For example, assume that the UIX rules are such that any loss must be deferred until such time 
as the gai n would otherwise be recognized. 
51. Remember, the expected value of the deferral is zero. See supra note 14 and accompanying 
text. 
52. The risk borne by a taxable investor in an investment with unanticipated deferral is, however, 
still less than the risk borne by a tax-exempt investor. 
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or $ 142, based on an immediate coin toss. After the co in toss, Di .:a will 
have either an asset or a li ab ility worth approximately $ 17. 36. Under a 
pure realization system with a thirty percent marg inal rate, Diva would be 
liable for a tax of (or wou ld receive a refund of) $6.30 in two years . In 
present value terms, she would have an after-tax gain or loss of $12 . 15 .53 
Under a full accrual system , however, she would have an after-tax gain or 
loss of onl y $ 11.20. 54 Because the deferral is unanticipated, under both 
a pure realization and a full accrual system , the expected after-tax value is 
zero. 55 The difference is in the range of the outcomes. In other words, 
the di fference in the tax regimes affects the r isk inherent in the transaction, 
but not the expected return. By increasing the risk, a pure deferral system 
would be likely to decrease the demand for such transactions.56 
Once the t iming option is considered , the effect of unant icipated 
deferral is more significant. The timing option operates through its 
differential effect on losses and gains. 57 For instance, in Example 3A the 
tax benefit of a loss on the bet is $5.21 while (in present value terms) the 
tax cost of a win on the bet is only $4.31 .58 The expected tax payment 
53. $12.15 = ($21.00- $6.30) 7 (I+ .!OJ. 
54 . The afte r-tax value is determined by discounting at the 10 % discount rate her payments 
(refund s) of tax and her receipts (payments) on the bet. It assumes that a tax wou ld be payable 
immediately on the gain (loss) and at one-year intervals the reafter. The following table shows the value 
of the contract at each period-assuming a win-and the resulting tax liability. 
I Year II Value I Income I Tax Liability I 
0 $17.36 $17 .36 $5.2 1 
I 19.09 1.73 0.52 
2 2 1.00 1.91 0 .57 
The after-tax present value of the contract is the present value of the payment under the 
contract minus the present value of the tax liab ilities. Thus, under a full accrual system the after-tax 
present value would be: 
$11.20 = $17.36 - $5.21 - $0·
52 
(1 + .10) 
$0.57 
(1 + .10)2 
55. See supra notes 14- 15 and accompanying text. 
56. The demand for risky transactions will depend on the level of risk aversion and the correlation 
between the ri sks in the transaction and other ri sks in the economy. To the extent th at a particular 
risky transaction can be used to hedge other risks , entering into such transactions may lower th e overall 
level of ri sk in the economy. 
57. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39 (noting that a taxpayer will have an incentive to 
accelerate losses but defer gains). 
58. See supra note 40. Th ese amounts are the tax benefit and cost of the loss or ga in at the time 
of the coin toss. Because the payment is deferred, there will be additional gain if the bet is held to 
maturity and, consequently , add itional tax cost. Similarly, there will be additional interest expense if 
the loss is funded out of borrowing. 
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is, therefore, -$0.45. 59 Absent taxes the expected value of the bet is 
zero. With taxes, the expected value of the bet is $0.45, the tax savings. 
Note that $0.45 is the expected value to each side of the bet. What has 
started out as a zero-sum game has become a positive-sum game, with the 
fisc providing the ante . The availability of the timing option is equivalent 
to a direct subsidy for such activities and, in general, leads to an inef-
ficiently large amount of investment in activities that provide a timing op-
tion. 60 
The value of the timing option increases with the variance in the 
return on the transaction, that is, with risk. Obviously, if there is no 
variance in the return, any deferral is fully anticipated and there is no 
timing option. As the variance increases, the potential gain and the 
resulting deferral increase, and, therefore, the value of the timing option 
increases. 61 A timing option, therefore, increases investment in risky 
activities. 62 
The value of the timing option also increases with the ratio between 
the maximum holding period of the investment given a gain and the 
minimum holding period given a loss. 63 For instance, in Example 2 there 
is no time between the determination of the amount of gain or loss (the 
coin toss) and the necessary realization of any gain (the payment under the 
transaction). Accordingly, there is no timing option. On the other hand , 
in Example 2A there is a two-year period between the coin toss and the 
payment, permitting a two-year difference between gains and losses. Thus, 
the timing option encourages investment in transactions in which gains can 
be held for long periods of time while losses can be realized quickly. 
The efficiency consequences of permitting straddle transactions 
derive primarily from the transaction costs of the straddle transactions. 
Since the essence of a straddle transaction is a perfectly balanced position, 
a straddle involves no 11et investment and no risk. Thus, straddles will not 
59. -$0.45 = ($4 .31- $5.21) X .50 chance. 
60. Cf. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govemment Policy: A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 725 (I 970) (noting that tax 
incentives constitute subsidies which "push or pull in unneutral directions"). 
61. The relationship between the value of the timing option and risk is equivalent to the fact that , 
all else equal, the value of an option increases with the variance in the underlying prices. See JOHN 
C. COX & MARK RUBINSTEIN, OPTIONS MARKETS 217,219 (1985). 
62. Of course, there are other aspects of tax law , such as the Jack of refundability of losses and 
the capital loss limitation, that tend to discourage investment in risky assets. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra 
note 49, at 678 (1988) (arguing that "[t]he limitations on the deduction of capital losses . . . actually 
discourages risky investments"). It is unclear whether the net effect of the tax code is to encourage 
or discourage risk . 
63. For example, a gain on a three-month cash-settlement forward contract can be deferred for at 
most three months, while the gain on a long position in stock can be held open indefinitely. Deferring 
the payment of taxes on gains for extended periods of time will increase the value of the timing option 
to the extent that losses may be recognized without deferral. 
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generally have the effect of encouraging misallocation of resources by 
virtue of the substance of the transactions. Nevertheless , substantial 
resources may be expended in promoting, entering into, and managing 
straddle transactions. Additionally, by reducing tax revenues, straddles 
require additional taxes to be levied on other transactions.64 Such 
replacement taxes will generate additional inefficiencies. Thus, although 
the direct efficiency costs of straddles are small, the indirect costs are 
significant. 
E. Equity Consequences 
Deferral has significant equity as well as efficiency consequences. 
In general, the seriousness of the consequences will depend on the extent 
to which market prices respond to the presence of deferral. 
Consider first anticipated deferral, and assume that market prices 
have not responded to the deferraL In other words, assume that the pre-t<Lx 
yield on the investment with deferral is equal to the pre-tax yield on a 
similar investment without deferral. Without price adjustment the deferral 
will, as discussed above, lead to a lower effective tax rate and a higher 
after-tax rate of return to holders of investments with deferral as compared 
to holders of similar investments without deferral. The divergence between 
economic income and taxable income has both horizontal and vertical 
equity consequences. Principles of horizontal equity are violated because 
taxpayers with equal economic income and thus presumably equal ability 
to pay are taxed differently depending on whether the income is derived 
from financial instruments that have anticipated deferral or from other 
sources that are not tax-favored . 65 Principles of vertical equity are 
violated to the extent that such instruments are not evenly distributed 
64. As part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U .S.C.), Congress has enacted a series of provisions intended 
to reduce the availability of tax straddles. These provisions include: l.R.C. § 263(g) (1988) (allowing 
no deduction for interest and carrying charges of a straddle); id. § I 092(a)(2) (allowing loss deferral 
when one leg of a straddle is disposed of); id. § 1256 (using mark-to-market accounting for certain 
contracts); see also infra text accompanying notes 161-75 (describing the current restrictions on tax 
straddles). At the time of the legislation , the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the revenue 
gain from the entire package of tax straddle rules was approximately $2.4 billion for the period June 
23, 1981 through December 31, 1986. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., !ST 
SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE EcONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 381 (Comm. Print 
1981) (Table: Summary of Estimated Revenue Effects of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 (H.R. 
4242) , Calendar Years 1981-1986). The revenue estimate for fiscal years 1981 through 1986 was 
approximately $1.7 billion. !d. at 380 (Table: Summary of Estimated Revenue Effects of the Economic 
Recovery Act of 1981 (H.R. 4242), Fiscal Years 1981-1986). David Burnham estimates that 
commodity tax straddles were costing the government $3 to $4 billion a year in lost revenue. DAVID 
BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS 214 (1989). 
65. See GRAETZ, supra note 48, at 17 (describing horizontal equity as treating equally those with 
equa l ability to pay). 
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throughout income classes. 66 Even without considering the bias intro-
duced by preferential taxation, it would seem reasonable to assume that 
higher income individuals are likely to receive a greater proportion of their 
income from financial instruments than are lower income individuals . 
The foregoing as sumes that markets have not adjusted to the 
existence of the anticipated deferral. The analysis changes dramatically if 
the market has adjusted to take into account the benefit of deferral. 
Ass ume that the entire tax benefit has been capitalized into the price of the 
investment. 67 In that case, the after-tax yield on the investment is the 
same as the after-tax yield on alternative investments without anticipated 
deferral. 68 Accordingly, a ho lder of the tax-favored instrument is, on an 
after-tax basis, treated no better than a holder of an instrument that is not 
tax-favored, and , consequently, there is no violation of equity con-
siderations.69 In summary, the degree of inequity that flows from 
anticipated deferral depends on the degree to which the market is able to 
adjust to the existence of the deferral. 70 
The equity implications of unanticipated deferral are different from 
those of anticipated deferral. To begin with, consider the effect of 
unanticipated deferral in the absence of the timing option. Unanticipated 
deferral differs from anticipated deferral in that the expected value of the 
deferral is zero. 71 As a result, the market price cannot adjust to reflect 
the deferral. 72 Accordingly, the market cannot be relied on to reduce 
66. See id. (describing vertical equity as a concern for fairness requiring persons with greater 
ability to pay higher taxes). 
67. See supra note 48 for a general discussion of the capitalization of tax benefits. 
68. Note that the capitalization of tax deferral into the price of the instrument compensates the 
party to the transaction with the expected loss as well as imposing an implicit tax on the party to the 
transaction with the expected income. The amount of the compensation will be correct only if the 
holder faces the same tax rate that is implicit in the market capitalization. For a general discussion of 
the market ' s ability to impose a substitute tax on parties to transactions with expected deferral , see 
Daniel I. Halperin , Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money , • 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986). 
69. While there may be no actual benefit to the holder of the tax-favored instrument, there may 
be an appearance of a benefit that may be as destructive to the tax system as an actual benefit. !d. at 
511 n.21. 
70. The degree to which the market will actually adjust is a complex question turning on a variety 
of factors, including the relative importance of taxable and non-taxable players in the market. To the 
extent that all market participants were taxable at the same rate, it would be surprising if the market 
did not quickly adjust. To the extent that there are significant market participants, both on the demand 
and supply side, who have lower or zero tax rates, the degree of adjustment becomes much more 
uncertain. 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56 (explaining that unanticipated deferral increases the 
variance in the expected returns from an instrument but does not add value to the instrument when it 
is executed). 
72. It is possible that the market will adjust somewhat to reflect the increased after-tax risk 
inherent in the transactions. It is difficult, however, to predict the direction of any such adjustment. 
See supra note 56 and accompanying text (arguing that unanticipated deferral increases the variance of 
outcomes, which increases the risk of the transaction, but that it is unclear how the market will adjust 
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inequity. On the other hand , because the expected value of deferral is 
zero, the expected tax rate on the income (or loss) is the same as the 
statutory rate. Accordingly, on an ex ante basis, no equity concern is 
raised. 73 On an ex post basis, however, the holder of an instrument with 
unanticipated deferral is taxed at an effective rate less than the statutory 
rate . 74 The question is then raised whether we should be concerned with 
ex post fairness or only ex ante fairness. In the extreme, it is unlikely that 
we would be content with a system where ex post effective tax rates 
diverged vastly from ex ante rates. For example, consider a tax system 
where all investments in corporate stock were taxed based on the average 
yield of ali corporate stock, rather than on the actual performance of the 
taxpayer's stock holding. While such a system is arguably fair on an ex 
ante basis, it is unlikely that it would be thought of as acceptable from an 
equity point of view. 75 Assuming this intuition is correct, it would 
suggest that we tend to think of equity more on an ex post basis than an ex 
ante basis .76 
to the increased risk) . 
73. As a practical matter, even if the sole policy concern is ex ante fairness, a policy of current 
taxation of gains or losses, whether anticipated or unanticipated, is likely to enhance fairness because 
it will capture instances of anticipated gain or loss that have been misclassified as unanticipated gain 
or loss. 
74. In the case of a deferred gain, the holder is undertaxed, and in the case of a deferred loss , the 
holder is overtaxed. In either case, the problem is that the effective rate is too low. 
75. The system would be unfair on an ex post basis because ·although each taxpayer would be 
taxed on the same amount (the average yield of all corporate stock), the system would fail to account 
for inevitable differences in the gains or losses of each taxpayer's portfolio. As described, such a 
system would also be unfair on an ex ante basis because it would fail to take into account the relative 
risk of different corporations. One can imagine, however. correcting the proposed system to account 
for ri sk. Even such a corrected approach is unlikely to be perceived as fair. 
76. Professor Michael J. Graetz , in discussing a possible consumption tax , has argued strenuously 
that equity must be viewed on an ex post basis: 
[A]n ex ante approach to taxation requires a major restructuring of the classic 
conceptions of tax equity. Horizontal equity , the most widely accepted notion of 
fairness in taxation, requires that persons in similar circumstances pay similar 
amounts of tax. Although the tax literature is replete with disputes over whether 
"similar" or "different" circumstances are being compared, the notion that similar 
circumstances should be evaluated ex ante in present value terms seems quite a 
radical departure. Regardless of the precise contours of the definition of income 
or consumption, it seems clear that horizontal equity must be an ex post concept. 
Circumstances should be considered as similar only after results are known; iucky 
gamblers are not the same as unlucky gamblers. 
An ex ante approach is even more troubling with reference to the vertical 
equity criterion. . . . Certainly , if one accepts a vertical equity criterion which 
relates the distribution of the tax burden to "ability to pay," ex post rather than ex 
ante circumstances would be relevant. 
Graetz, st<pra note 4, at 1600-0 I (footnotes omitted)-
One could , however, argue the other way . For example, as a matter of horizontal equity, 
consider two persons each of whom was permitted to choose a certain salary of $50,000 or a risky 
salary of eith er $20,000 or $80,000, depending on the profitability of the business. It could be argued 
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In summary, unanticipated deferral generally produces a timing 
option that raises additional equity concerns. The existence of the timing 
option alters the nature of unanticipated deferral. Absent the timing option, 
the expected tax benefit of unanticipated deferral is zero. Given the timing 
option, however, the expected value of unanticipated deferral is positive. 77 
Moreover, it is positive for both sides of the transaction. As a result, in 
general, the market price will not reflect the tax benefit. 78 Therefore, the 
that given their equality of opportunity, it is fair to demand an equal contribution to the federal 
government. 
The current Code takes a mixed approach. The basic mle is Ll-)at income is determined on 
an ex post basis. Thus, for example, individuals are taxed on actual salary, not on some average or 
expected salary. On the other hand, income on zero~coupon bonds is taxed on an expected basis, with 
a catch~up (in nominal, but not present value, terms) at maturity. l.R.C. §§ 1271~1274 (1988). 
Congress has recently considered expected versus actual outcomes in the area of annuities. 
Under § 72, each payment under an annuity is divided into a portion representing income and a portion 
representing a non~taxable return of capital using a fixed ratio based on the expected life of an 
annuitant. l.R.C. § 72(b) (1988). Until 1986, an annuitant who lived longer than expected continued 
to exclude a fixed portion of the annuity despite the fact that she had already recovered her entire 
investment in the contract. On the other hand, an annuitant who died prematurely was not permitted 
to take a loss for her unrecovered basis. Thus, annuitants recovered their capital correctly (in total 
amount, not as a timing matter) on an ex ante or expected basis, but not on an ex post or actual basis. 
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 72 was amended to provide that an annuitant who died 
prematurely could take a loss equal to her unrecovered basis and an annuitant who lived longer than 
expected could no longer recover more than her initial investment. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99~514, § 1122(c)(2), 100 Stat. 2467. With some apparent irony, Professor Graetz has 
suggested that the change was undesirable. GRAETZ, supra note 48, at 210 ("It is extremely difficult 
to discern any good reason for this 1986 change in policy."). 
In contrast to annuities, term life insurance is taxed approximately correctly on an ex ante 
basis, but incorrectly on an ex post basis. In general, term life insurance premiums are non~deductible, 
and the proceeds of term life insurance are not included in income. l.R.C . § 10l(a)(1) (1988). 
Assuming that the expected payment under a term life contract is equal to the premiums, the current 
system of taxation is essentially equivalent to permitting a deduction for the premiums and including 
as an offsetting amount the expected payment under the poi icy, which is correct on an ex ante basis. 
On the other hand, after the expiration of the term of the insurance, the policy holder has either 
survived or not. If he has survived, he should be entitled to a deduction for the premiums paid . If he 
has not, he (or his estate or beneficiary) should be taxed on the net insurance proceeds. Thus, the 
current taxation of term insurance is consistent with an ex ante, but not with an ex post approach. Of 
course, it is easy to justifY the exclusion of life insurance proceeds from income for reasons other than 
the non~deductibility of premiums-sympathy for widows and orphans ranks high on the list. 
77. Strnad offers a computation of the effect of the timing option on asset values. See Strnad, 
supra note 6, at 1883 (providing a table of marginal tax rates and corresponding calculated 
"proportion[s] of asset value attributable to timing option") . 
78. To the extent that the benefit to one side of the transaction is capitalized in the price of the 
transaction, the benefit to the other side of the transaction is increased . Moreover, the benefit to the 
other side of the transaction becomes one of anticipated deferral, not just the timing option. To see this 
outcome, consider a minor variant on Example 2A. In Example 2A, Diva promises to pay David $121 
in exchange for a 50-50 chance at either $100 or $142. If Diva was forced to pay, for example, $125 
to reflect the benefit of the timing option, the expected value of the payoff to David would be $4, 
instead of zero. Thus, David would have income at the time the bet was entered into of approximately 
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timing option raises questions of ex ante equity because certain types of 
mcome are treated more favorably than others on an expected value 
basis. 79 
As an ex post matter, the equity consequences turn on whether the 
holder of the instrument is a loser or a winner. If she is a loser, she will 
realize her loss immediately and be taxed at the statutory rate on the loss. 
If she is a winner (i.e., she has a gain on the transaction), she will choose 
to defer the gain and secure the value of the deferral. In other words, a 
loser will be taxed correctly on the loss; a winner wiil be undertaxed on 
the gain. 
Of the problems with deferral discussed above, the most serious 
horizontal and vertical equity concerns are raised by straddles. 80 Pure 
deferral and the timing option merely reduce the effective rate of tax on the 
specific transaction, but straddles permit deferral of taxation on unrelated 
income. 81 
$3.31 (the present value of $4). Under a pure realization approach, however, David would not be 
taxed on that income until the time of the payoff. Thus, David would h!!ve: (I) the advantage of the 
timing option on the basic bet; (2) an additional receipt of $4; and (3) deferral of the tax due on the 
receipt of the $4. 
79. Note that a system of pure ex ante taxation (with no correction upon realization) would 
eliminate the timing option and tax straddles . Even conceding that equity should generally be viewed 
on an ex post basis, it is theoretically possible that the advantages of pure ex ante taxation would 
outweigh the equity advantage of ex post taxation. lt is unlikely, however, that in most contexts a pure 
ex ante approach would be politically or administratively acceptable. In particular, a pure ex ante 
app roach places too much reliance on estimates of future income that are inherently unreliable and 
subject to abuse outside of narrow contexts like annuities and life insurance. See supra note 76 
(discussing conceptions of equity under ex ante and ex post approaches for annuities and life insurance). 
80. This statement is meant to cover only deviations from a full accrual system that are discussed 
in this Article . There are other provisions in the tax law that raise equally serious equity concerns. 
For example, the step up in ba sis at death, I.R .C . § 1014 (1988), has long been cited as one of the 
most serious loopholes in the tax code. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 5, at 212 (proposing that gain 
shou ld be taxed at death). While Simons recognized the importance of taxing gains at death, he did 
not recognize the importance of loss limitations to deal with the timing option and straddles. See id. 
("Full deduction should be allowed for all realized capital losses .... " (emphasis in original)). 
In addition, the most serious distortions often come from a combination of provisions. For 
example, in a pure realization system with perfect capital markets, the combination of deferral on 
capital gains, a current interest deduction , and the step up in basis at death can be used to insure that 
no taxes are paid on any income. See Stiglitz , Some Aspects, supra note 37, at 262-65 (demonstrating 
how one can avoid paying any tax given the above conditions); see also Stiglitz, 11re General11reory, 
supra note 3 7, at 326-28 (discussing methods of tax avoidance). Strnad discusses the interaction of the 
timing opt ion with the step up in basis at death. See Strnad, supra nOie 6, at 1883 n.l91. 
81. Any deviation from economic measurement of income arising from a transaction is magnified 
to the extent that the taxpayer is able to leverage her investment in the transaction. While this problem 
of tax arbitrage is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that, to the extent that economic 
income is correctly measured, there is generally no need to restrict leverage or, mo re particularly, the 
interest deduction. Most of the Internal Revenue Code restrictions on the deductibility of interest arise 
out of the failure to tax economic income. The following cha rt offers some examples . 
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IV. The Treatment of Financial Instruments Under Current Law 
In this Part, I discuss a variety of ways in which the current taJc law 
deal s with deferral and related problems. 82 
A. Restrictions on Anticipated Deferral 
In the area of financial products, the tax law's response to deferral 
JS varied and complex, 83 and often differs depending , among other 
Interest Restrictions Responding to Tax Arbitrage 
~<em•l R'"'""' Cod< Nature of Limitation Justificat ion I 
Investment interest Failure to accrue income on I § 163 CdJ 
I 
investments 
§ 163(h)(l ) Personal interest Failure to tax imputed income 
on consumer durables 
§ 263(g) Interest cost of carrying a Failure to accrue income to 
straddle other parts of the straddle 
§ 263A(f) Uniform capitalization rules Failure to accrue income on 
self-produced assets 
§ 264(a)(2) Interest on debt to carry Failure to properly accrue 
certain annuity contracts income on annuity contracts 
§ 265(a)(2) Interest on debt to carry tax- Failure to tax income on tax-
exempt obligations exempt ob ligations 
§ 469 Passive interest Failure to properly determine 
II 
income on passive activities 
(e.g., accelerated depreciation) 
§ 1277 Interest expense of carrying Failure to accrue market dis-
market discount bonds count 
I 
§ 1282 Interest expense of carrying Failure to accrue discount on 
certain short-term bonds certain short-term obliga tions 
For a more complete discussion of tax arbitrage, see generally Stanley A. Koppelman, Tax Arbitrage 
and the Interest Deduction, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1146 (1988); David J. Shakow, Confronting the 
Problem of Tax Arbitrage, 43 TAX L. REV . I (1987). 
82. The following description of current law is not meant to be exhaustive either in the sense of 
covering all provisions of the federal income tax laws affecting deferral or in the sense of fully 
describing those provisions mentioned. Rather, the description is intended to illustrate the effect of 
deviations from a pure realization model on the problems discussed above. Additionally, by noting that 
a particular provision has the effect of restricting deferral, I do not necessarily mean to suggest that the 
drafters of the provision had such an intent, only that the provision has such an effect . 
83 . See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 68 , at 519-24 (discuss ing deferred payments of compensat ion 
and the tax law's imp osi tion of a matching requirement to p revent !2x avoidance). 
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facto rs, on whether the deferral is anticipated or unanticipated and the 
extent to which the payments are certain or uncertain .84 Although it is 
difficult to generalize, to the extent that the payments are certain , the tax 
law often requires accrual of the expected income .SS Correspondingly, 
when the payment is uncertain , the tax law generally defers recognition at 
least until the time the uncertainty is resolved. 86 
1. Treatment of Noncontingent Payments Under the OlD 
Rules.-The primary example of the treatment of deferral with certainty is 
the treatment of debt instruments providing for fixed payments under the 
original issue discount ("OlD") and related rules. 87 Under these rules, 
the holder of an OlD instrument is generally required to accrue income on 
84 . By certainty I am referring to the payments as determined under the terms of the relevant 
contract. I am not referring to cred it risk. It is, of course, possible to view credit risk as creating a 
contingency in the same manner as a SUited contingency, but generally this approach is not taken und er 
current law . See, e.g., I.R. C. § 1273 (a) (1988) (stating that the amount of orig inal issue discount that 
must be acc rued is based on the stated redemption pric e of maturity, which is defined by reference to 
the amount specified und er the debt instrument, without regard to credit risk); Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ l.l 275-4(b)(i ) , 51 Fed. Reg. 12020, 12087 (1986) ("A payment [under a debt instrument] shall not 
be considered a contingent payment merely because the amount of or the liability for the payment may 
be impaired by insolvency or default."); I.R.C . § 585(c) (1988) (stating that large banks are not 
permitted a reserve fo r bad debts). But cf I.R. C. § 163(e)(5) (Supp. II 1990) (denying creditors a 
deduction for a portion of the original issue di scount on certain ob ligations with a yield in excess of 
the applicable federal rate plus five percentage points); I.R.C. § 585(a) (1988) (stating that small banks 
are permitted a bad debt reserve based on experience) . 
85 . The term "expected income" is used loosely . At best, expectations will have to be based on 
objective ma rket factors and will often have to be determined using significant approximations. As 
discussed below, a prime examp le of the requirement to accrue expected income is the original issue 
discount rules. More generally, acc rual basis taxpayers are required to accrue expected receipts of 
income when such amounts can be determined with reasonable accuracy. See Treas. Reg . § !.446-
l(c)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1987) (" Generally, under an accrual method, income is to be included for 
the ta xab le year when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the 
amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy."); see also Treas. Reg . §§ 1.451-l (a) (as 
amended in 1978); !.461-l (a)(2) (as amended in 1967) . 
86. A prime example of the failure to accrue uncertain expected income is th e treatment of 
contingent interest und er the OlD rules. See infra section IV(A)(2). The generalizations in the text 
of this Article deal with the ta xation of financial instruments, but this is not the only applicab le arena. 
See Halperin , supra note 68, at 519-24 (d iscussing the issue of deferral outside of the financial products 
area) . In particular, Halperin shows how th e tax code deals with the problem of deferred and 
accelerated payments through a combination of direct, indirect , and substitute taxation. See id . at 515-
39 (a nalyzi ng accelerated payments, deferred payments, and premature accruals, and weighing the 
appropriateness of three methods accounting for this investment income: direct ta xation by imputing 
interest, indirect taxation by denying an otherwise allowable deduction, and substitute taxa tion by 
denying a substitute party a deduction for interest). 
87. The OlD rules are contained in I.R .C. §§ 1271-1275 (1988) (discussing the treatment of the 
holder); id. § ! 63 (e) (S upp . II 1990) (discussi ng the treatment of the issuer) ; id. § l63(e)(5) (discussing 
the special rules for high-y ield obligations). Related rules include l.R.C. §§ 1276-1278 (1988) 
(discussi ng the treatment of market discount) ; id. §§ 1281 -1283 (discussing the treatment of short-term 
obligations); id. § 1286 (d iscussi ng the treatment of st ripp ed bonds). 
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a daily basis ,88 and the issuer is required to accrue a corresponding item 
of expense. 89 The amount to be accrued with respect to each period is 
determined under a constant y ield methodology. Under this approach, a 
single yield is determined for the instrument, and income is presumed to 
accrue based on that yield. 'X) 
For instance, in Example 1 where Diva pays David $100 today in 
exch ange for $ 121 in two years, Diva would be required to accrue the $21 
of income over the two-year period . In the example, the yield on the 
instrument is ten percent. 91 Therefore , Diva would be required to accrue 
$10 in the first year and $11 in the second year. 92 
The taxation of such an investment can be viewed as taxing 
expected income on the assumption that interest rates will remain constant 
throughout the life of the instrument.93 In other words, if interest rates 
remain constant at ten percent , the investment will be worth $110 in one 
year. Under a full accntal system, Diva would be taxed on the $ l0 
increase in value. Thus, the OlD rules are equivalent to a full accrual 
system under the constant yield assumption. 
To the extent that interest rates change or otherwise diverge from 
the constant yield assumption, actual income will diverge from expected 
income as will the amount of income under the OlD rules relative to a full 
accrual system. For example, assume that by the end of the first year the 
interest rate has dropped from ten percent to five percent. In that case, the 
value of the investment will be approximately $115 at the end of the first 
year. Diva will have earned $15 of income, not the $10 on which she is 
being taxed. 94 
88 . l.R.C. § 1272(a)(l) (1 988). 
89 . !d. § 163 (e) (Supp . II 1990) . 
90 . !d. § 1272(a)(3) (1988). 
91 . Assuming an annual accrual period, the y ield may be determined by solvi ng for r in the 
following equation: 
$100 $121 so r - ~ 121 - 1 - 10%. 
100 
92. In the language of the OlD rules, the issue price of the obligation would be $100 and the stated 
redemption price at maturity would be $121. See l.R .C . § 1273 (1988). There would therefore be $21 
in original issue discount, and th e yield to maturity would be 10 %. See id . The OlD for the first 
accrual period would be the issue price times the yield to maturity, or $10 . The adjusted issue price 
would then be the issue price plus the OlD fo r the accrual period, or $110. The OID fo r the second 
(and final) period would be the adjusted issue price times the yield, or $11. 
93 . More precisely, the OlD rules are consistent with taxing expected income if, as of the time 
of issuance , there is a level y ield curve over the relevant term and then, within that term, the yield 
curve is expected to remain constant. See infra text accompanying note 311. 
94. Alternatively, if interest rates have increased to 15 %, the value of the investment will be 
app roximately $ 105 and the proper income accrual would be approxi mately $5 . 
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Thus, even in the most basic case of debt instruments that provide 
for a predetermined fixed stream of payments , the OID rules tax on the 
basis of expected income, not actual income. As a result, in the case of 
noncontingem debt, the OID rules solve the problem of anticipated 
deferral, but do not solve the problems of unanticipated deferral and the 
timing option. 
2. Treatment of Contingencies Under the OlD Rules.-Where 
payments under a debt instrument are contingent, the OID rules are 
considerably less successful at accruing even expected income. Until 
recently, in the case of debt instruments issued for cash or publicly traded 
property, the contingent interest rules were divided into two parts. 95 The 
first set of rules governed instruments under which the total noncontingent 
payments (regardless of whether designated as interest or principal) are 
equal to or greater than the overall issue price of the instrument (the 
"Paragraph (e)" rules). 96 The second set of rules governed instruments 
under which the total noncontingent payments are less than the issue price 
(the "Paragraph (f)" rules) .97 
Under the Paragraph (e) rules, an instrument is divided into its 
noncontingent and contingent parts. 98 The noncontingent payments are 
then treated as a separate debt instrument with an issue price equal to the 
issue price of the overall debt instrument.99 The contingent payments are 
treated as interest in the taxable year in which they become fixed. 100 In 
other words, none of the issue price is allocated to the contingent pay-
ments, thereby minimizing the amount of income accrued with respect to 
the noncontingent payments. At the same time, the contingent payments 
are not accrued until they become fixed. 
95. Prop . Treas. Reg.§ 1.!275-4(e)-(f), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12090-94 (1986). The proposed 
regulations provide for an entirely different set of rules when the only contingency is that the interest 
payments are based on a qualified variable rate. Such variable rate debt instruments are essentially 
taxed on an expected value basis. See Ui. § 1.1275-5, 51 Fed. Reg. 12094 (1986) (providing rules for 
the treatment of variable interest payments); U1. § 1.1275-4(b)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12087 (1986) 
(providing that qualified variable payments of interest are not treated as contingent payments). Where 
contingent debt instruments are issued for nonpublicly traded property, the instruments are governed 
by id. § 1.1275-4(c)-(d), 51 Fed. Reg. 12087-90 (1986). 
96. !d.§ 1.1275-4(e), 51 Fed. Reg. 12090-92 (1986). 
97. !d. § I. 1275-4(f), 51 Fed . Reg. 12092-94 (1986) . The differences between the Paragraph (e) 
and the Paragraph (f) rules are more apparent than real. In particular, in the case of a debt instrument 
where the noncontingent payments exactly equal the issue price of the instrument, both sets of rules 
give precisely the same pattern of income accruals. 
98. Jd. § 1.1275-4(e)(l), 51 Fed . Reg. 12090-91 (1986). 
99. !d. § 1.1275-4(e)(2), 51 Red. Reg. 12091 (1986). 
100. Id. § I .1275-4(e)(3)(i), 51 Fed. Reg. 12091 (1986). If the contingent payment has become 
fixed but is not due within six months, only the present value of the contingent payment is taken into 
income. Id. § 1.1275-4(e)(3)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 12091 (1986). See infra Appendix C for a further 
discussion of these rules. 
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Under Paragraph (f), the instrument is again divided into noncon-
tingent and contingent payments, but the contingent payments are treated 
as a return of principal. 101 As each contingent payment becomes fixed , 
it is treated first as interest to the extent that interest would have accrued 
on the instrument if it bore interest at the applicable federal rate and then 
as principal to the extent of any remaining payment. 102 
The proposed contingent interest rules were recently modified to 
come closer to accruing expected income in certain circumstances (the 
"Paragraph (g)" rules) .103 The Paragraph (g) rules apply to any debt 
instrument that (1) is issued for cash or publicly traded property; (2) 
provides for noncontingent payments equal to or greater than the issue 
price; and (3) provides for one or more contingent payments determined, 
in whole or in part, by reference to the value of publicly traded stock, 
securities, commodities, or other pub! icly traded property. 104 Under 
Paragraph (g), as with Paragraph (e), the instrument is first divided into 
noncontingent and contingent payments, with the noncontingent payments 
being treated as a separate noncontingent debt instrument. 105 Unlike 
under Paragraph (e), the issue price of the overall instrument is allocated 
between the noncontingent and contingent payments in proportion to their 
respective fair market values. 106 Thus, at least with respect to the 
noncontingent part of the instrument, the correct amount of income is 
accrued. The contingent payments are then treated "in accordance with 
their economic substance as payments pursuant to one or more options or 
other property rights. "107 
101. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1275-4(f)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12092 (1986). 
102. !d. § 1.1275-4(f)(2), 51 Fed. Reg. 12092 (1986). The total amount treated as principal is 
limited to the issue price of the overall debt instrument. Once this limit has been reached, any 
remaining contingent payments are treated entirely as interest. The ordering rule is reversed for 
payments at maturity that are first treated as principal to the extent of unpaid principal and then treated 
as interest. If, at maturity, less than the entire issue price has been accounted for, the holder of the 
instrument is entitled to a loss to the extent of unrecovered principal. ld. § 1.1275-4(f)(3), 51 Fed. 
Reg. 12092-93 (1986). 
As with the Paragraph (e) rules, if a contingent payment is to be paid more than six months 
after it becomes fixed, only the present value of the payment is taken into account when it becomes 
fixed. !d.§ 1.1275-4(f)(2)(v), 51 Fed. Reg. 12092 (1986). 
103. /d.§ 1.1275-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8310-11 (1991). 
104. !d.§ 1.1275-4(g)(1), 56 Fed. Reg. 8310 (1991). 
105. !d. § 1.1275-4(g)(3), 56 Fed. Reg. 8311 (1991). 
106. !d. 
I 07. !d. § 1.1275-4(g)(4)(i), 56 Fed. Reg. 8311 ( 1991 ). One of the significant differences between 
the Paragraph (e) (and Paragraph (f)) rules and the Paragraph (g) rules is that under the former, a debt 
instrument is bifurcated solely for the purpose of determining the timing of income, while under the 
latter, the bifurcation applies for purposes of character as well as timing. See id. § 1.1275-4(g)(5), 56 
Fed. Reg. 8311 (1991) (providing an example of the application of the Paragraph (g) rules). The 
question of character is more acute than it might have once been because of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988). Prior to Arkansas Best, it 
is likely that, at least from the borrower's point of view , gain or loss would have been ordinary under 
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To see the difference between the Paragraph (e) and the Paragraph 
(g) mles , consider their application to Example 3. In Example 3, Diva 
pays David $100 today in exchange for David's promise to pay Diva $142 
or $100 in two years, depending on the toss of a coin at that time. 
Assuming that the obligation would be treated as a debt instrument, it 
would be viewed as an obligation with a principal amount of $100 and 
contingent interest of either $0 or $42. 108 Under Paragraph (e), the 
instrument would be bifurcated into a noncontingent and contingent 
instrument. The noncontingent instrument would have an issue price of 
$ 100 and a stated redemption price at maturity of $100 and, therefore, 
would be treated as having no original issue discount. As a result, no 
income would accrue and the $100 payment at maturity would be treated 
as a return of basis . With respect to the contingent payment, no income 
would accrue on the obi igation until the amount of the contingency was 
fixed. 109 Therefore, Diva would not be required to accrue any income 
until the end of the two years. At that time, if she won the coin toss she 
would take the $42 into income as interest, and if she lost the coin toss she 
would have no gain or loss. 110 In general, when payments under a debt 
instrument are contingent, the Paragraph (e) rules fail to accrue expected 
income. 111 
As an alternative, assume that the contingency in Example 3 is 
determined by reference to the value of publicly traded property and that, 
therefore, the Paragraph (g) rules apply. Under Paragraph (g), the $100 
issue price of the debt instrument would be divided between the noncontin-
an expansive reading of the Com Products doctrine. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 
U.S. 46, 50 (1955) (holding that the company's futures transactions "were vitally important to the 
company's business as a form of insurance against increases in ... price," so the gain and loss derived 
from them was ordinary). After Ark£msas Best, it is far more likely that gain or loss would be capital. 
See Arkansas Best, 485 U.S . at 217 ("The broad definition of the term 'capital asset' explicitly makes 
irrelevant any consideration of the property's connection with the taxpayer's business .... ");see also 
Edward D. Kleinbard & Suzanne F . Greenberg, Business Hedges After Arkansas Best, 43 TAX L. REV. 
393, 414-40 (1988) (comparing the decisions of Arkansas Best and Com Products). 
The magnitude of the problem from the issuer's point of view may, however, be overstated. 
If the issuer ha5 fully hedged the risk on the imbedded derivative product using nonimbedded derivative 
products, any gain or loss on the imbedded derivative products will be offset by gain or loss on the 
nonimbedded derivative products. Accordingly, the character of the gain or loss will be irrelevant. 
108. See Prop. Treas . Reg.§ 1.1275-4(b), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12087 (1986). 
109. See id . § 1.1275-4(e)(3)(i), 51 Fed. Reg . 12091 (1986). 
110. ld. 
Ill. While in general the contingent imerest rules defer expected income, there are instances 
where they accelerate expected income. In particular, when the contingency is resolved currently, but 
relates to future periods, the contingent interest rules accelerate the accrual of income. This point is 
discussed further in Appendix C. 
While the OlD rules do not generally require or permit accrual based on the expected 
amounts of contingent payments, the rules do provide for accrual based on the expected time of 
payments where the timing of such payments is uncertain. See infra Appendix C. 
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gent promise to pay $100 and the contingent promise to pay either $0 or 
$42 . The fair market value of the right to receive $100 in two years is 
approximately $83 112 and the fair market value of the right to receive the 
contingent payment is approximately $17. 113 Therefore, the holder of the 
instrument would be treated as if she had paid $83 for the right to receive 
$100 in two years, plus $17 for the right to receive the contingent payment 
of $42. She would then be required to accrue $17 of original issue 
discount with respect to the noncontingent instrument. 
The contingent instrument would be treated as an option with an 
issue price of $17 and a payoff of either $0 or $42. No accrual would be 
required with respect to this option. 114 At maturity, if she received $142, 
she would have an additional $25 of income on the option, and if she 
received $100, she would have a loss of $17. 115 Thus, under the Para-
graph (g) rules some but not all of the expected income is required to be 
accrued. 116 
3. Treatment of Anticipated Deferral Outside the OlD Rules.-In 
the case of financial products not covered by the OlD rules, taxpayers are 
generally not required to accrue expected income because taxation of the 
products is governed by the realization requirement. 117 For example, in 
the case of an option, neither the purchaser nor the seller of the option has 
income prior to the exercise or expiration of the option. 118 This failure 
112. $83 == $1001 (1+.1W. 
113. Assuming that there is an equal probability of receiving either $0 or $42, the future value of 
the right is $21. The present value is approximately $17. 
114. See infra note 118 for a discussion of the treatment of an option. 
115. Her loss would be equal to the amount of her basis allocated to the contingency. 
116. Under the Paragraph (g) rules , she is required to accrue $17 of income. Her expected 
income over the term of the bet is $21. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. 
118. In general, the purchaser of an option to purchase property (a call option) is required to 
capitalize the premium, thus resulting in no items of income or deduction from the initial purchase of 
the option. The purchaser is not required to accrue any income, nor is she permitted to accrue any 
deductions while she holds the option. If the option expires worthless, she is permitted a loss at that 
time. If she exercises the option, she recognizes no gain or loss and takes a basis in the property 
purchased equal to the option premium plus the strike price (the price paid above the initial cost of the 
option). The seller of the option treats the initial receipt of a premium as an open transaction. If the 
option is later exercised, the premium, along with the strike price, is treated as part of the saie 
proceeds. If the option expires unexercised, the premium is taken into income at that time. See 
Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T .A. 195 (ruling that payments received under 
a call option, which were to be applied to the purchase price if the option were exercised and retained 
if the option were not, should be considered income in the year in which the option was surrendered), 
a.ff'd, 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939). 
Similarly, the premium paid by the purchaser of an option to sell property (a put option) is 
a nondeductible capital expense. If the put expires worthless, the payor is permitted a loss at that time. 
If the put is exercised, the premium is subtracted from the amount realized from the sale of the 
underlying property. The writer of the put does not include the premium received in income at the time 
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to accme expected income occurs even in the context of debt instruments 
(e.g., market discoune 19 and discount on short-term obligations12l) and 
debt equivalents (e.g., deferred annuities 121 ). 
4. Alternatives to Accruing Expected Income. -Although 
substantial deferral is permitted due to the general failure of the tax system 
to accme anticipated deferral, there are a variety of provisions that limit 
taxpayers' ability to exploit this failure. 122 Many of these provisions 
operate by deferring interest deductions as a means of indirectly imputing 
income. 123 The principal provtston along these lines is section 
163( d). 124 Section 163 (d) I imits the deduction of investment interest to 
net investment income. Thus, for example, if a taxpayer makes a single 
debt-financed acquisition of an investment asset, the interest on the 
indebtedness will only be deductible to the extent that income is recognized 
with respect to that asset. 
of receipt. If the put expires, the premium is taken into income at such time. If the put is exercised, 
the premium reduces the writer's basis in the property purchased. See Rev. Rul. 78-!82, 1978-1 C.B. 
265 (stating that the cost of a put option is a nondeductible capital expense); Rev. Rui. 58-234, 1958-1 
C.B. 279 (stating that the amount paid by the issuer for granting a put option that is not exercised 
constitutes ordinary income for the taxable year in which failure to exercise the put becomes final). 
BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 2 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND G!FT.S § § 
40.8.3, 41.2.3, 51.8 (2d ed. 1990). 
119. I.R .C. §§ 1276-1278 (1988) . In general, the market discount tax accrues market discount 
as interest, but only upon disposition or repayment (including partial repayments). /d. § 1276. 
120. See id. §§ 1281-1283 (stating that discount on short-term obligations must be currently 
accrued only in the case of specified taxpayers). 
121. !d. § 72. A deferred annuity is an annuity for which the tirst payment is deferred to some 
future date. See supra note 76 for discussion of taxing mortality risk in life annuities. 
122. See Halperin, supra note 68, at 523-24 (discussing the use of indirect and substitute taxation 
in place of direct taxation of deferral); see also Thomas L. Evans, TI1e Evolution of Federal Income 
Tax Accounting-A Grov.-ing Trend Towards Mark-to-Market, 67 TAXES 824, 827-28 (1989) (explaining 
how the interest capitalization rules in I.R.C. § 263A(f) serve to impute a return to equity and thereby 
limit deferral). 
123. In its simplest form, consider an investment that yields $10 of deferred income in the taxable 
year. Deferring a $10 deduction is roughly equivalent to taxing the income currently. In theory, it 
makes no difference what deduction is disallowed. The advantage of choosing the interest deducti on 
is that, if properly defined, the amount of the associated interest deduction is correlated with the amount 
of the deferred income. Cf. Evans, supra note 122, at 825-33 (discussing the use of I.R.C. § 263A(f) 
as a proxy for accruing income on self-constructed assets). 
In the case of individuals, the equivalence between including one dollar in income and 
denying one dollar of deduction is exact only in the case of deductions permitted in computing adjusted 
gross income (generally trade or business deductions). See I.R.C. § 62 (1988). In the case of other 
deductions, including deductions for investment interest, disallowing one dollar of deduction will 
generally be less onerous than including one dollar of income because of a variety of provisions that 
have the effect of imposing additional tax liability based on adjusted gross income. See, e.g., id . § 67 
(requiring a two percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions); id. § 68 (Supp . II 1990) 
(requiring a phase-out of itemized deductions); id. § 151(d)(3) (requiring a phase-out of personal 
exemptions); id. § 469(i) (1988) (requiring a phase-out of passive activity losses). 
124. I.R.C. § 163(d) (1988). 
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As an alternative to accruing income on investments, section 163(d) 
has a number of weaknesses. 125 First, it operates on an aggregate, not 
on an asset-by-asset or a transaction-by-transaction basis. As a result , 
interest expense properly allocable to one investment may be used against 
income from a second investment. 126 Second, section 163 (d) operates 
only when investments are debt-financed; investments financed out of 
equity are not affected. Third, section 163(d) requires allocating interest 
expense to investments before the interest expense can be subject to 
disallowance. 127 The regulations under section 163(d) provide for 
allocating interest expense according to use of the debt proceeds determined 
under a tracing approach. 128 The allocation rul es are administratively 
complex and easily circumvented. 129 Fourth, section 163(d) applies only 
to individuals. 130 Fifth, the provision is overly broad because it disallows 
interest expense in the case of a real economic loss. 131 Finally, section 
163(d) is overly narrow in that it operates by stacking interest expense first 
against realized income. For example, assume that a taxpayer with no 
other investments or debt has the opportunity to finance the acquisition of 
125. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, § !63(d) was substantially weaker, permitting the 
deduction of up to $10,000 in investment interest expense over and above the amount of investment 
income. J.R.C. § 163(d)(l)(A)-(B) (1985), amended by J.R .C. § !63 (d)(1) (1988). 
126. Consider the following example. Rigel borrows $2000 at 10% and uses the proceeds to 
purchase two assets for $1000 each. The first asset is expected to appreciate by 10% per year, but to 
pay no current income. The second asset is expected to pay 10 % current income. 
Assuming that both assets perform as expected.§ 163 (d) works properly. Rigel has gross 
economic income in the first year of $200, $100 from each asset, and interest expense of $200. Her 
net economic income is, therefore, zero. Absent§ 163(d) , however, her gross taxable income would 
be only $100 (from the current asset), and her taxable income would be -$100. Under§ 163(d), her 
$200 of investment interest would only be allowed to the extent of investment income, or $100, and 
her taxable income would be zero. 
If, however, the current asset performs better than expected, § i63(d) does not work 
properly. For example, assume that the current asset generates income of $200 in the first year. Rigel 
now has investment income at least equal to her investment interest and § 163(d) would not act to 
disallow any of the investment interest. In other words, the income from the current asset is being used 
to offset the interest expense of the deferred asset. 
Additionally, § 163(d) does not work properiy if the deferred asset performs bette~ than 
expected. Assume the deferred asset grows at 20% per year. In that case, Rigel would have economic 
income of $100 ($200 + $100 - $200) and taxable income of zero. 
127. J.R.C. § 163 (d)(3)(A) (1988). 
128. See Temp. Tress. Reg.§ 1.163-8T(l987). 
129. See Section of Taxation, American Bar Ass'n, Commel!ls on Temporary and Proposed 
Regulations on Allocation of Interest Expense Among Expendimres, Tax Notes Today, Jan. 29, 1988 , 
available in LEXIS, FedTax Library, TNT File; Tax Section, New York State Bar Ass'n , Report on 
Proposed Regulations Under Section 163 Dealing with the Allocation of Interest Expense, Tax Notes 
Today, Nov. 30, 1987, available in LEXIS, FedTax Library, TNT File. 
130. J.R.C. § 163(d)(l) (1988) . 
131. For example, assume that the taxpayer makes a debt-financed purchase of stock and has no 
other debt or investments. Assume that the stock pays no dividends and after one year is sold for its 
purchase price and the proceeds are used to retire the debt. Under§ 163 (d), the entire interest expense 
on the debt would be disallowed, despite the fact that there was no deferral of income. 
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an investment with debt. Assume that the interest rate on the debt is ten 
percent and the yield on the investment is twelve percent, of which ten 
percent is paid currently and two percent is deferred. Under these 
circumstances, section 163(d) would not limit the taxpayer's interest 
deduction at all, because the ten percent current interest expense would be 
stacked first against the ten percent current income from the investment and 
would, therefore, be fully deductible. 
Wh ile it is easy to point out the flaws in section 163(d) , it is not so 
easy to suggest remedies. For example, stacking investment interest 
expense first against deferred income would require measuring the amount 
of deferred income. Once deferred income is measured, it is hard to 
justify not taking the additional step of taxing the deferred income on a 
current basis. At that point, however, section 163(d) becomes totally 
unnecessary and should be repealed rather than merely modified. 
In addition to section 163(d), there are a variety of interest deferral 
and disallowance provisions that operate only with respect to certain classes 
of deferred income. For example, section 1277 defers the deduction of 
certain interest payments on obligations incurred or continued to purchase 
or carry market discount bonds. 132 The principal weakness in such 
provisions is the difficulty of allocating interest to particular investments. 
As a result, such provisions tend to have limited application, serving 
mostly to prevent the marketing of tax shelters. 133 
5. Restrictions on the Timing Option.-There are a variety of 
provisions in the tax law that restrict taxpayers' ability to take advantage 
of the timing option by deferring or disallowing losses or other deductions. 
These provisions include, among others, the capital loss limitation/34 the 
132. I .R .C. § 1277 (1988). Other examples include§ 1282, which requires the deferral of interest 
expense allocable to short-term debt instruments with acquisition discount, and § 264(a)(2), which 
denies an interest deduction with respect to indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry a 
single-premium life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract. See id. § 1282; id. § 264(a)(2). 
Section 1282 responds to the iimited scope of§ 128 i, which requires current accrual of acquisition 
discount only by certain taxpayers. /d . § 1282 . Section 264(a)(2) responds to the failure to currently 
tax income from annuity and insurance contracts. /d. § 264(a)(2); see supra note 76 (describing the 
taxati on of annuities under § 72). 
133. Such provisions share other weaknesses associated with § 163(d). For example, they have 
no effect where the investment is financed out of equity. See, e.g., I.R.C . § 1277 (1988) (requiring 
deferral of interest deduction allocable to accrued market discount); id . § 1282 (requiring deferral of 
interest deduction allocable to accrued discount on short-term obligations). These provisions also 
permit interest expense to be allocated against current income and thereby deducted before deferred 
income. While this aspect is probably necessary in the case of§ 163(d) because of the difficulty in 
measuring the deferred income, it is harder to justifY in the case of§ 1277 and § 1282 because the 
amount of defetTed income is presumed to be known. 
134. !.R.C. §§ 12 11-1212 (1988). 
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wash sale rules, 135 restrictions on losses on sales to related parties, 136 
and the requirement of economic performance. 137 
The principal limitation on the timing option is the capital loss 
limitation, which generally limits the deductibility of capital losses to the 
amount of realized capital gains. 138 The capital loss limitation serves as 
a broad overall constraint on taxpayers' ability to utilize the timing option . 
The limitation is , hmvever, both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is 
ovcrinclusive because it does not permit taxpayers to utilize losses whose 
timing has not been affected by the timing option. 139 The limitation is 
underinclusive because, if the taxpayer has other capital gains, it permits 
those gains to offset accelerated losses. 140 
Another major weakness of the capital loss limitation is that it is 
limited to losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets. 141 This 
restriction causes two problems. First, it relies on the existence of a sale 
or exchange, leaving open L1e possibility that taxpayers will claim that the 
loss has been realized without such a sale or exchange, such as through the 
extinguishment of a contract. 142 More importantly, the capital loss 
135. !d. § 1091. 
136. !d.§ 267. 
137. !d.§ 461(h). 
138. See Strnad, supra note 6, at 1886 (describing the capital loss limitation as a restriction on the 
timing option). In the case of a corporation, § 1211 (a) allows capital losses only to the extent of capital 
gains. !d. § 121l(a). Section 1212(a) permits a three-year carryback and a five-year carryforward of 
unused losses. !d. § 1212(a). In the case of noncorporate taxpayers, § 1211 (b) permits up to $3,000 
in capital losses over and above the amount of capital gains. !d. § 12ll(b). Section 1212(b) permits 
an unlimited carryforward of unused losses. !d. § 1212(b). For a discussion of the importance of the 
capital loss limitation to the overall integrity of the tax code, see Stiglitz, Some Aspects, supra note 37, 
at 268-70; Stiglitz, The General I7zeory, supra note 37, at 326-29 (both describing various tax 
avoidance schemes and noting that the capital loss limitation restricts a taxpayer's ability to implement 
these strategies). 
139. Consider, for example, the purchase of a six-month cash-settlement option to purchase gold 
that expires worthless at the end of the period. Since any gain on the option would have to be 
recognized no later than the end of the six-month period, the taxpayer is not benefiting from the timing 
option if he is permitted to recognize the loss at the expiration of the option. Of course, if he sells the 
option at a loss prior to the end of the six months, it would be reasonable to defer his loss until the end 
of the option period. At that point, concern over the timing option does not justifY further deferral of 
his loss. Strnad, for example, suggests limiting the capital loss limitation to assets that may be held 
for long periods of time. Strnad, supra note 6, at 1888. 
140. See id. (arguing that low-risk assets will produce capital gains that can be used to offset 
capital losses on high-risk assets); see also Michael C. Durst, Inflation and the Tax Code: Guidelines 
for PolicymaJ..."ing, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1217, 1228 n.24 (1989) (noting that § 1211 and § 1212 "do not 
wholly eliminate the advantages that taxpayers can enjoy by pursuing a policy of realizing losses 
currently but deferring gains indefinitely"). 
141. I.R.C. § 1211 (1988). 
142. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. U.S., 306 U.S. 436 (1939) (holding that redemption of corporate 
bonds is not a sale or exchange); Commissioner v. Starr Bros., 204 F .2d 673, 674 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(holding that a manufacturer's payment to a dealer in exchange for extinguishment of their exclusive 
agency contract was not a sale or exchange of a good); Rev. Rul. 56-531, I 956-2 C. B. 983 (stating that 
the relinquishment of simple contract rights and the release of certain leasehold interests in real property 
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limitation relies on the definition of a cap ital asset . Unfortunately, the 
definition of "capital asset" is fo rced to serve two different functions. 
F irst, it delineates those gains and losses netted for capi tal loss limitation 
pu rposes .143 Second , it identifies those assets potentially eligible for 
favo rab le capital gains taxat ion . 144 Tnis need to serve two distinct 
purposes has made the search for a capital gains definition much more 
difficult and the realization of an ultimately satisfactory so lution unlike-
ly.l 45 
Wh ii e the capital loss limitation deal s with the timing option with 
a broad brush, a number of other provisions deal with more specific abuses 
of the timing option. One such type of abuse occurs when the taxpayer has 
disposed of the property as a legal matter, but maintains an economic 
interest in the property. For example, section 267 generally disallows any 
deduction for losses from the sale or exchange of property between related 
persons. 146 One justification for this provision is that there has been an 
insufficient di sposition of the property. Whil e the taxpayer has divested 
herself of legal ownership, she is presumed to still have equitable 
ownership-or at least control-of the property. 147 Similarly, the wash 
const itute proceeds from the sale of a capital asset and are not o rdinary income); Rev. Rul. 58-394, 
1958-2 C.B . 374 (stating that the sale of a partnership interest organized for managing an insurance 
compa ny constitutes the sale of a capital asset). In the case of certain contracts, I.R.C. § 1234A (1988) 
prov ides that an extinguishment shall be treated as a sale. 
143. See I.R.C. § 1211 (1988); see also Strnad, supra note 6, at 1888 (discussing the definition 
of "capital asset"). 
144. For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1990, in the case of an individual taxpayer, 
capital gains are nominally taxed at a maximum rate of 28%, see l.R.C . § I (h) (1988), while ordinary 
income is nominally ta xed at a maximum rate of 31 %, .>ee id. § I (a)-(d). The effective tax rates on 
both fonns of income may be considerably greater due primarily to the phase-out of itemized 
deductions and personal exemptions. !d. §§ 68 , 151 (d)(3). Prior to 1987, individuals were entitled 
to a deduction for 60% of their net long-term cap ital ga in. !d. § 1202, repealed by T ax Refo rm Act 
of 1986, § 301(a), Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stal. 2085, 2216 (1986). Thu s, for example, fo r a 
taxpayer in fl 50% bracket, the ra te on capital gair:s was only 20% (20% = (1 - .60) X .50). 
145. Compare Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commi ssione r, 485 U.S. 2 12,214 (1988) (finding agai nst 
a taxpayer who sought to deduct proceeds on the sale of subsidiary stock as ordinary rather than capital 
loss) with Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S . 46, 48-49 (1955) (finding against a 
taxpayer who sought to treat its hedging gains from corn futures as capital, rather than ord inary , gains). 
146. Section 267(b) defines the necessary sets of relationships, which includ e both familiai (e .g. , 
mother-daughter) and economic (individuals and contro lled entities). l.R .C. § 267(b) (1988). 
147. See , e.g., McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1947) (noting that such 
transactions often occur at times wh en ~he real party in interest can reduce her tax liability while 
allowing her to keep substantial control of the assets being traded or exchanged). Of course , the 
assumption of beneficial ownership or control may be wrong with respect to ar.y particular transaction. 
The fact that the provision operates on an irrebuttable presumption can be justified by administrative 
considerations and valuation concerns. See Wyly v. United States , 662 F .2d 397, 402 (5 th Cir. Nov . 
1981) (recognizing that § 267 takes a "blanket approach reliev[ing] the taxing authorities of many 
comp licated and melio ristic decisions in family tra nsactions" and noting that the ease of administration 
or simplicity "can be a va lid cong ress ional rationale for banning transac tions of this type" (ci ting 
Merritt v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 417,421 (5 th Cir. 1968))). In related party sales there is a well-
founded fear that the sale wi ll not be at fn ir m~rket value . The refu sal to permit a loss takes the 
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sale rules limit the ability of taxpayers to take losses while maintaining an 
interest in the same or similar property. 148 As with disallowance of 
losses on sales to related parties, the wash sale rules can be justified on the 
basis of a concern for the substance over the form of the transaction. In 
a wash sale, the taxpayer has not, in substance, disposed of the property. 
Therefore, no realization event sufficient to trigger a loss has occurred. 149 
Section 461 (h) provides yet another limitation on a taxpayer's 
ability to take advantage of the timing option. In general, under the 
accrual method of accounting, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct an expense 
when all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability 
giving rise to such deduction and the amount thereof can be determi ned 
with reasonable accuracy. 150 Thus, for example, if the loser of the bet 
described in Example 2N51 employs an accrual method of accounting, 
she would be permitted to deduct the loss for the taxable year in which the 
coin is tossed, rather than having to wait for the year of payment. 152 
Moreover, she would be permitted to take the deduction without regard to 
a realization event. 153 
pressure off monitoring such transactions. 
148. In general, § 1091, the wash sale provision, disallows the loss from the sale or other 
disposition of stock or securities if within 30 days before or after the date of such disposition the 
taxpayer acquires, or enters into a contract or option to so acquire, substantially identical stock o r 
securities. See I.R.C . § 1091 (1988). 
149. One significant difference between the related party and the wash sale rules is that in the 
former, the loss may be permanently disallowed, while in the latter, the loss is merely deferred. 
Compare I.R.C. § 267(d) (1988) (reducing future gain, but not increasing future loss, by the amount 
of any disallowed loss from a related party transaction) with id. § 109l(d) (stating that the basi s of 
property subject to the wash sale rules is increased or decreased by the difference between the price 
at which the property was acquired and the price at which substantially identical property was sold). 
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(2) (as amended in 1967). This determination is made under the 
rubric of the "all events test." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1987). 
!51. See supra text accompanying note 28 . 
!52. The amount of the deduction would be the iace amount of the liability ($21 ), not its present 
value (approximately $17). 
!53. Cf. Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F .2d 400, 406, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(disallowing a deduction for a future expense that meets the all events test on the ground that permitting 
the deduction would not clearly reflect income within the meaning of I.R.C. § 446(b)). The flip side 
of the rules for accruing deductions are the rules for accruing income . Under Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
1 (c)(l)(ii), "income is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred which fix 
the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. " 
Treas. Reg.§ 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1987). 
Because the accrual rules require the face amount, rather than the present value, of an item 
of income or expense to be accrued , the accrual rules can have the effect of accelerating income and 
expense. The principal opportunity for abuse comes from taxpayers ' ability to organize their affairs 
so that items of deduction will tend to be accrued prior to items of income. See generally Mooney 
Aircraft, 420 F.2d at 410; Daniel I. Halperin & William A. Klein, Tax Accouming for Fwure 
Obligations: Basic Principles Revised, 38 TAX NOTES 831, 832 (Feb. 22, 1988); William A. Klein, 
Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Basic Principles, 36 TAX NOTES 623, 627-28 (Aug. I 0, 1987); 
Halperin, supra note 68, at 525-34 . 
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Section 461 (h), however, adds the requirement of "economic 
performance" to the all events test. Under the regulations, if the liab ility 
of a taxpayer is to provide, inter alia, an award, prize, jackpot , or other 
similar payment to another person, economic performance occurs as 
payment is made to the person to whom the liability is owed. 15-l Thus, 
under section 461 (h) the loss would not be deductib le prior to the end of 
the two-year period of the bet even if the loser were to pay a third party 
to take over the liability. 155 
The latest weapon in the Internal Revenue Service's arsenal of 
devices des igned to combat the timing option is the treatment of termina-
tion payments under the proposed notional principal contract regula-
tions.156 A party wishing to terminate a notional principal contract has 
two choices. She can negotiate with her counterparty for a termination, or 
she can assign her rights and obligations under the contract to a third party. 
Where the two parties to a notional principal contract agree to terminate the 
contract in exchange for a termination payment by one party to the other, 
the proposed regulations provide the unremarkable rule that the termination 
payment is recognized by both parties in the year of termination . 157 The 
rule is , of course, merely a restatement of the realization requirement. 158 
The more remarkable rule is the one dealing with an assignment. 
If a party to a notional principal contract assigns her contract to a third 
party in exchange for a termination payment (in either direction), the 
termination payment must be recognized by both of the original parties in 
the year of payment. 159 Therefore, the assigning party is unable to 
Section 46J(h), described below , is one of the responses to this problem. See I.R.C . 
§ 461 (h) (1988). Other responses include: id. § 467 (providing special rules to account for rent under 
certain leases); id. § 468 (creating special rules for mining and solid waste reclamation and closing 
costs) ; id. § 468A (creating special rules for nu clear decommissioning costs) ; id. § 468B (creating 
sp ecial rules for designated settlement funds). 
!54_ Treas . Reg.§ L461-4(g)(4) (1992). 
!55. Note that § 46J(h) creates an asymmetry in the opposite direction from that generally 
provided by the timing option. In particular, § 46J(h) modifies the all events test for deductions, but 
not for inclusion of income. Thu s, income must still be accrued without rega rd to economic 
performance. This sort of one-sided approach often comes back to haunt the Treasury. See Ginsburg , 
supra note 38 (describing how "every stick crafted to beat on the head of a taxpayer wi!I, sooner or 
later, metamorphose into a large green snake and bite the Commissioner on the hind part"); see also 
supra note 38 (enlarging on the argument)_ 
!56_ See Prop. Treas. Reg. § L446-3 (e)(6) , 56 Fed_ Reg . 31350,3 1360 (!99! ). 
157. See id_ § L446-3 (e)(6)(ii), 56 Fed . Reg. 3!350, 31360 (1 99!) (discussing the treatment of 
termination payments); id. § 1.446-3 (e)(6)(i), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31360 (1991 ) (defining termination 
payment). 
!58_ Note that the rule chosen was not the only possible rule. Putting as ide the question of 
authority, the Treasury could have chosen a rule under which the termination payment would have been 
recognized over the remaining life of the contract. The latter rule would have eliminated the timing 
op tion by making income recognition independent of the action of the parties. 
159. Prop. Treas . Reg.§ !.446-3(e)(6) (i i), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 3!360 (1 991). The third party 
treats the termination payment as a nonperiodic payment under the contract. fd_ § !.446-3(e)(6)(iii), 
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recognize a loss without triggering gain recognition by her counterparty. 
If both parties face the same tax rate on gains and losses from the contract, 
the timing option effectively disappears. 160 
B. Restrictions on Tax Straddles 
Given well-developed markets, straddles represent one of the most 
serious threats to the integrity of a realization-based system. 161 The 
primary responses to the problem of straddles were the enactment of the 
straddle rules 162 and the mark-to--market ru!es. 163 
As discussed above , a straddle consists of two positions whose 
values are expected to change in equal but opposite amounts. 164 For 
example, a straddle can be created by simultaneously entering into a 
forward contract to buy gold at $400 per ounce and a forward contract to 
sell gold at $400 per ounce with the same maturity. As long as the price 
of gold either rises or falls, one of the positions will fall in value and the 
other will rise. The loss position can then be disposed of in .the current tax 
year while the gain position can be held and disposed of in a future tax 
year. 165 The straddle rules attack straddle transactions by deferring 
recognition of any realized loss on the straddle to the exten~ of any 
unrecognized gain. 166 
The straddle rules are, of course, unnecessary to the extent that the 
loss would be a capital loss actually restricted by the capital loss limita-
tion.167 By deferring losses if and only if there is unrecognized gain, the 
straddle rules represent a more precise and effective approach to straddles 
than does the capital loss limitation. This precision, however, necessarily 
comes at the expense of administrative complexity. The operation of the 
capital loss limitation requires looking only at recognized gains and losses. 
The straddle rules, on the other hand, require the identification of a 
56 Fed. Reg. 31350,31360 (1991). 
160. Of course, if the counterparty is tax-exempt, neither termination rule works to restrict the 
timing option. Similarly, if the counterparty has elected to be taxed under a mark-to-market approach, 
the timing option remains available. See id. § 1.446-4(a), 56 Fed. Reg. 31361 (1991) (detailing criteria 
for mark-to-market election); see also infra note 223 (describing the value of the timing option when 
one party is indifferent to the occurrence of a realization event). 
161. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the billions of dollars lost by the 
Treasury due to the costs of tax straddles). 
162. I.R .C. § 1092 (1988). 
163. !d. § 1256. 
164. See supra subpart III(C). 
165. Once the loss position is disposed of, the straddle is, of course, destroyed , and the taxpayer 
is subject to real gains and losses on the remaining pos:t ion. The taxpayer cJ.tn, however, protect 
against such losses by entering into a new offsetting positi on. 
166. I.R.C. § 1092(a)(l)(A) (1988). 
167. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
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specific straddle and measurement of the amount of unrecognized gam m 
the remaining leg of the straddle.168 
While the straddle rules are an effective means of I imiting the 
timing option in the case of straddles , it should be emphasized again that 
the timing option exists whether or not there is a straddle. The essence of 
the straddle probiem is the ability to take advantage of the timing option 
without the assumption of economic risk. 169 If the taxpayer is willing to 
assume risk , the opportunity to take advantage of the timing option 
remains . For example, consider a taxpayer who invests in a diversified 
portfolio of risky assets, the returns on which are not perfectly cor-
related. 170 It would seem clear that the portfolio is not a straddle within 
the meaning of section 1092. 171 Any other result would have the effect 
of substantially broadening the straddle rules beyond their intended scope. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the taxpayer expects, with a substantial degree 
168. See l.R.C. § 1092(a) (1988) (setting out the definition of "unrecognized gain" to be used to 
offset the loss leg of the straddle). The measurement of unrecognized gain implicitly requires marking 
the unrecognized leg to market. Thus, the straddle rules can be viewed as a partial mark-to-market 
rule. Under the straddle rules, gain on unrecognized legs is marked to market to the extent of 
recognized loss on the loss leg. This need to value the unrecognized leg of a straddle provides one 
justification for limiting the straddle rules to property for which there are active markets. In addition, 
an effective tax straddle requires the ability to dispose of the loss leg with relatively low transaction 
costs, which provides another justification for limiting the scope of the straddle rules to property for 
which there are active markets. The actual limitation in the statute is to "property of a type which is 
actively traded." /d. § !092(d)(l). The term "actively traded" has been interpreted so as not to 
require conventional markets. See Prop. Tress. Reg. §§ 1.1092(d)-1(b) to (c), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 
31361-62 (1991) (stating that a f!Otional principal contract is actively traded property if it is similar to 
contracts with respect to which dealers, brokers, or traders regularly disseminate price quotations). 
! 69 . For purposes of§ J 092, a straddle requires the reduction, but not the elimination, of all risk. 
Section 1092 detines a straddle as offsetting positions with respect to personal property. I.R.C. 
§ 1092(c)(l) (1988). Under§ 1092(c)(2), a taxpayer holds offsetting positions with respect to personal 
property if there is a substantial diminution of the taxpayer's risk of loss from any position by reason 
of his holding one or more other positions. /d. § 1092(c)(2). 
Section 1092(c)(3) identifies a number of indicia of straddle transactions, any one of which 
establish a rebuttable presumption that a straddle exists. The indicia include: (I) the positions are in 
the same property (whether or not in a substantially altered form); (2) the positions are in debt 
instruments of a similar maturity; (3) the positions are sold or marketed as offsetting positions; and (4) 
the aggregate margin requirement for such positions is lower than the sum of the margin requirements 
for each such position if held separately. ld. § I 092(c)(3). Section I 092(c)(3)(vi) provides authority 
for the Treasury to issut! regulations establishing additional subjective or objective presumptions. 
170. Diversification can potentially eliminate unsystematic risk. Diversification will not reduce 
market risk. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 137. 
171. The Joint Committee explanation of the straddle provisions noted that: 
Although the concept of offsetting positions is not narrowly defined in the statute, 
certain cases fall outside its scope. For example, risk reduction through mere 
diversification usually would not be considered to substantially diminish risk for 
purposes of this Act , if the positions are not balanced. Thus a taxpayer holding 
several types of securities but holding no short positions generally would not be 
considered to be holding offsetting positions. 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 64, at 288 . Presumably the modifiers "usually" 
and "generally" were added out of an abundance of caution. 
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of certainty, that he will have both winners and losers in his portfolio and 
thus will be able to take losses currently while deferring gains. 
It is only where the taxpayer has but a single investment, or a 
portfolio of perfectly correlated investments , that there is no straddle 
opportunity. 172 Nevertheless, even in these 1 imited ci rcumstances , the 
timing option remains. In general, as long as the investment is risky in the 
sense that there is a chance of either a gain or a loss, the timing option 
exists and increases the expected return from the investment. 
C. Comprehensive Solutions-Section 1256 
The ultimate solution to the straddle problem as well as all of the 
other problems discussed above is the adoption of full accrual, or mark-to-
market accounting. 173 Congress has been willing to adopt such a 
solution, but only for certain transactions involving limited classes of 
assets. In particular, section 1256 provides that certain contracts not used 
as part of an identified hedging transaction are marked to market at the 
dose of each taxable year. 174 Accordingly, the holder of such a contract 
is taxed on any gain or loss without regard to any realization requirement. 
Section 1256 contracts include regulated futures contracts, certain foreign 
currency contracts, nonequity options, and dealer equity options. 175 As 
discussed above, marking the contracts to market solves the problem of 
deferral in all of its manifestations by taxing gains and losses as they occur, 
rather than waiting for a realization event. 176 Consequently, the treat-
172. This might arise, for example, when most of an individual's net worth is in the form of 
ownership of a closely held corporation or similar real estate within a particular geographical area. 
173. The one problem that marking to market fails to deal with is inflation. In fact, by removing 
the benefit of deferral , it has the tendency to exacerbate the effect of inflation . On the other hand, an 
indexation scheme is probably easier to administer in a full accrual system than in a realization system, 
because there is no need to track the effect of inflation over long periods of time. Note also that the 
adoption of mark-to-market accounting could be used to pay for the adoption of indexation. See supra 
note 20; Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Federal Income Tax 18 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with Texas Law Review). 
174. I.R.C. § 1256(a)(l) (1988). 
175. !d. § 1256(b)(1)-(4). As first enacted in 1981, § 1256 applied only to regulated futures 
contracts. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub . L. No. 97-34, § 503(b), 95 Stat. 172, 328 
(1981) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1256 (1988)). Section 1256 was expanded in 1982 to include 
certain foreign currency contracts and in 1984 to include nonequity options and dealer equity options. 
Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 105(c)(5)(B), 96 Stat. 2365,2386 (1982); 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No . 98-369, § 102(a)(2), 98 Stat. 494, 620 (1984) (codified 
as amended at I.R.C . § 1256 (1988)). 
176. It is interesting to note that although mark-to-market rules have been adopted for certain 
financial instruments, Congress has not necessarily taken the additional step of removing th e capital loss 
limitation . This can perhaps be explained, at least in part , by revenue considerations. Compare I.R .C . 
§ l256(a)(3) (1988) (treating mark-to-market gain or loss as 60 % long-term capital gain or loss and 
40% short-term capital gain or loss) with proposed I.R.C. § 475(d)(3), H .R. I i , supra note 9 (treating 
mark-to-market gain or loss as ordinary income or loss), and proposed l.R .C. § 129l (c) , H.R . 11 , 
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ment of section 1256 contracts comes closest to meeting the ideal of the 
Haig-Simons definition of income. 
D. A Summary of Current Law Modifications to the Realization 
Requirement 
A pure realization system presents unacceptable opportunities for 
deferral and use of the timing option. The tax law has responded using a 
variety of approaches. The most comprehensive approach is, of course, 
the total abandonment of the realization system and the adoption of mark-
to-market accounting . Less radical approaches can be divided into two 
classes. The first class operates by attempting to accelerate the accrual of 
income. Sometimes the acceleration of income is done directly, such as 
through mandatory accrual. At other times the acceleration of income is 
indirect, such as through the disallowance of an interest deduction. A 
second class of half-way measures operate by deferring loss, thus limiting 
the value of the timing option. 177 Absent significant broadening of mark-
to-market taxation, the tax laws will inevitably remain a potpourri of 
seemingly ad hoc regulations designed to limit the consequences of the 
realization doctrine. 
V. Proposed Uniform Rules to Tax Financial Instruments 
As shown in Part IV, a pure realization tax system suffers to an 
unacceptable extent from deferral and its related problems. Existing 
attempts to deal with the problems of deferral are inconsistent and 
uncertain. They rely to a great extent on categorizing instruments178 
supra note 9 (treating mark-to-market gain as ordinary income, but treating mark-to-market loss as 
ordinary loss only to the extent of previously included gains). 
177 . Another approach, not discussed in this Article, involves permitting the deferral of gain, but 
imposing an interest charge on the deferral. Current provisions that take this approach include I.R.C. 
§ 453A (1988) (charging interest on deferred tax liability from certain nondealer installment sales) and 
id. § 1291 (charging interest on deferral relating to passive foreign investment companies). For a 
criticism of§ 453A, see Evans, supra note 122, at 842-43 & n.165 (criticizing § 453A because it 
allows taxpayers to elect whether to treat the government as a lender, which the taxpayer will only do 
if the government interest rates are lower than prevailing market rates). The use of an interest charge 
to compensate for the effect of deferral has been recommended by a number of commentators. See, 
e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167, 169 (1991) 
(proposing eliminating the incentive to defer capital gains by effectively charging interest on past gains 
when realized); Fellows, supra note 140, at 737-38 (proposing that tax liability be retroactively 
calculated for each period between the purchase of an asset and its realization event, and then adjusted 
for the time delay of the payment); Cynthia Blum, New Role for the Treasury: Charging Interest on 
Tax Deferral Loans, 25 HARV. I. ON LEGIS. 1, 6 (1988) (evaluating "using an interest charge to 
compensate for delay in income reporting") . 
178 . The categorization takes many different forms. For example, the timing rules often depend 
on whether an instrument is a debt instrument, an option, an annuity, a forward contract, or a notional 
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rather than looking at the underlying economics of the transaction to 
determine the timing of the income from the transaction. 179 
The solution is, of course, full accrual of gains and losses. Such 
an approach would solve both the direct and indirect problems of deferral. 
Most, if not all, of the provisions of the tax law described in Part IV wouid 
become unnecessary. Nevertheless, as discussed above, I assume that such 
an approach will not be adopted .180 The task, therefore, is to develop 
approaches that minimize the problems caused by realization-based 
accounting without adding significant additional problems. 
A. Expected Value Transaction 
The first step is to minimize the availability of anticipated deferral. 
The solution is , of course, to accrue expected income. Merely accruing 
expected income, however, does not deal with the timing option. 181 In 
order to limit the timing option, it is necessary to make certain that the 
income accrued at any point in time is as close as possible to the actual 
income from the instrument, not merely the expected income. This 
principal product. Different timing rules are provided for capital and ordinary income. The 
deductibility of payments depends on whether the payment is characterized as interest or as other 
ordinary income. 
179. Obviously, the tax law has already made significant steps in this direction. For example, the 
original issue discount rules for noncontingent instruments determine the timing of income based on 
the timing of payments, without regard to their characterization as interest or principal. Prop. Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.1272-1,51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12049 (1986). Section 467 attempts to apply similar rules to 
leases. See I.R.C. § 467 (1988) (providing that deferred rent shall be currently accrued based on 
present value concepts and imputing interest on such deferred rents). 
180. More precisely, I assume that the tax law will proceed slowly to embrace more mark-to-
market taxation, but that in the meantime, there will be continued need for the development of rules 
to deal with financial instruments not taxed on such a basis. See supra note 9 (discussing recent 
attempts to expand mark-to-market taxation). 
181. The timing option applies only where there is unanticipated deferral. See supra notes 44-45 
and accompanying text. Paradoxically, accruing expected income can actually make the timing option 
more, not less, valuable. Consider the zero-coupon bond in Example 1 where Diva pays David $100 
today in exchange for $121 in two years. The expected value of the bond in one year is approximately 
$110, and, therefore, under an expected value approach, Diva would have to accrue $10 in income over 
the first year. (This assumes a constant yield.) Diva would then have a basis in the bond of $110. 
Assume, however, that interest rates have increased to 15%. The value of the bond after one year 
would then be only $105.22. Diva would, therefore, have an incentive to dispose of the bond and 
recognize her loss of $4.78. On the other hand, if interest rates had fallen to 5%, the bond would be 
worth $115.24, a gain of $5.24 that Diva would be able to defer. 
Consider, by contrast, the treatment of Diva if her expected income was not taxed. In that 
case, her basis in the bond at the end of the first year would still be $100, her cost. The expected 
vaiue of her bond as of the end of the first year would be $110. Therefore, assuming that rates did 
not change, she would have a deferred gain of $10. If, however, interest rates rose to 15%, her bond 
would be worth $105.22 and she would still have a gain, albeit a smaller gain, that she would be able 
to defer. It would not be until interest rates rose over 21% that she would have an actual loss. Thus, 
within a broad range of interest rates (0 to 21 %), the failure to accrue expected income deprives Diva 
of her timing option. 
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requires having realization events occur as frequently as possible. 182 In 
order to have realization events occur as frequently as possible, without 
requ iring revaluation of the instruments, and to accrue expected income as 
closely as possible, I suggest the following rules: 
1. instruments should initially be split into separate co mponents 
each with a single contingency; 183 
2. income should be accrued with respect to each separate com-
ponent according to that component's expected future value deter-
mined as of the time the transaction is entered into; and 
3. gain or loss should be recognized whenever a contingency is 
resolved. 
I refer to this approach as "expected value taxation. " In Part VI, expected 
value taxation is further developed using a series of examples concerning 
wagers. Before doing so, however, it is worthwhile to make several 
points. 
First, the discussion in this Article is intended to deal only with the 
timing issues inherent in complex financial instruments. It is not intended 
to deal with questions of character or source. By using the term "charac-
ter " in this context I mean not only the question of ordinary income versus 
capital gains, but also any other consequence that flows from the peculiar 
nature of income. 184 For example, whether income or expense is 
characterized as interest or as some other form of ordinary income or ex-
pense can be extremely important. 185 
Second, this Article is not intended to provide a set of rules that can 
be immediately and simply applied to all financial products. Rather, it is 
intended to provide a uniform benchmark against which other rules can be 
tested. The expected value approach is to be contrasted with the frequently 
employed approach that I will call the "multiple paradigm" approach. 
Under the multiple paradigm approach, there are a variety of different 
approaches used in a variety of contexts. 186 Every time a new financial 
182 . In the extreme this policy would , of course, require full accrual accounting, a step that has 
already been ruled out. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (assuming full accrual will not be 
used because of administrative complexities). 
183 . See infra subpart V(A) for a further discussion of the issue of bifurcation of financial 
instruments . 
184. In some ways it is impossible to separate questions of character from questions of timing. 
For example, the most fundamental character di stinction in the Code is the distinction between ordinary 
income and capital gain. At the same time, one of the most fundamental timing rules in the Code is 
the capital loss limitation, which is obviously tied to the character of the income. Nevertheless, I th ink 
it is important to separate, at least at the theoretical level, questions of timing and character. Once 
appropriate timing rules are determined, they can be integrated with the character rules. 
185 . For example, an interest expense may not be deductible, see I.R .C. § 163(d) (1988), while 
a noninterest expense may be deductible under some other section. See supra note 81 for a partial list 
of interest restrictions. 
186. Edward Kleinbard uses the term "cubbyhole" to refe r to the existing tax paradigms. Edward 
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instrument is introduced , there is an attempt to analogize the new 
instrument to the existing paradigms. It is then argued that the instrument 
should be taxed in the same manner as the other instruments within the 
chosen paradigm. The principal justification for this approach is one of 
consistency-similar transactions should be taxed in a similar fashion. 187 
The flaw in the multiple paradigm approach is that a new instrument can 
generally be analogized to more than one existing instrument. Thus, the 
approach is not well defined. Moreover, the creators of new instruments 
are able to design instruments to be arbitrarily close to the line between 
any two (or more) paradigms. 188 Thus, to the extent that the paradigms 
offer different timing rules, the timing of income becomes elective and the 
goal of consistency is not met. Similarly, a particular financial instrument 
can generally be created using a variety of different instruments as building 
blocks. 189 There is, however, no guarantee that the taxation of the 
combination of the various building blocks will be the same as the 
combined taxation of the individual building blocks. 190 On the other 
hand, if there is a uniform benchmark against which each new product can 
be measured, it is possible to create a situation in which there is a much 
greater level of consistency, predictability, and accuracy in the timing of 
income. 191 
Third, it is sometimes argued that the timing of income with respect 
to a transaction is relatively unimportant as long as both sides to the 
transaction are taxed in the same manner. 192 The principal fallacy in this 
argument is that one can never assume that both sides of the transaction 
will face the same tax rate. To the contrary, one may usually assume that 
taxpayers will arrange themselves so that the side of the transaction that 
accelerates income is held by a person in a low or zero bracket, and the 
D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest Ozallenge to the Tax System, 
69 TE.X. L. REV . 1319, 1320 (1991) . 
187. Randall Kau calls this the "matching principle." See Randall K.C. Kau, Carving Up Assets 
and Liabilities-Integration or Bifurcation of Filzancial Products, 68 T A.XES I 003, I 007 (1990). 
188. See David P. Hariton, The Taxation of Complex Financial Instruments, 43 TAX L. REV. 731 
(1988) (analyzing the ambiguities in the treatment of complex financial instruments under current tax 
law). 
189. For example, Kau lists 13 different ways to borrow money using a combination of debt and 
different financial products. See Kau, supra note 187, at 1004-05. 
190. For example, prior to the recent revision in the OlD regulations , a contingent debt instrument 
made up of a noncontingent debt obligation and a cash-settlement option was taxed differently than a 
separate noncontingent debt obligation and cash-settlement option. See supra section IV(A)(2). 
191. See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products (July 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Texas Law Review) (discussing the application of "spanning" theory to the taxation of financial 
products). 
192. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 68, at 510-11 (suggesting that overtaxation of one side of a 
transaction can compensate for undertaxation of the other side of the transaction);GRAETZ, supra note 
49, at 944 (arguing "that the Internal Revenue Code may, to some extent at least, be indifferent to the 
timing of income or deductions so long as no tax advantage results"). 
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side that defers income is held by a person in a high bracket. 193 In ad-
dition, the symmetric treatment may often be more apparent than real. For 
example, if one side of the transaction is able to force a realization event 
for itself without forcing a realization event for the other side, any 
acceleration of income can be neutralized through a realized loss, while the 
corresponding acceleration of loss remains unaffected. 
In light of these concerns, I believe that it is a mistake to rely solely 
on symmetry to provide appropriate tax rules. On the other hand, the rules 
that I advocate are symmetric. Their symmetry, however, follows 
naturally from the symmetry inherent in the economics of the underlying 
transaction, rather than being driven by an arbitrary choice of rules. 194 
B. The Bifurcation and Integration of Financial Instruments 
When faced with a financial instrument, there are at least three 
general approaches to determining its taxation. First, it can be viewed as 
a single unified instrument. Second, it can be "bifurcated" into its 
component parts .195 Third, it can be integrated with one or more other 
financial instruments to form a new instrument. For example, an interest 
rate swap could simply be taxed as a swap. 196 Alternatively, it could be 
broken down into a series of forward contracts. 197 Finally, it could be 
integrated into a debt instrument to form a new debt instrument with 
different terms. 
The tax law takes no consistent approach to the question of unified, 
bifurcated, or integrated treatment. For example, consider the original 
issue discount rules. The basic approach of the OlD rules is one of 
treating the debt instrument as a single unified instrument, as seen, for 
example, in the use of a single yield for purposes of computing the accrual 
of discount. 198 In certain circumstances, however, the OlD rules take a 
193. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 48, at 515 ("Over the years, one of the major tax planning 
techniques has been to shift income from persons or entities to whom it would be taxed at high 
marginal rates to persons or entities subject to low or zero rates of tax.") ; see also Halperin, supra note 
68, at 512; Kau, supra note 187, at 1004. 
194. Obviously, a full accrual system would be perfectly symmetric. 
195. The term "bifurcation" is routinely used to describe the process of dividing financial 
instruments into their component parts. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil D ebt 
(and Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowances System , 67 TAXES 943, 947 (suggesting that 
deconstruction would be a better term); Kau, supra note 187, at 1005 (describing bifurcation). 
196. Prior to the notional principal contract regulations, no one knew for sure exactly what that 
meant, but sensible tax practitioners assumed it meant pretty much what it now means under the 
regulations . See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(2), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31351 (1991) (regarding 
generally the timing of periodic payments made under a swap contract) . 
197. See infra section Vll(D)(2) . 
198. See I .R.C. § 1272(a)(3)(A)(ii) (1988) (describing the use of a single yield to maturity). Other 
examples of a unified approach are the treatment of uni fied put and call options under Prop. Treas. 
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bifurcation approach. For example, the issue price of an investment unit 
must be allocated among the elements of the unit on the basis of relative 
fair market value. 199 Another area where the OlD rules take a bifur-
cation approach is the treatment of contingent interest. 200 Finally, in 
other circumstances, the OID rules take an integration approach, requiring 
independent debt instruments to be aggregated for purposes of determining 
the accrual of discount 201 
The same tension between these approaches is apparent outside of 
t~e OlD rules. For example, the proposed regulations on notional principal 
contracts take the overall approach of treating a notional principal contract 
as a single instrument. 202 When a financial instrument is composed of 
two or more notional principal contracts, however, the proposed regula-
tions require bifurcation of the instrument into separate contracts?03 On 
the other hand, in the case of hedged notional principal contracts, the 
regulations take an approach closer to integration.ZCl4 
In the area of international taxation, there has been a general 
movement toward integrated treatment of hedged transactions. For 
example, section 988(d), added by the 1986 Act, provides authority for the 
Treasury to write regulations providing for integrated treatment of currency 
hedging transactions. 205 Under this authority, regulations now permit a 
foreign currency borrowing that has been hedged to preserve a U.S. dollar 
Reg. § 1.1272-l(f)(4), 51 Fed. Reg . 12052 (1986), and the treatment of convertible debt under id. 
§ 1.1273-2(e), 51 Fed. Reg. 12062 (1986). 
199. I.R.C. § 1273(c)(2) (1988). 
200. Where the sum of the noncontingent payments is greater than or equai to the issue price of 
the overall instrument, the instrument is bifurcated into separate contingent and noncontingent debt 
instruments. Prop. Treas. Reg . § 1.1275-4(e), (g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308, 8310-11 (1991). See supra 
section IV(A)(2). 
The Code also takes a bifurcation approach in the case of certain long-term high-yield 
corporate OlD obligations . l.R.C. § 163(e)(5), (i) (Supp. II 1990) (requiring that OlD instruments be 
bifurcated into a disqualified and a deferred portion). 
201. Prop. Treas. Reg .§ 1.1275-2(d), 51 Fed. Reg . 12022, 12085 (1986) (as amended in 1991). 
202. /d.§ 1.446-3(e), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31355-61 (1991) . 
203. See Prop. Treas . Reg.§ 1.446-3(e)(4)(i), 56 Fed. Reg . 31350,31359 (1991) (specifYing the 
treatment of compound and disguised notional principal contracts). Given the fact that almost any 
notional principal contract can be described as the combination of two other notional principal contracts, 
the scope of this bifurcation rule is unclear. See infra section VI1(D)(2) (describing how any multi-
period notional principal contract is really just a series of single-period contracts); see also Prop . Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.446-3(e)(4)(iii) & (iv), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31359 (1991) (requiring bifurcation of certain 
notional principal contracts into a notional principal contract and a loan). 
204. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(4)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31359 (1991) (permitting the 
Commissioner to require that hedged contracts be treated in a manner consistent with the economic 
substance of the transaction as a whole). Although the regulations do not provide for integrated 
treatment as such, the effect of taxing the hedge in a manner consistent with the transaction as a whole 
should provide timing results that are consistent with integration. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
3(e)(4)(v) example 4, 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31360 (1991) (requiring integration of two swap contracts 
into a single loan). 
205. See I.R.C. § 988(d) (1988). 
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equ ivalent to be treated as a single integrated dollar-denominated bor-
rowing. 206 Similarly, the 1986 Act added section 864(e), which, inter 
alia, provided regulatory authority for integrated treatment of financial 
transactions for purposes of interest allocation. 207 A final example of the 
increased use of integrated treatment is section 1092, which has the effect 
of treating both legs of a straddle as a single transaction for purposes of 
loss recognition. 208 
At first glance, expected value taxation appears to rely on bifur-
cation of the financial instruments. In fact, that is not the case . The 
purpose of bifurcation is simply to assist in the estimation of expected 
future values of each component and to help delimit the points where 
income should be realized based on the outcome of contingencies. An 
alternative approach that is analytically equivalent would be to simply 
determine u1e expected future value of the entire instrument at each point 
in the future and to accrue income based on the overall expected value. 
More importantly, one of the goals of the expected value approach is to 
reduce the importance of the debate over bifurcation by making the taxation 
of a given instrument independent of whether or not it is bifurcated or 
integrated into another financial instrument. If each component of a 
financial instrument is taxed according to its expected future value, in 
theory, it should make no difference whether an instrument is bifurcated 
or integrated with another instrument. The aggregate income recognized 
under the transaction should be the same. 209 
The proposal for expected value taxation does not, however, solve 
the problem of the timing option or the related problem of tax straddles. 
Accordingly, it will make a difference whether related transactions are 
integrated for purposes of loss recognition. To the extent that the timing 
option remains, integrating related transactions has the benefit of reducing 
the opportunity for loss recognition on one part of a transaction while gain 
is unrecognized on another part of the transaction. 210 
206 . See Treas. Reg.§ 1.988-5 (1992). 
207. l.R.C . § 864(e) (1988). The Treasury has responded with Temp . Treas. Reg . §§ 1.861-9T, 
-lOT (1992). 
208. I.R.C. § 1092 (1988); see supra subpart TV (B) (discussing the restrictions on tax straddles). 
209. A full accrual system, such as I.R.C . § 1256 (1988), would make the question of bifurcation 
or integration entirely irrelevant except to the extent that the aggregate value of two separate 
instruments differed from the value of the combined instrument. Assuming perfect capital markets , 
there should be no such difference in values. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 128-29. In 
practice, there would likely be differences. See id. at 412. 
210. See, e.g., I.R.C . § 1092 (1988) (requiring loss deferral on one leg of a straddle to the extent 
of unrecognized gain on another leg of the straddle). 
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VI. An Illustration of Expected Value Taxation Through Wagers 
Even the most complex financial instrument can be thought of as a 
combination of certain and uncertain cash flows. In turn, uncertain cash 
flows can be thought of as the payoffs from simple wagers. Given this 
equivalence, it is possible to study an approach to the taxation of financial 
instruments by analogy to the taxation of wagers . In this Part, I pose a 
series of hypothetical wagers and use these wagers to develop and test 
expected value taxation. 
A. Single Bets 
Examples 4 through 6 deal with a single wager. In Example 4, the 
wager is a fair wager with no prepayment being made by either party. 
Examples S and SA introduce a form of prepayment whereby one party's 
payment under the bet is placed in escrow. In Example S interest on the 
escrow account is paid to the depositor, while in Example SA interest is 
paid to the other party. Finally, Example 6 analyzes a bet where one 
party's obligation is prepaid. 
1. Example 4: No Prepayment.-Consider a bet on whether 
a Democrat or a Republican will win the 1992 presidential elec-
tion.211 Assume that because of my fondness for the under-
dog, I bet that a Democrat will win. You, being strictly 
rational, bet that a Republican will win. Not being a fool, I 
insist on odds and we settle on a $1000 bet with 4-to-1 odds 
(i.e., if a Democrat wins you will pay me $4000, and if a 
Republican wins I will pay you $1000).212 We shake hands 
and await the outcome. 
211. To put Examples 4 through 10 in historical perspective, the author would like to note that 
the examples were originally written in 1989: before Mr. Perot had entered the race as an independent, 
before President Bush had broken his no new taxes pledge, and before the odds on the 1992 election 
had radically changed. 
212. Odds and probabilities are alternative ways of expressing the same concept. In particular, 
the statement that the odds are 4-to-1 in favor of a certain outcome is equivalent to the statement that 
the probability of the outcome is .8 or 80%. More generally, if the odds of a particular outcome are 
x toy, the probability of the outcome is: 
X 
(x+y) 
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Initially, there should be no tax consequences arising out of our bet . 
Our bet was an arm's length transaction. Therefore, it is reasonabl e to 
assume that our mutual obligations have the same value and that neither of 
us has income. Thus, even under a pure accrual system, there would be 
no accrual of income. 
Of course, it is possible that one or both of us are better o ff and in 
a strict economic sense have income. For examp le, I may have been 
\villing to settle for 3-to-1 odds and you may have been willing to go as 
high as 5-to-1. In that case, we would both perceive that we had made a 
good bargain , and, in that sense, we would both be better off. in theory, 
it could be argued that it would be appropriate to increase our tax li ab ilities 
based on our perceived increase in well-being. 213 Even if it were 
desirable, however, it would obviously be impractical to tax us on our 
perceived increase in welfare. The only conceivably administrable 
approach would be to tax us based on objective market valuations. 214 
Even market valuations, however, should not be enough to impose 
a tax at this point. For example, assume that the market "price" for such 
bets is 3-to-1. In that case, I would have a favorable bet as judged against 
the market. If the bet were immediately marked to market, the bet would 
have a positive market value, and I would have taxable income. 215 While 
in theory it would be appropriate to tax this income at this time, it would, 
in general, be unwise from an administrative point of view. The cost of 
discovering and valuing such off-market transactions would usually 
213. For example, it can be argued that the appropriate tax base is ability to pay and that income 
is merely a proxy for ability to pay. See , e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 48, at 17 (stating that tax equity 
presumes those "persons with equal ability to pay taxes should pay equal amounts of tax"). The further 
argument can then be made that ability to pay should be based on the subjective valuation of one's well-
being, rather than on objective market valuations. But cf Haig, supra note 5, at 5 (questioning whether 
"satisfactions are really the proper theoretical basis for apportioning tax ~). Determining the tax base 
on the basis of subjective valuations is equivalent to an argument that consumer surplus should be 
taxed. See Shaviro, supra note 326, at 119i (noting that consumer surplus theoretically constitutes 
income, but is immeasurable). 
214. Cf. Haig, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing that "everyone will agree that [subjective valuations] 
constitute an entirely impractical basis") . 
215 . The value of the bet can be determined by the following argument: I could immediately enter 
into an offsetting bet at the 3-to-1 market odds. In particular, I could enter into a bet whereby I would 
be paid $1250 if a Republican won, and I would pay $3750 if a Democrat won. I would then have a 
certain payment of $250 at the conclusion of the bet. (lf a Democrat won, I would be paid $4000 on 
the first bet and would pay $3750 on the second bet. If a Republican won, I would be paid $1250 on 
the second bet and would pay $1000 on the first bet.) Because the payment would be deferred for 
approximately a year, the value of the pair of bets would be the present value of $250, o r $227. The 
second bet, however, is a market bet and therefore has a zero value. Accordingly, the first bet must 
be worth approximately $227. 
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overwhelm the benefit. 2 16 lt seems much better to adopt the assumption 
that arm's length transactions give rise to no immediate income. 
The following day, George Bush admits that he has again misread 
his own lips and proposes increasing taxes again by getting rid of the 
fifteen percent tax bracket. The odds on the 1992 election shift to 3-to-1. 
Our bet is now worth $227 to me, and you have a corresponding unreal-
ized loss of $227. 217 Under a full accrual system, the bet would be 
marked to market, and we would each recognize our gain and ioss. As 
discussed above, however, I have assumed that. mark ing to market is 
unacceptable.218 
The failure to mark to market means that, absent a realization event, 
I am being undert<L'<ed on my economic income from the bet wh ile you are 
being overtaxed on your economic loss. The mistaxation of our bet is 
caused by unanticipated deferral. 219 There is no anticipated deferral 
because the expected value of the bet, at the time we entered into it, was 
presumed to be zero. 
The potentially greater problem is the timing option-the ab ility of 
the losing party to recognize its loss while the winning party defers its 
gain. It is the ability to manipulate realization that lowers the expected 
effective tax rate on the entire transaction. 220 The value of the timing 
option can be minimized by having realization events occur as frequently 
as possible. 221 In Example 4, however, there is no logical time to value 
the bet prior to its conclusion. In other words, there is no practical way 
to subdivide the bet into components so that the income on each piece of 
the instrument can be individually assessed at an earlier date . 
216. The benefit of taxing such transactions would be small. To begin with, little, if any, revenue 
would be collected because of the fact that any gain on one side of the transaction would be countered 
by loss on the other side of the transaction. Furthermore, there would be little opportunity for 
taxpayers facing different marginal rates to align themselves on the "correct" side of the transactio n. 
See supra text accompanyi ng note 193 (describing how taxpayers with different marginal rates may 
increase the tax benefits arising from a transaction) . It is therefore difficult to argue that any serious 
efficiency implications arise from failing to properly tax such gains and losses. Thus, the only 
argument for taxing such gains and losses would seem to be one of equity . The equity concerns, 
however , would generally be insufficient to warrant the administrative cost. 
217. See supra note 215 fo r the computation of this amount. 
218. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. 
220. Example 4 is reaily a modification of Example 2A. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
In Example 2A, all of the contingencies were resolved once the coin was tossed . In Example 4, th e 
contingency is not resolved until the conclusion of the bet (i.e., the 1992 election), but the probabilities 
continually change. 
221. Increasing the frequency of realization events is not the only solution . Another approach is 
to defer loss beyond the time of a realization event. Loss deferral is the approach adopted by, for 
example, I.R.C. §§ 1211 - 1212 (1988) (the capital loss limitation rules); id. § 1091 (the wash sa le rule); 
and id. § 461 (h) (the economic performance rule) . 
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Note also that to the extent that a market exists for the bet, the 
problem is much greater. If you, as the current loser, have no choice but 
to hold on to the bet, then there is de facto no timing option. Even in the 
absence of a market, however, it would ordinarily be possible to terminate 
the contract by mutual consent (i.e., you should be able to pay your 
counterparty to terminate the contract, thus forcing a recogmtton 
event). 222 Of course, termination of the contract would force recognition 
by both parties, thus potentially eliminating any net value to the timing 
option. 223 
Assume now that Bush wins a second term, and I pay you $1000 
as required by the wager. As all contingencies have been resolved and 
payment has been made, there is no reason to further delay recognition of 
222. The ability of a party to a contract to terminate the contract at a "market" price in the 
absence of a formal market will vary greatly depending upon the circumstances. Factors that will tend 
to make termination el!sier include: (I) the ease of valuing the contract; (2) the extent of ongoing 
relationships with the counterparty; and (3) the availability of other potential counterparties. 
223. Even if both parties face the same marginal rate, there may be value to the timing opti on if 
one party is indifferent to the occurrence of a realization event. For example, the proposed regulations 
permit dealers in notional principal contracts to elect to account for such contracts under a mark-to-
market system. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.446-4, 56 Fed. Reg. 3!350, 31361 (1991). Consider a swap 
contract between Townbank, a swap dealer, and LBM, an industrial corporation. Under the terms of 
the contract, LBM has agreed to pay Townba!lk a fixed interest rate times a notional principal amount, 
and Townbank has agreed to pay LBM a variable rate times the same amount. Assume that Townbank 
has made the election to mark the notional principal contracts to market under§ l.446-4(a). See id. 
If fixed rates rise, LBM will have a gain on the contract, and Townbank will have a loss. Townbank 
will, however, be able to recognize its loss without forcing a realization event, thereby permitting LBM 
to defer its gain. If fixed rates fall, LBM will have a loss and Townbank will have a gain . LBM can 
then recognize its loss by terminating the contract and making a termination payment to Townbank. 
!d. § 1.446-3(e)(6)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg . 31350, 31360 (1991). While ordinarily the making of such a 
payment would cause Townbank to recognize gain, Townbank will recognize no further gain because 
it will have already recognized gain under its method of accounting. In summary, LBM will get the 
advantage of the timing option while Townbank will be taxed neutrally. 
The mark-to-market election under § 1.446-4 is particularly interesting in light of § 1.446-
3(e)(6) of the proposed regulation. Paragraph (e)(6) provides, inter alia, that when a contract is 
assigned, the assignment is a recognition event for both the assigning party and its counterparty (the 
"symmetric recognition rule"). See id . The effect of the symmetric recognition rule is to limit the 
timing option where both parties to a swap contract are taxable and neither party makes the mark-to-
market election. Each party retains the timing option, but its effect on the fisc is neutralized, because 
when one party exercises the timing option, the other party must immediately recognize his income or 
Joss from the transaction . When one party, however, is a dealer electing mark-to-market treatment, 
the symmetric recognition rule has no effect when the nondealer counterparty assigns the contract and 
triggers early recognition of the loss. Thus, the effect of the mark-to-market election is to neutralize 
the symmetric recognition rule. Similarly, when the dealer has a loss, it will be able to recognize its 
loss without triggering gain for the nondealer. 
More perversely, LI-Je combination of the mark-to-market election and the symmetric 
recognition rule potentially permits a nondealer party to recognize its loss without the nondealer having 
to assign the contract. In particular, if the nondealer can convince the electing dealer to assign the 
contract, the nondealerwill recognize its loss under the symmetric recognition rule without any adverse 
tax consequences to the dealer. 
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my loss and your gain. 224 Moreover, the amount of the loss and gain are 
correctly measured by the cash payment made at the termination of the bet. 
2. Example 5: Escrow Account (Depositor Receives 
Interest).-Consider now the same bet as in Example 4 except 
that you decide that anyone who would bet that a Democrat will 
win a presidential election must be unreliable and, therefore, a 
credit risk. You insist that I post collateral. I do so by 
depositing $1000 in an escrow account from which I receive the 
interest. 
Ideally, the tax consequences of the bet in Example 5 should be 
exactly the same as the consequences of the bet in Example 4.225 
Whether or not you have security should not affect your income when the 
bet is first entered into, nor does it militate in any significant way for 
interim marking to market of the contract. 
3. Example 5A: Escrow Account (Depositor Does Not Receive 
lnterest).-Assume the same bet as in Example 5, except that 
we agree that you receive the interest from the escrow account. 
Now, we have significantly changed the terms of the bet. In 
essence, I am loaning you $1000 on an interest-free basis. 
Assuming we end up with the same economic bet, I will insist 
that I only deposit the present value of $1000, or $909.226 
You should be indifferent because you will have $1000 at the 
time of the election. I will be indifferent because I will have 
an asset that is expected to be worth $1000 at the same time. 
Of course, if I win the bet, you will pay me $5000.227 If I 
lose, I will get nothing back, but I will have satisfied my 
obligation to pay $1000. In either case, the asset is worth 
$1000. 
Under these circumstances, the tax consequences of the arrangement 
in Example SA should be different from that of the previous bets. I have 
224. In Example 4, payment is made at the time the contingency is resolved. This result is not 
meant to suggest that payment is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for gain recognition. 
Compare Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1275-4(e)(3)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986) (providing for gain 
recognition without payment when contingent interest on a debt obligation becomes fixed and is payable 
in more than six months) with id. § 1.1272-l(e)(2)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12051 (1986) (providing 
for payment without recognition of income when amounts other than qualified periodic interest are paid 
with respect to an installment obligation). 
225. For purposes of exposition, I assume away credit risk in the previous wager and assume that 
the escrow covers any credit risk in this wager. I ignore credit risk in the subsequent wagers. 
226. I am assuming that we can borrow and lend at a rate of 10% and that the election is in one 
year. 
227. $4000 for winning the bet plus $1000 refund of my deposit. 
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acquired an asset for $909 that is expected to increase in value in one year 
to $1000. It is appwpriate to tax the expected income from the deposit in 
the same manner as a zero-coupon bond. As with the zero-coupon bond, 
I, as the "holder," should be required to accnte $91 of income over the 
intervening year. Correspondingly, you, as the "issuer," should be entitled 
to an equal deduction over the same period . At the time of the election, 
if I win, I would have additional income of $4000. 228 If I lose, I would 
have a loss of $1000. The consequence of failing to accrue the $91 in 
expected income is that there would be anticipated deferral on the bet. 229 
While the expected income of $91 should be taxed on an accrual 
basis, the actual income or loss should continue to be deferred until the ter-
mination of the bet or some earlier realization event. Note that the taxation 
of the bet in Example 5A is the same as the taxation of an economically 
equivalent arrangement whereby instead of placing the $909 in an escrow 
account, I purchase from you a zero coupon bond with a ten-percent yield 
for $909 with the bond pledged as collateral for the bet. 
4. Example 6: Prepayment.-You offer to enter into a bet 
whereby if a Democrat is elected you will pay me $5000, and 
if a Republican is elected I will pay you nothing. Since it is 
not a fair bet, you insist I pay you $909 to enter into the bet . 
I do so. 230 
The first question is whether the $909 should be income to you and 
a loss for me at the time the bet is entered into. The correct answer must 
be that you should have no taxable income merely by entering into the 
transaction and receiving payment. 231 
228. My basis in the bet should be my initial payment of $909 plus the accrued $91 in interest. 
My gain would therefore be the $5000 cash receipt minus $1000 basis , or $4000. 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 49-49 and 65-70 for a discussion of the undesirable effects 
of anticipated deferral. 
230. I will sometimes refer to a bet that requires an initial payment as an off-market bet. 
231. Note that it can be argued that this result is inconsistent with Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 
U.S . 128 (1963). Schlude concerned the taxation of dance instructors using the accrual method and 
held that the Commissioner had not abused his discretion under the § 446(b) clear reflection of income 
requirement by requiring the taxpayer to recognize income upon the receipt of prepayments for future 
dance lessons . Schlude, 3 72 U.S. at 133-37. Schlude can be read for the proposition that an accrual 
method taxpayer has income at the earlier of the time that an item of income accrues or the receipt of 
payment. A better reading of the case, however, is that the courts will give the Commissioner 
significant latitude in determining when a method of accounting clearly reflects income. This latter 
reading of the case is consistent with the approach taken in proposed regulations on notional principal 
contracts . See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(3), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31357 (1991), and its 
predecessor, I.R.S . Notice 89-21, 1989-1 C.B. 651 (stating that up-front payments in notional principal 
contracts must be amortized over the life of such contracts); see also Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 
549 (stating that under specified circumstances, an accrual basis taxpayer may defer the inclusion of 
payments received in one taxable year for services to be performed in the succeeding taxable year 
where such treatment is consistent with th e taxpayer's book accounting) ; Treas. Reg . § 1.451 -5 (as 
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There are several reasons for the conclusion that there should be no 
immediate tax consequences of the initial payment. First, in economic 
terms you have no income. You are no better off after entering into the 
transaction than you were before entering into it. This is because the $909 
increase in your assets has been offset by your liability, which has an 
expected value of $909. 232 Second, to accept any other answer would 
permit taxpayers to manipulate their income in a manner that would invite 
wholesale tax avoidance. For example, it might permit complete avoidance 
of the limitations on the carryforward period for net operating losses, 233 
as well as the limitations on loss carryforwards in corporate ac-
quisitions.234 Finally, assuming that the payor is not permitted an equal 
and offsetting loss, the effect of treating the payment as income is to 
overtax the transaction. Overtaxing the transaction is generally inefficient, 
leading to an alteration in the form of the transaction (with presumably 
greater transaction costs) and to a reduction in the number of such transac-
tions.235 Just as there should be no income from the receipt of the $909 
payment, there should be no deduction. The reasoning parallels that just 
given on the income side. 236 
The next question is whether there should be any income or 
deduction over the life of the bet (i.e., up until the moment before the 
election). There are several aspects to this question. First is the issue of 
whether the bettors should have income or loss during the life of the bet 
resulting from changes in the expected outcome of the wager. In this 
amended in 1986) (expounding similar rules for sales of property). 
232. The existence of an offsetting liability is the usual justification given for not including 
borrowed funds in income. See, e.g., Commissionerv. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) ("When a 
taxpayer receives a loan, he incurs an obligation to repay that loan at some future date. Because of this 
obligation, the loan proceeds do not quality as income to the taxpayer."); GRAETZ, supra note 48, at 
216 ("In Henry Simons' terms, there is no change in the net worth of either party [to a loan]. The 
increase in funds to the borrower is offset by an equivalent liability to repay .... "). 
233. For example, consider a taxpayer with an expiring net operating loss of $909. The taxpayer 
could enter into two bets. In the first bet, she would receive $909 immediately and would be required 
to pay $5000 in one year if a Democrat is elected. In the second bet, she would receive $4000 in one 
year if a Democrat is elected and would pay $1000 in one year if a Republican is elected. Therefore, 
taken together, the bets would produce receipts of $909 immediately and outlays of $1000 in one year. 
If the receipts were immediately taxable, she would have $909 of income in the current taxable year 
and $1000 loss in the next taxable year, effectively refreshing her net operating loss for another 15 
years. See I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990) (providing that net operating loss can be carried 
forward to each of the 15 taxable years following the taxable year of the loss). 
234. See id. § 382. Attempts to use up-front payments to avoid§ 382 may also be prevented by 
treating subsequent payments under the transaction as built-in losses. !d. § 382(h)(6). It is, however, 
better to directly attack the mismeasurement of income, rather than to try to foresee every possible use 
by taxpayers of such mismeasurement. 
235. See supra subpart III(D) for a discussion concerning efficiency consequences. 
236. On the deduction side, it is much easier to see the opportunities for tax avoidance, since the 
circumstances in which taxpayers prefer tax losses without economic losses overwhelm the 
circumstances in which taxpayers prefer taxable income without economic income. 
1992] Taxation of Financial Instruments 297 
respect, however, Example 6 is no different than Examples 4 or 5 and 
should be treated the same. In other words, it should be assumed that the 
probability of the outcomes is unch anged and there is no gain or loss. 237 
A separate issue is whether the payor of the $909 should be 
permitted to amortize the payment and , correspondingly, whether the payee 
should be required to take the payment into income over the same period . 
In general , the payor should be permitted to amortize her payment if and 
only if the value of the asset is expected to decline over the period.m 
Here, the payor has no such expectation and, accordingly, no amortization 
should be permitted. 
The final issue is whether the payor should be required to take any 
imputed income into account over the life of the bet. In this regard, the 
prepayment in this example is equivalent to the deposit in Example SA. 
The payor has purchased an asset which is expected to increase in value to 
$1000 over the next year. In order to avoid creating a transaction with 
anticipated deferral, it is necessary to tax the payor currently. Accord-
ingly, the payor should have imputed income of $91 from the bet. As of 
the election, she would have a $1000 basis and either a $1000 loss (if the 
Republicans won) or a $4000 gain (if the Democrats won). Note that 
under the approach described above for Examples 5A and 6, the incidence 
of taxation on each party is the same whether the payment is denominated 
a security deposit or an up-front payment for entering into an off-market 
bet. 
B. Multiple Bets 
Examples 4 through 6 dealt with the taxation of a single bet. The 
following four examples demonstrate how the problem becomes more 
difficult when multiple bets are introduced. Example 7 introduces a simple 
series of two bets in which each bet is on-market. Example 8 expands 
Example 7 by introducing prepayments while assuming that the odds on the 
underlying bets are unchanged. Example 9 demonstrates that with 
prepayments the underlying economics of a series of bets, and thus the 
desired taxation of the bets, is not determined solely by the terms of the 
bet. This point is demonstrated by showing that the pattern of cash flows 
in Example 8 is consistent with different underlying odds. Finally, 
Example 10 demonstrates that the inability to determine the underlying bet 
in the case of prepayment extends to the case in which there appears to be 
237. See supra text accompanying notes 215-16 (adopting the assumption that ann's length 
transactions give rise to no immed iate income) . 
238. Th e statement in t.'1e text is essentially present law for depreciable assets. See I.R.C. § 167 
(1988) (a llowing as a dep recia tion deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion and wear and 
tear of property used in a trade or business or held for the production of income). 
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no prepayment. The case of a hidden prepayment is demonstrated by 
comparing the bet in Example 7 to a new bet with identical odds and 
identical payment times , but different payment amounts. 
1. Example 7: No Prepayment.-Consider a somewhat more 
complicated bet. Rather than betting only on the next election, 
we bet on the next two elections. Assume that the odds are 4-
to-1 and 3-to-1 on the first and second elections, respectively. 
Thus , if a Democrat wins the first election , you will pay me 
$4000, and if a Republican wins, I will pay you $1000. If a 
Democrat wins the second election you will pay me $4000, and 
if a Republican wins I will pay you $1333.239 
Initially, for the same reasons as in the case of the single bet, there 
should be no income to either party. Similarly, we begin with the 
assumption that the bet will not be marked to market prior to the first 
election. The question of the appropriate taxation becomes more difficult 
once the outcome of the fi rst election is known. Assume that a Democrat 
wins the first election. In a pure mark-to-market system, I would have 
income of $4000 from the first part of the bet plus or minus the value of 
the remaining part of the bet. Assuming, as before, that we are unwilling 
to mark the bet to market, there are a variety of alternatives. 
One possibility would be to treat the payment as an open transaction 
and wait until the completion of the bet (the second election) to determine 
gain or loss. Under this alternative, no immediate tax consequences would 
flow from the outcome of the first bet or the resulting receipt of $4000. 
The primary problem with this approach is that by extending the period 
before realization the timing option is made more valuable. 
A second possibility would be to mark the bet to market at the time 
of the first election?40 There is no reason, however, to believe that it is 
any easier to value the second part of the bet at the time of the first 
election than it would be at any other time. Thus , this alternative suffers 
from the same sort of administrative problems of any mark-to-market 
approach. 
A third possibility would be to value the contract at the time of the 
239. Example 7 is similar to Strnad's dual lottery example, except that the odds of the second part 
of the bet are affected by the outcome of the first part. See Strnad, supra note 6, at 1910. 
240 . Marking to market at the time of the first election differs from a pure accrual system in that 
the accrual is triggered by a specific event internal to the bet (or financial instrument) rather than being 
triggered by the passage of time, e.g., every year . 
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first election using the conditionai probabilities as determined at the time 
the contract was initially entered into. 241 • For example, assume that as of 
the time the bet was first entered into we agreed that if the Democrats won 
the first election, the odds against their winning the second election would 
become 2-to-1 rather than 3-to-1. In that case, assuming that the probabili-
ties have not otherwise changed , once the Democrats win the first election, 
my 3-to-1 bet for the second election has a known value, approximately 
$291. 242 Thus, using the initial conditional probabilities, I would have 
income of $4291 243 and you would have an equal loss. 
The problem with valuing the bet based on the conditional 
probabilities is that it requires knowing the conditional probabilities . In 
general, it is likely to be more difficult to determine the conditional 
probabilities than it would be to simply value the second bet at the time of 
the election . It is thus unlikely that this would prove to be a fruitful 
approach. 244 
A fourth approach, and the one that I believe is most attractive, is 
to treat the two bets as independent for timing purposes and to tax each bet 
in the same manner as a single bet. Under this approach, at the time of the 
first election I would have income of $4000 on the first bet, but would wait 
until the outcome of the second election to determine the taxation of the 
second bet. This approach strikes a balance between the highly accurate, 
but administratively costly, full accrual system and the open transaction 
approach with the problems of deferral and the timing option that it 
presents. 245 
2. Example 8: Prepayment.-As a variant of the previous 
pair of bets, assume that I pay for my side of the bets up front. 
In that case, I would make a payment of $1737 246 and you 
24i. See infra Appendix D (describing the treatment of correlated events). 
242. The expected value of the payoff in four years is $427 (I /3 x $4000 - 2/3 X $1333). The 
bet is worth the present value of $427, or $291. 
243. $4000 from the first part of the bet plus $291 from the second part of the bet. 
244 . Where the outcome of the earlier contingency determines the later contingency with certainty, 
it would generally be appropriate to take that fact into account in determining income at the time that 
the first contingency is resolved. For a more complete discussion, see infra Appendix D. See infra 
Appendix C for a discussion of Prop . Treas . Reg. § 1. 1275-4(e)(3)(ii) & -4(f)(2)(v) (explaining the 
treatment of contingencies that have been fixed but are payable more than six months in the future). 
245. Note, however, that the bifurcation of the transaction into two independent bets may not be 
as simple as it appears. In particular, the bifurcation approach assumes that the two bets were each 
correctly priced. As discussed below, there is generally no reason to believe that this holds true . See 
infra text accompanying note 251 . 
246. $1737 is equal to the present value of a $1000 payment in one year plus the present value 
of a $1333 payment in five years . 
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will pay me $5000 if there is a Democratic victory in the first 
election and $5333 if there is a Democratic victory in the 
second election. 
The taxation of the bet in Example 8 follows easily from the rules 
suggested above. The overall bet should be separated into the two 
individual bets and the prepayment should be allocated among the bets 
based on the fair market value of each bet. The first bet has a payoff of 
$5000 in one year with a probability of twenty percent. Its value is, 
therefore, $909 . The second bet has a payoff of $5333 in five years with 
a probabi lity of twenty-five percent. Its value is $828. Accordingly, I 
would be treated as paying $909 for the first bet and $828 for the second 
bet, for a total of $1737 . I would then be required to accrue income on the 
two bets as shown in the table below. 
Table 1: Imputed Income from Series of Bets with Prepayments 
Income Income 
Total income 
Year accrued from accrued from 
: 
first bet second bet 
accrued 
1 $91 $83 $174 
2 0 91 91 
3 0 100 100 
4 0 110 110 
5 0 121 121 
Total Income 
I 
$91 
I 
$505 
I 
$596 
I 
Purchase Price 909 828 1737 
I Final Basis II $1000 I $1333 I I 
During the first year, I would accrue $174 in income, of which $91 
would be attributable to the first bet. 247 As of the end of the first year, 
247. Note that the income in each year from the bets with prepayments in Example 8 is the same 
as would be the case if there were no prepayments on the bets, but there were two zero-coupon loans, 
a one-year loan with an issue price of $909 and a five-year loan with an issue price of $505. 
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my basis in the first bet would be $1000. If a Democrat won, I would be 
paid $5000 and have a gain of $4000. If a Republican won , I would pay 
nothing and have a loss of $1000. I would then accrue an additional $422 
in income with respect to the second portion of the bet over the next four 
years. At the time of the second election, I would have a basis in the bet 
of $1333 . If I won , I would receive $5333 and have a gain of $4000. If 
I lost, I would have a loss of $1333. As before, the principal weakness of 
this approach to taxation is the existence of the timing option. The timing 
option inherent in this approach, however, should not be significantly 
greater than the option afforded by two independent bets.248 
Note, however, that the proposed solution imposes a significant 
informational burden. It is now necessary to know the odds on the first 
two bets at the time the bets are placed. In other words, it is necessary to 
know the fair market value or market price for each individual bet. To see 
this informational requirement more clearly, consider the following 
example. 
3. Example 9: Prepayment with Modified Odds.-Consider a 
modified series of bets with prepayment. Under the first bet in 
the series, I would pay you $1135 for a Republican victory, 
and you would pay me $3865 for a Democratic victory 
(equivalent to odds of 3.4-to-1). Under the second bet, the 
payments would be $1135 and $4198 (equivalent to odds of 
3. 7 -to-1). Assuming prepayment, I would pay $1032 for the 
first election and $705 for the second election for a total of 
$1737. You would then pay me $5000 ($1135 + $3865) and 
$5333 for a Democratic victory in the first and second elec-
tions, respectively. 
The cash flows from the bets in Example 9, including the prepay-
ment, are identical to those from the bets in Example 8. In Example 9, 
however, the imputed income would be different, as is shown in Table 2. 
248. The value of the timing option is lessened by the inability to trade the bets separately. The 
value is increased if selling the two bets together has lower transaction costs than selling them as two 
independent bets. 
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Table 2: Imputed Income from Series of Bets with Modified Odds 
Income Income accrued Total income 
Year accrued from from second accrued 
first bet bet 
1 $103 $70 $ 173249 
2 0 78 78 
3 0 85 85 
4 0 94 94 
5 0 103 103 
Total Income $103 $430 $533 
Purchase Price 1032 705 1737 
I Final Basis II $1135 I $1135 I I 
In addition, my basis in the first bet as of the first election would be 
$1135, instead of$1000, and my basis in the second bet as of the second 
election would also be $1135 instead of $1333. 
Example 9 demonstrates that, given the amount of the up-front 
payment and the payoffs from the bets (the known cash flows), more than 
one allocation between the two bets is possible. In fact, an unlimited 
number of allocations are possible. The particular allocation in Example 
9 was arbitrarily selected so that the amount paid in case of a Republican 
victory was the same (as of each respective election date). Obviously, 
there is no reason to believe that every pair of bets would meet this 
criterion. 250 
249. The total first-year income in Table 2 is less than the total first-year income in Table I due 
to rounding. 
250. More generally, any time there is a single prepayment for two future costs, there is 
essentially an infinite set of future values that the prepayment is consistent with. To see this, consider 
two payments defining a bet, p 1 and p2 , where p 1 is to be paid in one year and p2 is to be paid in two 
years. Assuming a discount rate r, the prepayment would be: 
Pt Pz 
Po=--+ · 
(1 +r) (1 +r? 
Now, assume that the only known numbers are p0 and r. In that case, the above equation 
is a single equation with two variables. There are, in general, an infinite number of solutions to such 
a problem. In Example 9, it is further assumed that p1 = p2 • In such a case, there are now two 
equations containing two unknowns, and a unique solution generally exists. 
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Put most simply, the problem is allocating the purchase price of the 
pair of bets between the two bets. The correct answer is obtained only 
when the allocation is by fair market value. While making a fair market 
valuation may not be easy, it needs to be done only once. Moreover, the 
valuation will only have to be performed at the time the transaction is 
entered into, rather than at later, arbitrary times. Furthermore, the 
allocation is no different in kind than the allocation that must be made any 
time a person purchases a set of assets for a single price, such as in the 
purchase of a business. 251 
The previous example demonstrated that when there is more than 
one bet and there is a prepayment, it is not possible to determine from the 
terms of the bets the correct treatment of the individual bets. As 
demonstrated in the following example, the amounts paid for each 
individual bet may not represent the correct price for each bet even where 
there appears to be no prepayment. 
4. Example 10: Hidden Prepayment.-Assume that the odds 
for the next two elections are still 4-to-1 and 3-to-1, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, assume that we agree to bet on both 
elections, using the odds of 3.54-to-1 for both bets . In 
particular, I agree to pay you $1130 for each Republican 
victory, and you agree to pay me $4000 for each Democratic 
victory. 
While neither of the bets by themselves are fair, the two bets taken 
together are fair. In other words, the present value of the expected payoffs 
is zero. Essentially, I am agreeing to overpay you for the first election in 
exchange for underpaying you for the second election. The correct 
treatment of the pair of bets depends on knowing the prices for the two 
individual bets. 252 We know that the probability of a Democratic victory 
251 . To say that such an allocation has to be performed elsewhere is not to minimize the difficulty 
of such an allocation. The allocation of purchase price in the context of a business allocation is a 
theoretically simple, but administratively complex area of the tax law. See infra text accompanying 
notes 372-79 for further discussion of the difficulty of such an allocation in the context of financial 
instruments and of current rules in the tax law requiring similar allocations. 
252 . More generally, assume, following supra note 250, that the correct forward prices are p1 and 
p2 • There is essentially an infinite set of pairs of prices p 1' and p2 ' such that the present value of the 
pair {p/, p/} is equal to the present value of the pair {p1, p2 }. In particular, any pair {p1' , pz'} has 
the same present value as {p1 , p 2}, so long as : 
+ + 
(1 + r) (1 + r? (1 + r) 
The set of solutions to this equat ion is saved from being infinite only if additional constraints are 
imposed. 
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in the first election is twenty percent. Therefore, the correct price for the 
first bet is $1026. 253 The first payment, therefore, should be viewed as 
a payment of $1026 for the first bet and a prepayment of $104 for the 
second bet. In the case of a Republican victory, therefore, I should have 
a loss of only $1026, rather than the full $1130 payment. At the same 
time, I should have a basis of $104 in the second bet. During the next four 
years, I should have approximately $48 of imputed income on the second 
bet.2..'i4 At the time of the second election, I will pay an additional $1130 
for a total basis of $1282, the correct forward price for the second bet. 255 
Thus, it does not matter whether or not payments are made at the 
time that the uncertainties are resolved or in advance of their resolution. 
As long as there is more than one uncertainty, it is necessary to determine 
the correct forward price for each uncertainty in order to determine the 
proper timing of income. 256 
VII. An Application of the Expected Value Approach to Typical 
Financial Instruments 
The advantages and disadvantages of expected value taxation were 
explored in Part VI using a series of hypothetical wagers. In this Part, 
expected value taxation is further developed by applying the approach to 
a selection of actual financial products. 257 
A. Cash-Settlement Forward Contracts 
1. Description of a Cash-Settlement Forward Contract.-A 
forward contract is a two-party executory contract wherein one party agrees 
to buy specified property, and the other party agrees to sell such property 
at a specified price on a specified delivery date. 258 Payment for the 
property is generally made at the time of transfer. 259 A cash-settlement 
forward contract is a forward contract that is settled in cash, rather than by 
delivery of the underlying good. 260 
253 . $1026 is the expected value of the bet. 
254. $48 is the amount of interest $104 will earn in four years at 10% compounded annually. 
255. $1282 is the expected value of the second bet. 
256 . The same result holds true when payments are deferred. 
257. The following discussion assumes that the described financial instrument is not a § 1256 
contract and , therefore, is not subject to the mark-to-market rules in § !256(a). See I.R .C. § 1256 
(1988); see also supra subpart IV(C) (describing LIJe types of instruments subject to § 1256). 
258. See generally I THOMAS A. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES, FUTURES, AND 
OPTIONS MARKET§ 9.01 (1983). 
259. !d. § 9 .02. While payment is generally made at the time of delivery, payment may be made 
at an earlier or later point in time. !d. 
260. See I.R.C. § 1234(c)(2)(B) (1988). The amount of cash paid is the difference between the 
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2. Proposed Taxation of a Cash-Settlement Forrvard Contract.-A 
forward contract involves only a single contingency, the price of the 
underlying commodity on the delivery date. Accordingly, it should be 
treated as a single instrument for timing purposes. The second step 
requires determining the expected future price of the forw ard. 261 There 
are at least two approaches for determining an expected fu ture price fo r 
timing purposes. First, at least in theory, it would be possible to try to 
determine the true expected value of the future price. 262 Second, it 
would be possible to use the market forward price. In a competitive 
equilibrium in a risk-neutral world, the forward price of an asset must 
equal the expected future price. If the forward price for a commodity were 
less than the expected future price, an expected profit could be made by 
purchasing the commodity forward, taking delivery at maturity, and then 
selling the commodity in the spot market. Given the assumption of risk-
neutrality, such transactions would be carried out until the forward price 
was driven up to the expected future price. Therefore, in a risk-neutral 
world, the use of either the forward price or the expected future price 
would give the same answer. 
In a world where people are risk averse (or risk-preferring) 
expected future prices will generally differ from forward prices. For 
example, a risk-averse potential purchaser of the commodity will be willing 
to pay a premium over the expected future price, while a risk-averse 
potential seller of the commodity will be willing to sell for less than the 
expected future price. Thus, even in equilibrium, forward prices will 
generally differ from expected future prices. 
Nevertheless, I believe that forward prices are the appropriate prices 
to use for purposes of determining expected future prices for tax purposes . 
The primary argument in favor of forward prices is administrative. 
Determining true expected prices is administratively impractical. Forward 
prices provide a reasonable proxy for expected future prices at far lower 
administrative cost. 263 
contract or forward price and the spot price at the delivery date. See I Russo , supra note 258, § 9 .02 . 
For example, assume that David has entered into a cash-settlement forward contract with BankCo to 
purchase 100 ounces of gold at $400 per ounce on April I, 1992 . On April I, 1992, gold is selling 
for $420 per ounce. BankCo would be obligated to pay David $20 per ounce, or $2000. If David 
actually wished to purchase 100 ounces of gold on that date, it would cost him $42 ,000 . Taking into 
account his receipt of $2000, however, his net cost would be $40,000 or $400 per ounce, exactly the 
cost under the contract. 
261. The expected value of a forward contract at maturity is equal to the contract valued at the 
expected price of the underlying commodity. Thus, the expected future value of the contract and the 
expected future price of the underlying commodity can be used essentially interchangeably . Cf infra 
note 393 (noting that the expected value of an option is not equal to the option valued at the expected 
price of the underlying commodity) . 
262. Of course, it would be necessary to ask whose expectation: the buyer' s, the seller's, or the 
"market's." Presumably, as di scussed above, it should be the market 's expectation that counts. 
263 . In a competitive equilibrium, given the spot price and the cost of ca rrying a commodity, 
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A second argument can also be made for using forward prices 
rather than expected future prices. Consider a forward contract to 
purchase an asset that is current! y selling for $100 and offers no current 
return. Assume that because of the risk characteristics of the asset it is 
expected to yield an eighteen percent return at a time when the risk-free 
interest rate is ten percent. 264 In that case, the one-year forward price of 
forward prices can be determined mechanicaily without regard to expected future prices. The spot price 
is the current price for current delivery of the good. The cost of carrying always includes the 
opportunity cost of the funds used in purchasing the good on the spot market and also includes such 
costs as storage and insurance. Carrying costs are negative to the extent that the good generates a 
current return. If the current return is large enough, total carrying costs can be negative and the future 
price will be less than the spot price. Markets where the forward price is less than the spot price are 
often referred to as being in backwardation. See 2 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY 
142-44 (6th ed. 1960) . 
To understand the relationship between spot and forward prices, consider the following 
example. Assume that the spot price for silver is $10 per ounce &nd the cost of carrying silver for one 
year is $1 per ounce. In equilibrium, it must be the case that the one-year forward price for silver is 
$11 per ounce. Should the forward price for silver exceed $11, riskless arbitrage profits could be made 
by purchasing silver in the spot market and selling it in the forward market. These purchases and sales 
would drive up the spot price and lower the forward price until they met the condition that forward 
prices equal spot prices plus the cost of carrying the commodity. Similarly , if the forward price was 
less than $11, riskless arbitrage profits could be obtained by selling silver short in the spot market and 
purchasing silver in the forward market. 
Given the fact that forward prices can be determined mechanically from the spot price and 
the carrying costs for the commodity, it might be concluded that forward prices are independent of 
expected future prices. If forward prices were independent of expected future prices, the argument for 
using forward prices as a proxy for expected future prices would be severely weakened. Fortunately, 
the relationship between spot and forward prices does not demonstrate that forward prices are 
independent of expectations, but rather that spot and forward prices are not independent of each other. 
They are, in fact, both dependent on expectations about the future demand and supply for the com-
modity. GERALD GOLD, MODERN COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 30, 54 (6th ed. 1971). In 
equilibrium, if you know the forward price, no additional information about expected future prices can 
be gleaned from the spot price and vice versa. Knowing either the spot or the forward price, however, 
provides information about expected future prices. See infra text accompanying note 383 for a 
suggestion that forward prices may be estimated by use of the spot price plus the cost of carry. 
The proof that in equilibrium the forward price of a good must be equal to its spot price plus 
carrying costs is an arbitrage proof that requires the ability to transfer the good between periods. Thus, 
the forward price of a good cannot be in excess of the spot price plus carrying costs as long as it is 
possible to purchase the good in the spot market and hold onto it until the forward contract matures. 
If the good in question is gold, an arbitrageur is able to purchase gold in the spot market and hold it 
for delivery in the forward market. If, on the other hand, the good is fresh raspberries, it would 
generally not be possible to carry the good from the spot market to the forward market and , therefore, 
the forward price may exceed the spot price. For example, in August, fresh raspberries may sell for 
$1 per pint while at the same time fresh raspberries for December delivery may be $6 per pint (represe-
nting the expected cost of importing raspberries from Chile) . See GOLD, supra, at 31-34. 
Similarly, the forward price may be less than the spot price plus carrying costs when it is not 
possible to borrow the good now for spot delivery. Again, using gold, an arbitrageur is able to borrow 
gold for delivery into the spot market, later taking delivery in the forward market to return the 
borrowed gold. On the other hand, if it is not possible to borrow the commodity, the forward price 
can be sustained at less than the spot price plus carrying costs. 
264. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, ch. 8 (describing the relationship between the 
riskiness of an investment and its expected return). 
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the asset would be $ 110, whi le the expected future price would be $118. 
Assuming a fifty percent tax rate, under a mark-to-market system, the 
expected tax I iabil ity of the holder of the forward would be $9, fifty 
percent of the expected income of $18. On the other hand, consider the 
current market price of the future tax payment-the amount that someone 
would currently agree to pay in one year in exchange for the tax liabili ty 
of the holder of the forward contract. The market price for the future tax 
payment would have to be $5. If the price were more than $5, it would 
be possible to make a certain arbitrage profit by selling the tax payment 
and purchasing one-half of a forward contract on the asset. 265 Converse-
ly, if the price of the future tax payment were less than $5, the purchaser 
of the tax payment could make an arbitrage profit by purchasing the tax 
payment and selling one-half of a forward contract. Thus, in a mark-to-
market world, the future tax payments would be priced based on the 
forward price for the asset, not the expected future price.266 Therefore, 
a mark-to-market system is arguably best approximated using the forward 
price rather than the expected future price. Assuming that the forward 
contract was entered into at the market forward price, the best estimate for 
tax purposes of the expected future value of the forward contract is zero. 
Therefore, there should be no accrual of income prior to maturity. At 
maturity, the parties should have income and loss equal to the amount 
required to be paid under the contract. 
3. Example JJ.-Diva enters into a cash-settlement forward 
contract with David to purchase 10,000 ounces of silver in two 
years at $12 per ounce. When the contract matures, the spot 
price of silver is $14.50 per ounce. David pays Diva $25,000 . 
Example 11 involves a single forward contract at the market price. 
Accordingly, as under current law, there should be no income imputed to 
either party prior to maturity. 267 At maturity, Diva should include 
$25,000 in income and David should be permitted an equal loss. While the 
on-market forward contract in Example 11 offers no anticipated deferral, 
265. For example, assume you sold the U!x payment for $6 and purchased one-half of a forward 
contract. If the asset price at the end of the year were $125, you would owe $12.50 in U! x payments 
and would receive $7.50 under the forward contract, plus $6 for the sale of the U!x payments, for a 
toU!l profit of $1. If, on the other hand, the asset price were $90, you would be paid $5 in U!x 
payments (i.e., you would pay a negative U!x of $5 , assuming fully deductible losses) , you would pay 
$5 under the one-half forward contract and would be paid $6 for the forward sale of the tax payments, 
for a toU!l profit of $1. 
266. See Jeremy T. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, 17ze Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. POL. 
ECON. 20 (1984). 
267. Under current law, no gain or loss would be realized on the forward contract until there was 
a sale or other disposition. Cj ANDREA S. KRAMER, 2 FINANCIAL PRODUCTS: T A.X...AT ION, 
REGULATION , AND DESIGN§ 42.1(b) , at 1118-19 (1991). 
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it offers unanticipated deferral, and, therefore, the timing option, to ul.e 
extent that the forward price varies over the term of the contract. 
The timing option is made worse in the case of forward contracts 
that can be settled in property. In such cases, because exercise is not 
considered to be a realization event, the forward purchaser can continue to 
defer any gain beyond the life of the contract by exercising her right to 
settle in the underlying property.268 The timing option could be limited 
in such cases by treating exercise of the forward contract as a realization 
event. 269 Treating exercise as a realization event would require valuing 
the underlying property as of the exercise date, but would not requ ire 
valuation of the forward contract as such. 270 
B. Cash-Settlement European Options 
1. Description of a Cash-Settlement Option.-A call option is a 
contract that gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase 
specified property at a specified price (the "strike price") at a specified 
time (the "strike date"). 271 A put option gives the holder the right , but 
not the obligation, to sell rather than purchase specified property. 272 As 
defined, an option confers a valuable right without any offsetting 
obligation, and, therefore, always has a positive value. 273 An option 
premium, which is generally paid upon entering into the contract, serves 
as payment for this value. 274 
268. q id. 
269 . Note that § 1256(c) requires gain recognition on exercise of a futures contract subject to 
§ 1256(a) . See I.R.C . § 1256 (1988). 
270. If the property that is the subject of the forward contract is a publicly traded asset, the 
administrative cost of valuing the asset at the time of purchase should be small. If the property is not 
publicly traded, the administrative cost of valuation could be prohibitive. 
271. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 485 (defining a call option) . The foregoing is a 
description of a European call option. In the case of an American option, the holder has the right to 
exercise the option at any time until and including the strike date. See infra subpart VII(C) fo r a 
discussion of American options. 
272. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 485-86 (distinguishing call and put options) . 
273. The value of the option may be arbitrarily close to zero, but as long as there is the possibility 
of price movement, the value should be positive. 
274 . See Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra , Financial Innovation an.d Uncertain 
Regulation.: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431 , 1432 n.2 
(1991). In a present value sense, there is no significance to the time the option premium is paid as long 
as the amount of the premium is adjusted for the time value of money. In fact, a forward contract is 
equivalent to a call option with a zero strike price for which the premium is generally paid at exercise. 
The principal effect of shifting the time that the premium is paid is to allocate credit risk between the 
parties. If, for example, the premium is payable at the strike date, the option plus the obligation to pay 
the premium can have a negative value. Unless specified otherwise, I assume that any option premium 
is paid at the time that the option contract is made. 
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2. Proposed Taxation of a Cash-Settlement Option.-As with a 
forward contract, an option contract involves only a single contingency, the 
price of the underlying good at the exercise date. Accordingly, it should 
be treated as a single instrument for timing purposes with the only 
realization event occurring at exercise, or exp iration, of the option. The 
rnore difficult question is determining whether any expected income or loss 
occurs during the term of the option and, therefore, whether any income 
or loss should be accrued during the term. An option is fundamentally no 
different from the bet in Example 6. 275 In Example 6, one party to the 
bet has prepaid its obligation under the bet. Similarly, an option can be 
viewed as a bet where one s ide has prepaid its obligation.276 
In Example 6, the amount of the prepayment was equal to the 
present value of the expected return from the bet. Similarly, with an 
option the premium is equal to the present value of the expected return 
from the option. 277 Just as with L~e bet , the payor of the option premium 
should accrue income in each period equal to the change in the expected 
value of the option, which is assumed to be measured by its forward 
price. 278 Given that the carrying cost of an option is generally limited to 
the interest cost of the premium, the expected value can be estimated by 
assuming that the value of the option increases by an appropriate interest 
factor. 279 Similarly, the writer of the option should be entitled to accrue 
a deduction over the same period. Any accrual should be added to or 
subtracted from basis, and at maturity the purchaser and the writer of the 
option should have income and loss measured against their respective 
adjusted bases. 
275. See supra text accompanying note 230. The finance literature has recognized the equivalence 
between an option and many other financial instruments. For example, debt of a corporation can be 
viewed as a purchase of the assets of a corporation by the debt holder along with a sale by the debt 
holder to the stockholders of a cal! option on the same assets with a strike price equal to the face 
amount of the debt. See, e.g., Cox & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 61, at 376; BREA.LEY & MYERS, supra 
note 18, at 582. 
276. By "prepaid" I mean only that the payment is made prior to the time that the underlying 
contingency is resolved. The fact that the premium on an option is normally paid at the time the 
contract is entered into has nothing to do with the question of whether the premium is prepaid as the 
term is used here . 
277. To be exact, the value of an option is equal to its discounted expected future value in a risk-
neutral world. See John C. Cox & Stephen A. Ross, 17ze Valuation of Options for Altemative 
Stochastic Processes, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 145, 164 (1976). 
278 . See supra section Vll(A)(2) (arguing that the forward price is the best measure of future 
value). 
279 . Cj. Committee on Financial Instruments, New York State Bar Ass'n, Repon on Tax 
Accounting for Notional Principal Comracts , Tax Notes Today, Oct. 18, 1989, available in LEXIS, 
FedTax Library, TNT File (discussing alternative methods of amortizing cap premiums and concluding 
that the method recommended in the text is incorrect and that "economic amortization" or "market 
accrual" should be used instead) . For a more complete discussion of this point, see infra Appendix 
A. 
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3. Example 12.-Diva enters into a cash-settlement call 
option with David to purchase 10,000 ounces of silver in two 
years at $12 per ounce. Diva pays David $10,000 for the 
option. The contract matures at a time when the spot price of 
silver is $14.50 per ounce. David pays Diva $25,000. 280 
Diva has purchased an asset for $10,000 which she is presumed to 
expect to increase in value to $11,000 by the end of the first year and to 
$12,100 by the end of the second year. Diva should accordingly have 
income of $1000 in the first year and $1100 in the second year. Diva's 
basis in the option as of the end of the second year should be $12,100. At 
maturity, Diva should have income of $12,900. David's tax treatment 
should be the opposite of Diva's. 
In general, under current law, both the holder and the writer of an 
option have no income or deduction prior to the exercise or expiration of 
the option. 281 Thus, under both current law and my proposal there is a 
timing option to the extent that the price changes between the time of 
purchase and the maturity of the option .282 The difference between the 
two approaches is that current law fails to tax anticipated deferral . 
4. Cash-Settlement American Options.-The discussion so far has 
assumed that the option is a European option, exercisable only at 
maturity. 283 To what extent would the analysis change if the option was 
an American option, exercisable at any time prior to maturity?284 To 
begin with, it is useful to note that the difference between the two types of 
options is less than might appear. One of the standard conclusions of 
option pricing theory is that, in the absence of taxation and under certain 
reasonable assumptions, an American call option will never be exercised 
prior to maturity, and therefore is de facto equivalent to a European call 
option. 285 In particular, consider an American option to purchase a 
280. $25,000 is the difference between the spot price and the strike price multiplied by 10,000 
ounces . 
281. See supra note 118. 
282. As with a forward contract, the timing option is greatly increased if the call option can be 
settled in property rather than cash . In that case, the holder of the option can delay recognition of gain 
beyond the maturity of the option by exercising the option and holding onto the underlying property. 
See supra note 118 . A put option does not offer the same flexibility, because settlement of a put 
involves the sale, not the purchase, of property and will, therefore, generally trigger recognition of 
taxable income. 
283. European options are more likely to be used as building blocks in certain types of financial 
instruments, including interest rate caps, hybrid debt instruments, and convertible debt where the 
conversion right can only be exercised at maturity. On the other hand, convertible debt where the 
conversion right may be exercised at any time prior to maturity is similar to conventional debt plus an 
American call option where the exercise price of the option is the current value of the debt. 
284. Similar comparisons could be made between a forward contract exercisable only on a 
particular date and a forward contract that could be exercised by one or both parties prior to maturity. 
285. See, e. g. , C OX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 61 , at 141 (" [A]n American call on a stock paying 
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specified commodity for a fixed price at any time through time t. Assume 
that there are no costs or benefits to owning the commodity other than the 
purchase price and the return from sale. 286 In that case, it will never be 
optimal (i.e., profit maximizing) to exercise the option prior to matur-
ity. 287 
Therefore, under the assumption that the opportunity to exercise the 
option prior to maturity has no value, the value of the American call option 
should be equal to the value of the equivalent European call option. This 
equivalence holds true under both a full accrual and a pure realization tax 
system. Under a full accrual system, the holder of an American option 
contemplating exercise will have already taken into account any gains or 
losses with respect to the option. The holder, therefore, has no incentive 
to exercise or not exercise the option based on accrued gain or loss. 
Similarly, future gain or loss on either the option or the underlying 
commodity will be recognized as it accrues, regardless of the form of 
ownership. Accordingly, the prospect of future taxation will not affect the 
decision to exercise the option.288 
no dividends should never be exercized prior to the expiration date." (emphasis in original)). 
286. Thus, for example, there are no rental receipts, consumption values, or voting rights that 
follow from ownership of the commodity. Similarly, there are no insurance or storage costs of 
ownership. Under these assumptions, the only reason to exercise the option is to take advantage of 
increases in the price of the commodity. Assume also that there are no carrying costs to the option 
other than the foregone return on the investment. When these conditions are not met, the value of an 
American option exceeds the value of a European option. See generally In Joon Kim, The Analytic 
Valuation of American Options, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 547 (1990) (offering an analytic solution to the 
value of an American call option on an asset paying a continuous return). 
287. The statement in the text can be proved by the following argument. Assume that the strike 
price is p, and that the current price of the commodity is Pc· If Pc < p, it would be cheaper to 
purchase the commodity on the open market and therefore the option should not be exercised. Now, 
assume that Pc ~ p, . Consider two possibilities. First, assume that the holder believes that Pc will 
remain constant or increase in the future. In that case, there is no advantage to exercising the option 
and holding the commodity as compared to simply holding the option. In either case, the holder will 
ultimately realize the increase in the commodity price. Moreover, by exercising the option the holder 
loses the opportunity to earn interest on the strike price and risks losing the additional investment of 
p, to the extent that the commodity price declines below p,. By merely holding the option, the holder 
captures any increase in the commodity price without bearing the risk that the commodity price will 
decline below p,. 
In the alternative, assume that the holder believes that Pc will decline in the future. In that 
case the holder will be no worse off selling the option than she would be if she exercised the option 
and then sold the commodity, because the option value cannot be less than the difference between the 
commodity price and the strike price. Thus, it will never be optimal to exercise the option prior to 
maturity. And because it is never optimal to exercise the option prior to maturity, there is no de facto 
difference between an American and a European option. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 
526 (noting that "[s]ince an American call option should not be exercized before maturity, its value is 
the same as that of a European call, and the Black-Scholes formula applies to both options"). 
288 . Of course, the decision to invest in the option in the first place or to continue the investment 
may well be affected by taxation. The point is that the decision to retain the option rather than 
exercising it and holding the commodity is unaffected. 
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Similarly, the incentive to exercise or hold a call option will be 
unaffected by a realization-based t<Lx system. Neither exercising nor 
holding the option will trigger recognition of income under such a system. 
Accordingly, while a holder may be encouraged to sell the option to 
recognize a loss or to hold onto an option to defer gain, the holder has no 
tax-based incentive to exercise or not exercise the option prior to maturity. 
In particular, if the holder wishes to terminate her investment in the option 
(or the underlying commodity), she has no tax incentive to exercise the 
option and then sell the commodity, rather than simply selling the option. 
Similarly, if the holder wishes to continue her investment and the option 
has appreciated in value, she will have no tax incentive to exercise the 
option and hold the commodity, rather than simply hold the option. If the 
option has depreciated in value and she wishes to recognize the loss , she 
can sell the option and purchase the commodity on the market. 289 Thus, 
the holder has no incentive to exercise an American call option prior to 
maturity under either a full accrual or a realization-based system. 290 
Because the value of an American call option is the same as the 
value of a European call option under the limiting conditions specified 
above and because the two types of options will generally be exercised 
under the same set of circumstances, it is reasonable to have the same rules 
for taxation of the two options. The utility of this conclusion is, of course, 
limited by the underlying assumptions-primarily the assumption that there 
is no benefit to direct ownership of the underlying commodity or other 
property that is the subject of the option. Obviously, there are many cases 
for which this assumption is not true. For example, gold may have a 
positive rental value, and corporate shares generally have both dividend 
and voting rights . Nevertheless, in a broad class of cases the result 
continues to hold. 291 
289 . She could also sell the option and purchase a fl~>.v 0pti.on. 
290. American and European call options are not of equal value under all conceivable tax systems. 
It is likely , however, to hold under reasonable combinations of a full accrual system and pure 
realization system. For example, consider a modified realization system under which the exercise of 
an option is a realization event. The holder of a depreciated American option could recognize her loss 
by exercising the option. At first glance this would suggest that she might choose to do so. She could, 
however, also trigger her loss by selling the option and purchasing the underlying commodity. 
Moreover, the latter course should be more valuable for the same reasons that it is generally not 
optimal to exercise an American option prior to maturity. See supra text accompanying notes 285-87. 
291. While under the conditions described above an American call option is equivalent to a 
European call option, a similar equivalence does not hold between an American put option and a 
European put option. The basis of the equivalence for call options is that it is never optimal to exercise 
an American call option before maturity. It may, however, be optimal to exercise an American put 
option before maturity. Consider, for example, an American option to sell stock in X for $100 at any 
time during the next 60 days. Assume that after 30 days X is bankrupt and its stock is worthless. The 
put is worth $100 if exercised at that time. If, on the other hand, the put is held until maturity, the 
most it can be worth at maturity is $100. Assuming a positive interest rate, it is more valuable to 
exercise the put immediately. See Robert Geske & H.E. Johnson, The American Put Option Valued 
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On the other hand, the equivalence of American and European call 
options does not hold once the option is combined with other rights or 
obligations that cannot be transferred independently because they are part 
of the same overall instrument. Consider, for example, a cash-settiement 
option to buy one ounce of gold in one year at $100 combined in a single 
instrument with a second cash-settlement option to purchase ten ounces of 
silver at the same time for $10 per ounce. Assume t!-Jat the options can_i10t 
be transferred independently. Under these circumstances it may well be in 
the interest of the holder to exercise one option and continue to hold onto 
the other. Assume, for example, that the prices of gold and silver are 
currently $125 and $9 respectively. Assume further that the holder expects 
the price of gold to drop and the price of silver to rise. In that case, it 
may well be optimal to exercise the gold option currently while continuing 
to hold the silver option. The holder can only do so if the gold option is 
an American option. 292 
Assuming that under some circumstances American options are 
different from European options, the question remains whether there is any 
reason to treat them differently for tax purposes. The answer is generally 
no. The argument in favor of waiting until a European option is sold or 
matures is not based on the holder's inability to exercise the option prior 
to maturity, but rather on the difficulty in valuing the option prior to 
maturity or sale. Whether or not an American option will be exercised 
prior to maturity, in the absence of such an exercise there is no reason to 
believe that the valuation question is any easier than with a European 
option. 293 Accordingly, absent a premature exercise of the option, there 
would not appear to be any reason to accrue income any differently with 
respect to an American, as opposed to a European, option. If, on the other 
hand, the American option is in fact exercised prior to maturity, that would 
appear to represent a good opportunity for realization of any gain or loss, 
just as it is appropriate to recognize gain or loss when the option is 
exercised at maturity. 294 
Analytically, 39 J. FIN. 1511, 1511 (1984) (providing an analytical valuation formula for an American 
put option). 
292. Even in the case of paired call options (gold and silver in the text), the holder has alternatives 
other than exercising one option while continuing to hold the second option . For example, the holder 
could sell the pair of options and then enter into a replacement call option for silver. Alternatively, 
she could write a cail option on gold . Finally, she could purchase a put on gold. In any case, she will 
have achieved the desired result of cashing in on the gain from the gold option while maintaining an 
open position in silver. The optimal course may well be determined by relative transaction costs. 
293. Both American and European options may be traded under a system in which daily gains and 
losses are marked to market. In such a case the valuation problem is solved, and the justification for 
not using a full accrual system is seriously undermined. The existence of a mark-to-market trading 
system was one of the principal factors that led to the adoption of§ 1256. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM . 
ON TAXATION, supra note 64, at 296. 
294. In the case of a cash-settlement option, taxing an American option at exerci se is 
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C. Fixed-for-Floating Interest Rate Swap 
I. Description of a Fixed-for-Floating Interest Rate Swap. -A 
fixed-for-floating interest rate swap is a contract between two parties 
whereby one party agrees to make periodic payments to a second party (the 
"counterparty") equal to a fi xed interest rate (the "swap rate") times a 
specified principal amount, and the counterparty agrees to make payments 
to the first party equal to a variable interest rate times the same principal 
amount. 295 The payments are generally netted. 296 The specified prin-
cipal amount is used only to determine the amount of the swap payments 
and is not actually borrowed or lent. Because the specified principal is 
generally used only to measure the parties' payments and is not actually 
transferred between the parties, it is often referred to as a "notional" 
principal amount and swap contracts are referred to as notional principal 
contracts. 297 
A swap contract may or may not require an initial payment by 
either party.298 Such a payment is required when the present value of the 
expected future payments on one leg of the swap is not equal to the present 
value of the expected payments on the other leg of the swap.299 
2. The Economics of a Swap.-Economically, a swap contract is 
equivalent to a series of cash-settlement forward contracts on short-term 
loans. Consider, for example, a contract to borrow $1000 in one year for 
uncontroversial and relatively inescapable. See supra note 119. In the case of an option settled in 
property , it would be an acceleration of realization in comparison with current law. For more 
discussion of this point, see supra note 282; supra text accompanying note 270. 
295 . See Henry T.C . Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the 
Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm , 138 U. PA. L. REV . 333,347 (1989) (describing the swap as 
an exchange of cash flows). More generally, an interest rate swap is a contract betwee>! two parties 
where each party agrees to pay the other party interest on a specified principal amount c;vec a specified 
term according to a specified formula. Id. at 347 . 
296. See id. at 348 n.42 (1989). 
297. See, e.g ., Prop. Treas . Reg. § 1.446-3 , 56 Fed. Reg . 31350,31350-51 (1991). Interest rate 
caps are another type of notional principal contract. See infra section VTI(E)(l) (describing an interest 
rate cap). 
298. A swap that does not require any up-front payment is often referred to as an on-market swap. 
A swap that requires an up-front payment is often referred to as an off-market swap. See 26 C .F.R. 
§ 1.988-2(e)(3) (1992) (describing an off-market currency swap); Prop . Treas . Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(4)(v) 
exa mple 4, 56 Fed . Reg. 31350, 31360 (1991) (showing an off-market interest rate swap). 
299. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.988-2(e)(3) (1992). For example, assume that the market rate for a five-
year annual-pay LIB OR (London Interbank Offered Rate) swap is 10%. In other words, market 
participants are willing to enter into swaps where they will pay LIBOR times a notional principal 
amount in exchange for 10% times the same notional principal amount. If a party wished to enter into 
a swap at 9% she would be required to make an up-front payment equal to the present value of 1% 
(10% minus 9%) of the notional principal amount per year for five years. Similarly, if she wished to 
enter into a swap at 12 %, she would receive an up-front payment equal to the present value of 2 % of 
the notional principal amount per year for five years. 
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a term of one year at an interest rate of ten percent. Such a contract is 
simply a forward contract for a loan with a forward price of $100 (or ten 
percent). 300 Consider now a cash-settlement version of the above 
contract. 301 Assume that at the time of settlement , the rate for one-year 
loans is eleven percent. In that case, the forward borrower would need an 
additional one percent over and above the contract rate of ten percent in 
order to borrow the funds in the market. The amount payable under a 
cash-settlement forward contract would, therefore , be one percent times the 
stated principal amount of the contract or $10. The receipt of the $10 is 
sufficient to permit the forward borrower to obtain a market loan at eleven 
percent or $110, while paying a net interest cost equal to the contract rate 
of ten percent or $100. 302 The payment of $10 under the cash-settled 
forward contract, however, is exactly the same payment that would be 
required under an equivalent one-period swap contract. Thus, a one-period 
swap contract is functionally indistinguishable from a cash-settlement 
forward contract at the swap rate. Similarly, a multiperiod swap contract 
(i.e., a standard swap contract) is functionally indistinguishable from a 
series of cash-settlement forward contracts each at the swap rate. 
The fact that the swap rate is constant means that the parties have 
agreed to a constant forward price (i.e., interest rate) for the series of 
short-term loans. Assuming that the term structure of interest rates is not 
fiat (i.e., that interest rates on short-term loans are different than interest 
rates on long-term loans), a constant swap rate means that the parties have 
agreed to overpay for certain loans in exchange for underpaying for other 
loans. Thus, for example, consider the interest rates shown in Figure 1. 
300. For simplicity, I ignore the difference between a payment made at the beginning and the end 
of the loan period. 
301. A cash-settlement contract is a contract that is settled in cash, rather than by delivery of the 
underlying good (here the use of the money). See supra section VII(A)(I). 
302. The discussion in the text ignores the difference between the risk of changes in market 
interest rates and the risk of changes in the borrower's credit worthiness. A forward loan contract 
would generally transfer both risks to the forward lender, while a cash-settlement forward loan contract 
would only transfer the risk of changes in market interest rates. If the forward borrower's 
creditworthiness deteriorates during the interim period, its net cost of borrowing would be expected to 
increase. Of course, the forward borrower can eliminate the risk of a decline in its creditworthiness 
by entering into a separate forward borrowing contract at a variable rate (i.e., a market rate to be 
determined at the time of borrowing). One of the advantages of having swap and forward interest rate 
markets is that it enables such a separation of credit and interest rate risks. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Swap and Forward Rate Curves 
The curve marked Yield Curve is a hypothetical zero-coupon yield 
curve. 303 The curve marked Forward Rate Curve represents the as-
sociated forward rate curves.304 The forward rates range from approxi-
mately 10 percent to approximately 16.5 percent. Thus, if the parties 
entered into a series of forward borrowing agreements , each at the 
respective market rate, the forward contracts would call for interest rates 
beginning at approximately ten percent in one year and increasing to 
approximately sixteen percent for the final loan in ten years. On the other 
hand, if the parties wished to have the same rate for all of the forward 
agreements, in order to maintain the same overall cost of the loans they 
303. For example, the point at the coordinates (4, 10 .9) indicates that a four-year zero-coupon bond 
would yield 10.9 %. A zero-coupon yield curve differs from an ordinary yield curve in that each point 
represents the yield on a zero-coupon bond, rather than a coupon-paying bond. The yield curve is often 
referred to as the term structure of interest rates. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, THE TERM STRUCTURE 
OF INTEREST RATES: EXPECTATIONS AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS 1-2 (1966) (describing the "functional 
relationship among yields of securities which differ only in their term to maturity" as "the term 
structure of interest rates," and stating that the yield curve is the most widely used graphic device for 
examining this relationship). The steepness of the yield curve has been exaggerated for clarity of 
presentation. 
304. That is, the set of forward rates on one-year loans consistent with the yield curve. For 
example, the point at the coordinates (3,14.0) indicates that the three-year forward rate for a one-year 
loan is 14 .0%. See Appendix B for a discussion of the relationship between the yield curve and the 
forward rate curve . 
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would set a rate at the level such that the overpayment in the early years 
(along with interest on such overpayment) would offset the underpayment 
in the later years. In other words, the rate would be selected such that the 
present value of the overpayments is equal to the present value of the 
underpayments. 305 At such a rate, each of the individual forward 
contracts would generally be priced off-market. Only the package of 
forward contracts taken as a whole would be a market transaction. Thus, 
the market swap rate is essentially an "average" of a series of off-market 
forward rates. 306 In this example, the swap rate is approximately four-
teen percent. 
3. Proposed Ta.xation.-As discussed above, a swap is similar to 
a series of cash-settlement forward contracts. 307 As such, it is ap-
propriate to treat each forward contract as generating a separate realization 
event. Thus, for example, gain on the one-year forward contract should 
be recognized at the end of the first year; gain on the two-year forward 
contract should be recognized at the end of the second year; and so forth. 
The complication arises in determining the amount of gain with respect to 
each forward contract. As long as the term structure of interest rates is not 
flat, each of the forward contracts will have been priced off-market. 308 
In order to determine the amount of gain with respect to each component, 
it is necessary to know the price of that component. To the extent that the 
swap rate differs from the market forward rates, any underpayment or 
overpayment should be treated as an amount paid with respect to other 
periods. The parties should not have any income or loss from such 
payments on future or past forward contracts at the time of payment on 
presently matured forward contracts. In addition, because such over-
payment and underpayment are essentially loans, the parties should be 
required to accrue income or expense with respect to the resulting 
loans. 309 In essence, such a swap contract presents the same issues as 
305. See infra Appendix B (deriving an exact formula to determine the appropriate rate). 
306. More precisely, in a competitive equilibrium, the swap rate is a weighted average of forward 
rates . 
307. See supra text accompanying notes 300-04. 
308. This discussion assumes the parties have agreed to a single swap rate for the entire term of 
the contract. 
309. The principal on this mini-loan should not be confused with the underlying notional principal 
amount for the swap contract. The principal amount on the mini-loan is the accumulated difference 
between the swap rate and the market forward rate multiplied by the notional principal amount. 
The use of the term "loan" is meant to help clarity the fact that the income flows from the 
swap contract. It is not meant to suggest that some portion of the swap income or expense should be 
characterized as interest income or expense for federal income tax purposes. The desirability of such 
a characterization depends on a multitude of factors beyond the scope of this Article . 
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does the series of off-market bets in Example 10, and should be taxed in 
the same manner. 310 
It should be noted that the proposed treatment of swaps is inconsis-
tent with the current tax treatment of long-term fixed-rate debt. Just as a 
swap is equivalent to a series of cash-settlement forward contracts for 
short-term debt, fixed rate debt is equivalent to a series of noncash-
settlement forward contracts on short-term debt. Thus, for example, ten-
year debt at eleven percent can be viewed as a one-year loan followed by 
a series of nine forward contracts for additional one-year loans, each priced 
at eleven percent. Viewed in such a fashion, it becomes obvious that, in 
general, each of the individual short-term obligations is mispriced because 
the contract rate is not the series of market forward rates, but rather a 
blended rate for the package. 311 
4. Example 13.-Diva enters into a two-year interest rate 
swap with David. Under the terms of the swap, Diva agrees to 
pay David the swap rate (a fixed rate) times a notional principal 
amount of $1000 at the end of each year in exchange for a 
payment of the prime rate (a variable rate) times the same 
amount. At the time that they enter into the contract, prime for 
one-year loans is ten percent, the one-year forward rate for 
prime is eleven percent, and the two-year forward rate is twelve 
percent. 312 Given current spot and forward interest rates, 
Diva and David set a swap rate equal to 11.47 percent. At the 
end of the first year, prime is 11.2 percent and Diva makes a 
net payment of $2.70.313 At the end of the second year, 
prime is 11.8 percent and David makes a net payment of $3.30. 
Under expected value taxation, in order to determine the timing of 
income on the swap contract it is first necessary to determine the market 
forward interest rates, here assumed to be eleven percent and twelve 
percent for the first and second years, respectively. Based on the forward 
rates, the swap agreement would be treated as requiring a payment of 
eleven percent for the first year along with an advance payment of 0.47 
310. See supra section VI(B)(4). 
311. See Joseph Bankman& William A. Klein, Accurate Taxation of Long-Term Debt: Taking into 
Account the Term Structure of Interest, 44 TAX L. REV. 335, 335-36 (1989) (noting that the current 
taxation of long-term debt is inconsistent with the term structure of interest rates); see also Bruce 
Kayle, Where Has All the Income Gone? The Mysterious Relocation of Interest and Principal in 
Coupon Stripping and Related Transactions, 7 VA. TAX REV. 303, 324-32 (1987) (discussing the 
potential mismeasurement of holders' income from stripped bonds) . 
312. The forward rates are equivalent to rates on two-year and three-year fixed-rate loans of 
10.50% and 11.00%, respectively. 
313. $2.70 is the difference between the swap rate and prime, multiplied by the notional principal 
amount. 
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percent for the second year. At the end of the first year Diva would, 
therefore, be treated as having received a payment of $2.00 under the first 
forward contrace14 and as having made an advance payment of $4.70 
under the second forward contract. 315 Accordingly, despite the fact that 
Diva will have made a net payment of $2.70, she would have taxable 
income of $2.00. She will also have a basis of $4.70 in the remaining 
swap contract. 
Based on the forward rate of twelve percent for the second period, 
Diva expects to receive a payment with respect to the second forward 
contract of $5.30 at the end of the second year. 316 Therefore, Diva 
should accrue an additional $0.60 in income during the second year.317 
Diva's basis in the swap at the end of the second year would, therefore, be 
$5.30. 318 Upon receipt of the final cash payment of $3.30, she would 
have a taxable loss of $2.00. 
5. The Treatment Under Current Law.-Under the proposed 
notional principal contract regulations, both parties to the swap would be 
treated as having taxable income or loss in each period equal to the amount 
they pay or receive in that period. 319 Under the regulations, therefore, 
Diva would have a deduction at the end of the first year equal to the $2.70 
that she paid and would have income equal to the $3.30 that she received 
at the end of the second period. 
6. Resolving the Discrepancy Between the Proposed Taxation of 
Swaps and the Taxation of Fixed-Rate Debt.-As noted, the treatment of 
swaps under the expected value approach is inconsistent with the treatment 
of long-term fixed-rate debt. 320 Given that it is unlikely that the treat-
314 . $2.00 is the product of the notional principal amount times the difference between prime 
(11.2 %) and the forward rate (11.0%). 
315. $4.70 is the product of the notional principal amount times the difference between the swap 
rate (11 .47%) and the forward rate (11.00%). 
316. $5.30 is the product of the notional principal amount times the difference between the forward 
rate for the second period (12.00%) and the swap rate (11.47%) . 
317. $0.60 is the difference between the expected value of the contract at the end of the year and 
her basis at the beginning of the year. $0.60 is also approximately her basis ($4 .70) times the forward 
rate of 11 percent. The difference between $0.60 and $0 .52 (11% x $4 .70) is caused by a round-off 
error in the selection of the swap rate. The precise swap rate is closer to 11 .4739%. At that rate, her 
basis after the first year would be $4.74 and the expected value at the end of the second year would 
be $5 .26. The difference of $0.52 between these two figures is equal to her basis of $4 .74 times the 
forward rate of 11 percent. 
318 . $5.30 is the sum of the prepayment ($4 .70) plus the amount accrued during the second year 
($0.60). 
319. Prop. Tress. Reg.§ 1.446-3(e)(3), 56 Fed . Reg . 31350,31356-59 (1991). 
320. See supra text accompanying note 311. 
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ment of long-term debt will be changed, consistency suggests that the 
expected value approach is inappropriate as applied to swaps. 321 
In most cases, it is probably preferable to tax swaps consistently 
with long-term debt. For example, consider two persons, the first of 
whom borrows $100 million at ten percent, and the second of whom 
borrows $100 mill ion at LIB OR and enters into a swap with respect to 
which she pays ten percent and receives LIBOR on a notional principai 
amount of $100 million. Given that the two persons have entered into 
economically similar arrangements, in general they should be taxed 
similarly. The need to tax the two parties similarly implies that the correct 
way to tax the swap is to simply account for the payments under the swap 
as they are paid (or accrued). 
Even, however, where a swap is paired with a borrowing, there is 
a difference between the fixed-rate borrowing and the variable-rate bor-
rowing plus a swap. In the case of the fixed-rate borrowing, a borrower 
who wishes to take advantage of a decrease in interest rates to recognize 
a loss on the borrowing must go through the cumbersome and expensive 
process of refinancing her debt. On the other hand, in the case of the 
variable-rate borrowing plus a swap, the borrower need only close out the 
swap and enter into a new one. In other words, the existence of the swap 
market greatly enhances the timing option available to long-term bor-
rowers.322 
Putting aside the timing option, there remains a critical difference 
between a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap and a fixed-rate debt 
instrument. Accepting that fixed-rate debt is taxed incorrectly, most people 
would agree that the discrepancy is not sufficiently serious or subject to 
abuse to warrant fixing. 323 As with many examples of mismeasurement 
in the income tax, complacency turns to concern when the taxpayer 
321. On the other hand, a treatment of swaps that is consistent with the treatment of long-term debt 
is inconsistent with the treatment of a series of properly priced independent forward contracts. Because 
each forward contract would generally be off-market, each would involve an up-front payment, the sum 
of which would be zero. Regardless of whether interest was imputed to each off-market contract, the 
amount of gain or loss recognized on each individual contract as it matured would be different than the 
gain or loss recognized for a swap under the treatment of Prop . Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 56 Fed. Reg. 
31350, 31351 (1991) (treating parties to a swap as having taxable income or loss in each period equal 
to the amount they pay or receive in payment). Therefore, consistency alone cannot be the 
determinative factor. 
322. The enhanced timing option may be reduced somewhat by the rule that makes both parties 
to a swap recognize income at the time of an assignment. See id . § 1.446-3(e)(6), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 
31353 (1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 155-61 (discussing the effect of the notional 
principal contract regulations on the timing option); supra note 223 (explaining the value of the timing 
option where both parties face the same marginal rate, but one party is indifferent to the occurrence 
of a realization event). 
323. See, e.g., Kayle, supra note 311, at 314-15 (arguing that administrative advantages of single 
rate convention outweigh mismeasurement of income). 
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leverages her investment in the mistaxed item. 324 Thus, for example, 
market discount is generally not taxed currently, but there are special ruies 
governing leveraged investments in market discount bonds. 325 Similarly, 
in certain circumstances , leveraged investments in long-term fixed-rate 
bonds cause concern. Another example of the concern with leveraged 
investments is the case of real estate mortgage investment conduits 
("REMIC"). A REMIC is a tax-created vehicle for investments in real 
estate mortgages. 326 In general, the assets of a REMIC consist of a pool 
of mortgages and the interests in a REMIC consist of debt and a residual 
ownership interest. 327 Economically, the residual interest can be viewed 
as owning a highly leveraged investment in mortgages. 328 In other 
words, a REMIC can be used as a convenient device for a leveraged 
investment in certain long-term fixed-rate debt. If long-term debt were 
taxed correctly, this would present no problem. Since, however, long-term 
debt is taxed incorrectly, the taxable income of the residual interest can be 
significantly different from its economic income. 329 As a result of this 
disparity between taxable and economic income, the tax law has developed 
an elaborate set of special rules for taxing residual interests and has effec-
tively mandated that a broad class of leveraged investments in mortgages 
must be carried out in the REMIC form. 330 
324. See supra note 81 (listing a variety of Code sections limiting leveraged transactions); cf 
Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1214-18 (1989) 
(arguing that leveraged transactions are inherently abusive). 
325. Compare I.R.C. § 1276 (1988) (providing that gain on the disposition of a market discount 
bond will be treated as ordinary income to the extent of the accrued market discount) with id. § 1277 
(providing that the net direct interest expense incurred on debt to purchase or carry market discount 
bonds shall be deductible in the current taxable year only to the extent it exceeds the market discount 
allocable to the current taxable year). 
326. See I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G (1988) (creating REMICs); Kayle, supra note 311, at 346-54 
(discussing the REMIC legislation). See generally ]AMES M. PEASLEE & DAVID Z. NIRENBERG, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (1989). 
327. See I.R.C. § 860D (1988) (defining a REM I C). The debt-like interest in a REMIC is called 
a "regular interest" and the residual ownership interest is called a "residual interest." !d. § 860G(a)(l)-
(2) . 
328. See Kayle, supra note 311, at 348 (stating that "the income of the residual holder is 
calculated as if it owned the REMIC's assets and the regular interests in the REM1C represented its 
debt"). 
329. Assuming an upward sloping yield curve, the taxable income of the residual holder will 
generally exceed economic income in the early years of the REMIC and will be less than economic 
income in the later years. The disparity between economic and taxable income is often referred to as 
phantom income. See, e.g., PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 326, at 175-81 (explaining the source 
of phantom income) . 
330. See I.R .C . § 860E (1988) (regulating taxation of excess inclusions); id. § 770l(i) (providing 
that multi-class mortgage pools not qualifYing for REMIC status are to be taxed as corporations). The 
problem of excess inclusions is usually thought to be one of !ranching debt, that is dividing long-term 
debt into short-term, medium-term, and long-term debt. Tranching debt simply involves taking a 
blended rate and substituting the correct market rates for the various terms that make up the blended 
rate. See Kayle , supra note 311, at 342 (discussing how collaterized mortgage obligations (CMOs) 
322 Texas Law Review [Vol. 71:243 
The danger that REMICs pose to the tax system is that they 
simplify the process of creating leveraged investments in long-term debt. 
Nevertheless, with a REMIC both the long-term debt (the mortgages) and 
the leverage supporting the long-term debt (the regular interests), really 
exist. Interest rate swaps go a step further. An interest rate swap, in 
essence, creates a fully leveraged investment in long-term debt without 
having to actually create either the long-term debt or the leverage. 
Consider, for example, a taxpayer who wishes to purchase $100 million 
worth of fixed-rate debt, borrowing $100 million at a floating interest rate 
in order to make the purchase. The cash flow from such a transaction is 
identical to the cash flow from an interest rate swap under which the 
taxpayer receives a fixed rate of interest and pays a floating rate of interest. 
The difference is that the back-to-back loans require actual loans, while the 
swap requires merely a notional principal amount. As a practical matter, 
it is vastly easier to enter into the swap than it would be to enter into the 
back -to-back loans. 331 
Interest rate swaps thus make it very easy to take advantage of the 
incorrect taxation of debt. As a result, it is not safe to conclude that 
because the tax system has always lived with the mistaxation of long-term 
debt, it should ignore the mistaxation of interest rate swaps. This does not 
mean that every interest rate swap should be taxed " correctly" according 
to an expected value approach. It is, however, important to be aware of 
the extent to which the taxation of swaps varies from their correct taxation 
and to be prepared to prevent abuses based on that variance.332 
consist of several classes of debt, known as "tranches"). Ironically, rather than moving in the direction 
of taxing the fixed-rate debt correctly, Congress enacted a scheme designed to make sure that the 
holders of fixed-rate mortgages (including both the regular and residual interests) continue to be taxed 
on an incorrect basis. In other words, Congress attempted to ensure that REMICs could not be used 
as a vehicle for fixing the mistaxation of debt. 
331. One reason that the swap is easier to emer into than the back-to-hack loans is that the swap 
subjects the parties to less credit risk. While a swap entails credit risk to the extent thai either party 
may be obligated to make net interest payments , the back-to-hack loan potentially entails risk of t.'le 
principal and the gross interest payments. Also, the transaction costs of the swap are likely to be 
lower. 
332. To some extent, the regulations provide rules designed to limit such abuses. In particular, 
Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.446-3(e)(4)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350,31359 (1991), provides that if a taxpayer 
hedges a notional principal contract, the "Commissioner may require that amounts paid to or received 
by the taxpayer under the notional principal contract be treated in a manner that is consistent with the 
economic substance of the transaction as a whole." Also, Prop. Treas. Reg. § !.446-3(f), 56 Fed. 
Reg. 31350, 31361 (1991), provides that if (I) a taxpayer enters into a transaction that is not a 
customary commercial transaction; (2) the general rules would produce a material distortion of income; 
and (3) the taxpayer would not have entered into the transaction but for that material distortion, then 
the Commissioner may exercise his discretion to depart from the general rules as necessary to clearly 
reflect the income from the transaction. 
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D. Interest Rate Caps 
1. Description of an Interest Rate Cap. -An interest rate cap is 
an agreement to make periodic payments equal to a specified principal 
amount times the excess, if any, of the level of an interest rate index over 
a specified rate. 333 In exchange for the promise to pay such excess 
interest costs, the purchaser of a cap is generally required to make an 
initial payment. 334 The initial payment is referred to as a cap 
premium. 335 Thus, for example, the purchaser of an annual-pay five-year 
LIBOR cap at ten percent with a notional principal amount of $1 million 
would have the right to receive the excess, if any, of LIBOR over ten 
percent times $1 mill ion once per year for the next five years. Assume 
that at the end of the first year, LIBOR was nine percent; at the end of the 
second year, LIBOR was twelve percent; and at the end of the following 
three years, LIBOR was 9.5 percent. Under the agreement, the purchaser 
would receive nothing in the first year, $20,000 in the second year, and 
nothing for the remaining three years. 
2. The Economics of an Interest Rate Cap.-An interest rate cap 
is the equivalent of a series of cash-settlement options on fixed-rate 
loans. 336 The cap premium is the sum of the option premiums for each 
option in the series. To see that the amount payable under a cap agreement 
is equal to the amount payable under a series of cash-settlement options, 
consider an option to borrow $1 mill ion for one year at ten percent. If at 
maturity interest rates are less than ten percent, the option would expire 
worthless. If the option were settled in cash, no payment would be made. 
On the other hand, if interest rates are greater than ten percent, the option 
would be exercised. If the option were settled in cash, a payment would 
be made in an amount equal to the excess of the cost of the loan over the 
cost of a ten percent loan. That payment would be equal to the principal 
of the loan times the excess of the market interest rate over the option 
rate. 337 Assume that the market rate was twelve percent. In that case, 
333. See New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 279 (describing interest rate caps) . 
334. See id. 
335. While cap agreements generally provide for the cap premium to be paid at the time the 
contract is entered into, as with an option, there is no intrinsic reason that payments could not be made 
over time. 
336. As with interest rate swaps, interest rate caps generally protect against changes in market 
interest rates, but not against changes in credit risk. See supra note 302 . 
337. For simplicity of exposition, it is assumed that interest on a loan is payable in advance. 
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the payment would be $20,000, 338 exactly the payment under the cap 
agreement described above. 339 
3. Proposed Taxation.-A straightforward application of the rules 
developed above suggests that for purposes of determining the timing of 
taxable income a cap should be divided into the individual options of which 
it is constructed. In order to do this, the cap premium must be allocated 
among the options in proportion to their fair market value. Each individual 
option should then be taxed as follows: 
(1) No gain or loss should be recognized upon receipt of the 
premiUm; 
(2) The holder of the cap should accrue income over the I ife 
of the option equal to the increase in the expected value of 
the option; 
(3) The holder's adjusted basis in each option should be 
equal to her share of the initial premium plus any accrued 
income; and 
(4) The holder of the cap should have income (or loss) at 
the time of exercise of each option equal to the amount of 
the payment under the cap minus her adjusted basis with 
respect to that option. 
4. Example 14.-Diva. enters into a two-year interest rate cap 
agreement with David. Under the terms of the agreement, 
David will pay Diva the excess, if any, of prime over eleven 
percent times a notional principal amount of $5,000 at the end 
of each year for two years. Diva pays a premium of $128.10. 
At the end of the first year prime is ten percent, and, accor-
dingly, David makes no payment. As of the end of the second 
year prime is fourteen percent, and David makes a payment of 
$150. 340 
For federal income tax purposes, the cap should be divided into two 
components, a cash-settlement option for the first period and a cash-
settlement option for the second period. To properly measure gain or loss 
on each option, the premium of $128.10 must be divided between the two 
options. Assume that the fair market value of the individual options is 
$45.45 and $82.64 for the first and second option, respectively. 341 
338. $20,000 is the principal amount times the difference in the market interest rate and the cap 
rate. 
339. See supra text accompanying note 334. 
340. $!50 is the notional principal amount times the difference in the prime rate and the cap rate . 
341. Options are typically valued using variants of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. See 
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Accordingly, Diva is treated as if she purchased two separate options, a 
one-year option for $45.45 and a two-year option for $82.64. 
The one-year option is expected to be worth approximately $50 at 
the end of the first year. 342 Accordingly, Diva should accrue income of 
$4 .55 during the first year with respect to the first option. As of the end 
of the first year, the first option expires worthless and Diva has a loss of 
$50.343 
The two-year option is expected to be worth $90.91 and $100 at the 
end of the first and second years, respectively. Accordingly, Diva will 
accrue income of $8.26 in the first year344 and $9.09 in the second 
year. 345 Diva's basis in the second option at the end of the second year 
will, therefore, be $100. Upon receipt of the $150 option payment, Diva 
will, therefore, have income of only $50. 
Table 3: Taxation of Diva for Interest Rate Cap 
[Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Net 
1st 2d Income 
End Option Option 2d Before 
of Expected 1st Option Expected Option Cap Cap Net 
Year Income Basis Income Basis Receipt Receipt Income 
8 $4.55 $(50.00) $8.26 $ $(37.19) $0.00 $(37.19) 9.09 (100.00) (90.91) 150.00 59.09 
Gdl $4.55 I $(50.00) I $17.35 1 $(100.00) II $(128.10) 1 $150.00 II $21 .90 I 
Table 3 shows the income flows under the analysis presented above. 
Columns 2 through 5 show the accrual of expected income and the write-
off of basis in each year for each of the separate imbedded options. 
Column 6 contains the sum of columns 2 through 5. Column 7 shows the 
payment received under the cap, and column 8 gives the total net income 
for each year. 
In lieu of imputing income to each unexpired option and then 
permitting an increased basis write-off, the same amount of net income 
could be produced by treating the holder of the cap as being taxable on any 
payments received under the cap (here $0 and $150) and permitting the 
Appendix A for a description of the Black-Scholes formula and its application to this example. 
342. This assumes that the value of the option is expected to grow at 10%. See infra Appendix 
A. 
343. Her initial basis of $45.45 plus her accrued income of $4 .55. 
344. $8.26 = $90.91 - $82.64. 
345. $9.09 = $100.00- $90.91. 
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holder to amortize the cap premium according to a prescribed schedule. 
The appropriate amortization for the cap in Example 14 can be seen in 
column 6 of Table 3. Under the approach described above, in the first 
year Diva has income of $4 .55 and $8 .26 from the first and second options 
and a basis write-off of $50 from the first option. Her net deduction 
before cap receipts is , therefore , $37.19. In the second year she has a net 
deduction before cap receipts of $90 .91 . Together, these amounts equal 
her premium of $ 128.10. 346 Thus, alternatively, she could simply be 
permitted to amortize $37.19 of her basis in the first year and $90.91 in 
the second year. 
While the amortization approach wo rks in Example 14, it does not 
work in all cases. In particular, the amortization approach fails when the 
amount of income accruing with respect to options for later years exceeds 
the amount of premium allocable to the options maturing in the early 
years . 347 Nevertheless, such an amortization approach may be a reason-
able compromise solution. 
Note also that the suggested amortization method differs from the 
amortization that would be permitted simply by reference to the amount 
paid for each option ($45 .45 for the first option and $82.64 for the second 
option). The difference between these two approaches can be explained by 
the fact that the latter approach fails to take into account the increase in 
value in the second option during the first year.348 
346. These computations ignore the timing differences between amounts accrued during the year 
and write-offs at the end of the year. 
347. Consider a simple example in which the option premium with respect to the first year is $10 
and the option premiums with respect to the second and succeeding years total $200. Assume that 
interest rates remain bel ow the cap rate at all times, so there are no further payments under the cap. 
In the first year, the purchaser of the cap should have income of approximately $1 from the first option 
and $20 from the later options (assuming a I 0% growth rate) and a write-off of $11 from the expiration 
of the first option. The purchaser's net income for the first period is $10 ($10 = $1 + $20- $11). 
Under an amortization approach, the closest approximation would be to permit zero amortization, 
giving the purchaser of the cap net income of zero. Any additional amortization would simply permit 
the purchaser to take a loss where, in fact, he had net income. Thus, under these circumstances , there 
is no amortization schedule that will correctly match the income flow from the cap contract. 
348. The court in Citizens & S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T .C. 463 (1988), ajf'd per curiam, 
919 F .2d 1492 (II th Cir. 1990), made essentially the same mistake in determining the amortization of 
core deposits. See id. at 473 (permitting an amortization deduction for core deposits equal to the 
present value on the acquisition date of the expected cost savings for the taxable year without regard 
to changes in value of cost savings in other taxable years); see also George Mundstock, Eleventh 
Circuit Ajfim1s Accelerated Depreciation of Land?, 47 TAX N OTES 737, 738 (May 7, 1990) (arguing 
that "the Tax Court's approach ignores the increase in value of future cost savings and therefore 
radically exceeds economic depreciation"). The amortization method proposed in the text is different 
than the amortization method prescribed in the proposed regulation . See Prop . Treas. Reg . § 1.446-
3(e)(2)(ii). 
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5. Treatment Under Current Law.- Proposed Treasury Regulation 
section 1.446-3(e)349 provides rules for taxing both the periodic payments 
made under an interest rate cap and the cap premium. Under the 
regulations, periodic payments are taken into account over the period to 
which they relate. 350 In general, non periodic payments, such as a cap 
premium, must be recognized over the term of the contract " in a manner 
that reflects the economic substance of the contract. " 351 In the case of 
a cap, the cap is considered to be equivalent to a series of cash-settled 
option contracts. 352 Accordingly, the premium must first be allocated 
among the individual options. The portion of the premium allocated to 
each separate option is then recognized during the period in which that 
option expires. 353 The difference between the approach taken in the 
proposed regulations and expected value taxation is that the regulations fail 
to take into account the expected increase in value of each option as it 
matures . 
E. Hybrid Debt Instruments 
1. Description of a Hybrid Debt Instrument.-The term "hybrid 
debt instrument" is used in this Article to refer to a combination of a 
conventional debt instrument and one or more other derivative products, 
such as forwards or options.354 
2. Proposed Taxation.-For purposes of determining the correct 
timing of income, a hybrid debt instrument should first be divided into the 
noncontingent debt instrument and the various derivative products of which 
349. Prop. Tress. Reg.§ 1.446-3(e) , 56 Fed . Reg . 31350,31355-61 (1991) . 
350. !d.§ 1.446-3(e)(2)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350,31356 (1991) . 
351. !d. § 1.446-3 (e)(3) (ii)(A), 56 Fed. Reg . 31350,31357 (1991). 
352. !d.§ 1.446-3(e)(3)(ii)(C), 56 Fed . Reg . 31350,31357 (1991). 
353. !d. The regulations deal with the administrative problem of valuing the separate options in 
two ways. First, the regulations provide that the option pricing used by the parties to determine the 
total amount paid for the cap or floor will be respected, if reasonable. !d. Second, the regulations 
provide that the Commissioner may publish a revenue procedure providing an alternative method for 
valuing the options. !d.§ 1.446-3(e)(3)(ii)(D)(2), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350,31357 (1991). The Treasury 
published a sample revenue procedure in the preamble to the regulations. Under the sample revenue 
procedure, the cap premium would be allocated based on the term of the interest rate cap and the excess 
of the cap rate over the current interest rate. See Regulations Under Section 446 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986: Application of Section 446 with Respect to Notional Principal Contracts, 56 
Fed. Reg . 31350, 31352-53 (1991). Presumably the allocations provided in the revenue procedure 
would be based on the Black-Scholes option valuation formula and Service estimates of interest rate 
variance. See Appendix A for more information on the Black-Scholes formula. 
354. Traditionally, the term "hybrid securities" has been used to refer to securities that combine 
features of debt and equity. See, e.g., HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF 
CORPORATIONS § 162 (3 d ed. 1983) (defining hybrid securities as combinations of debt securities and 
shares) . 
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it is composed. Second, the issue price of the entire instrument should be 
allocated among the pieces in proportion to their respective fair market 
values. Income should then be accrued in the usual fashion with respect 
to both the debt instrument and each of the derivative products. Gain or 
loss should be recognized with respect to each derivative product 
whenever its value is determined. 
The proposed approach is close to the approach that has been 
adopted by the Treasury Department in the recent modification to the 
proposed original issue discount rules (the "Paragraph (g)" rules). 355 
There are, however, at least a couple of differences. First, having 
bifurcated the issue price of the hybrid debt instrument into an issue price 
for a noncontingent debt instrument and a price for one or more derivative 
products, the Treasury fails to take the next step of accruing income on the 
issue price of the derivative products, thereby providing anticipated deferral 
with respect to the instrument as a whole.356 
Second, the Treasury has limited the application of the Paragraph 
(g) rules to debt instruments that: (1) provide for noncontingent payments 
equal to or greater than the issue price; and (2) provide for one or more 
contingent payments determined, in whole or in part, by reference to the 
value of publicly traded stock, securities, commodities, or other publicly 
traded property. 357 
3. Example 15.-Consider a ten-year debt instrument that 
provides for ten percent interest on a $1000 face amount, but, 
in lieu of the payment of $1000 at maturity, the holder will be 
paid five times the price of an ounce of gold. Assume further 
that the ten-year forward price for gold is $200 358 and that 
the instrument is issued at par. Finally, assume that at matur-
ity, the price of gold is $110 per ounce. 
The instrument is a combination of a ten-year, ten percent debt 
instrument with a $1000 face value issued at par and a singie ten-year 
prepaid forward contract. Assuming the holder purchased the debt at 
issuance, the holder should be taxable on the ten percent coupon on an 
355. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.12 75-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308, 8310-11 (1991); supra text accom-
panying note 95. 
356. Prop. Treas . Reg.§§ 1.1275-4(g)(4),-4(g)(5), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308 , 8310-11 (1991). 
357. /d. The Commissioner is permitted to apply the new rules to a debt instrument that otherwise 
meets the requirementS"of Paragraph (g) (I) even when the issue price of the instrument exceeds the total 
noncontingent payments by an insubstantial amount. /d. § 1.1275-4(f)(l), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308, 8310 
(1991). The application of the Paragraph (g) rules is also limited to debt instruments issued for cash 
or publicly traded property. /d.§ 1.1275-4(g)(l), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308,8310 (1991). 
358. This example assumes that there is a ten-year forward market. The informational problems 
in this approach are discussed more fully below. See discussion infra Part VIII. 
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annual basis. At maturity, the holder should have a basis of $1000 in the 
instrument. Upon payment of the $550 redemption price, L1e holder 
should have a loss of $450 .359 The issuer's tax treatment should mirror 
the holder's. 
The taxation of hybrid debt instruments under current law depends 
on whether they come under the Paragraph (e) or Paragraph (g) niles. 360 
Under the Paragraph (e) rules, the instrument would be divided into its 
contingent and noncontingent components, and the entire issue price would 
be allocated to the noncontingent payments.361 The noncontingent 
components, consisting of the interest coupons, would then be analyzed 
under the general OlD rules. 362 Under those rules, the noncontingent 
debt instrument would have both an issue price and a stated redemption 
price at maturity of $1000. 363 Accordingly, it would have no OlD and 
there would be no accrual of income under the noncontingent instrument. 
The effect of this result is to treat all coupon payments as nontaxable 
returns of principal. Upon maturity, any payment made based on the price 
of gold would be treated as contingent interest. 364 The holder, therefore, 
would have no income until the end of the tenth year, at which time he 
would have income of $550. 
Under the Paragraph (g) rules, the issue price would be allocated 
between the contingent and noncontingent payments in proportion to their 
respective fair market values. 365 The noncontingent payments consist of 
359. The example was chosen so that the issue price would equal the expected redemption price 
valued at the forward price. If, for example, the forward price of gold was only $100, the instrument 
would have been treated as if it had a stated redemption price at maturity of,only $500 and was, 
therefore, issued at a premium. In that case it would have had a yield to maturity of approximately 
6.25%, and each payment of $100 in stated interest would be treated as partially interest and partially 
a return of principal. Any difference between the "expected" payment of $500 and the actual payment 
would be treated as gain or loss at the time of payment. 
360. See supra text accompanying note 95. As described, the instrument would come under the 
Paragraph (g) rules. The analysis is presented under both sets of rules for purposes of comparison. 
If the instrument in the example had a coupon rate under 10% or a term under 10 years , the amount 
of the noncontingent payments would be less than the issue price and the Paragraph (f) rules would 
apply. Prop. Treas . Reg.§ 1.1275-4(g)(l),56 Fed. Reg. 8308,8310 (1991). But see id. § l.i275-
4(f)(l), 56 Fed . Reg. 8308, 8310 (1991) (stating that the Commissioner can apply Paragraph (g) if the 
difference between the noncontingent payments and the issue price is insubstantial). In either case, the 
discussion assumes that the instrument would be treated as debt. The original issue discount rules apply 
only to debt obligations and do not seek to define the term. !d. § 1.1275-4(a)(l), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308, 
83 I 0 (1991) . 
361. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100. 
362. !d. 
363. The issue price would be the issue price of the entire instrument which is by hypothesis 
$1000. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(e)(1), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12090-91 (1986). The stated 
redemption price at maturity would be the sum of all of the payments under the noncontingent 
instrument which would be the ten interest coupons of $100 each. 
364. !d.§ 1.1275-4(e)(3)(i), 51 Fed . Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986). 
365. !d.§ 1.1275-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg . 8308, 8310-11 (1991). 
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ten annual payments of $100. The fair market value of such a stream of 
payments is approximately $6 14. 366 The fair market value of the right 
to receive five times the price of gold in ten years is equal to the present 
value of fiv e times the forward price of gold, 0r $386. The instrument 
would therefore be bifurcated into an installment obligation with an issue 
price of $614 and a prepaid forward contract with an issue price of $386. 
Income would accrue with respect to the installment obligation under the 
normal constant-yield OlD rules. 367 No income would accrue wiu1 
respect to the forward obligation?68 At maturity, the holder would have 
additional income of $1 64. 369 
Table 4 shows the income that would be accrued under each of the 
three methodologies discussed above. Column 2 shows the accrual of 
income under the expected value approach. Columns 3 and 4 show the 
accrual of income under the Paragraph (e) rules. As discussed above, no 
income would accrue with respect to the noncontingent bond because it 
would have an issue price of $1000, equal to its stated redemption price at 
maturity, and , therefore, be treated as having no original issue discount. 
All of the income on the bond would be treated as accruing on the 
contingent portion, and that income would accrue only at maturity when it 
became noncontingent. Columns 5 and 6 show the income that would 
accrue under the Paragraph (g) rules. As discussed above, the noncontin-
gent portion would be treated as having an issue price of only $614 and 
would therefore accrue $386 of original issue discount over its life. The 
contingent portion would accrue no income until maturity and would then 
have income of $614 (the $1000 payment minus the issue price of $386). 
As can be seen by inspection, the Paragraph (g) rules are much closer to 
the expected value rules than are the Paragraph (e) rules, but still provide 
for substantial expected deferral of income. 
366 . The noncontingent payments are equivalent to a ten-year annuity or installment obligation. 
The present value of such a stream of payments assuming a I 0% discount rate is $614. 
367. Prop . Treas. Reg .§ l.1275-4(g) (3), 56 Fed . Reg . 8308,8311 (1991). 
368. ld. § 1.1275-4(g)(4), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308 , 8311 (1991) . 
369. $164 is the difference between the payment received under the forward contract and the 
amount allocated for its purchase. 
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Table 4: Hybrid Instrument Income Accrual 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Paragraph Paragraph Paragraph Paragraph 
Expected (e) Non- (e) (g) Non- (g) 
Year Value contingent Contingent contingent Contingent 
1 $100 $0 $0 $61 $0 
2 100 0 0 58 0 
3 100 0 0 53 0 
4 100 0 0 49 0 
5 100 0 0 44 0 
6 100 0 0 38 0 
7 100 0 0 32 0 
8 100 0 0 25 0 
9 100 0 0 17 0 
10 100 0 0 9 0 
Maturity (450) 0 550 0 164 
I Total II $550 I $0 I $550 I $386 I $164 I 
VIII. Information Requirements 
The expected value approach to taxing financial instruments requires 
two sets of information: (1) the fa ir market value of each component of the 
instrument; 370 and (2) the expected future value of each component, both 
measured at the time the transaction is entered into. 
The fair market value of each component is required in order to 
allocate the cost of the instrument among the various components.371 
Obviously, the task of determining the fair market value can in some 
370. When there is only a single component such as a single option or forward contract, there is 
no need to separately determine the fair market value of any components . It may still be necessary to 
determine the overall fair market value of the instrument when it is exchanged for property. See I.R.C. 
§ l273(b)(3) (1988) (determining the issue price of debt instruments issued for publicly traded 
property); id . § 1274(b)(3)(A) (setting the issue price for debt instruments issued for other types of 
property). 
371. Allocating too much ofL'Je issue price to short-term components of the instruments will cause 
income to be deferred. Correspondingly, allocating too much of the issue price to long-term 
components will cause income to be accelerated. See supra text accompanying notes 308-09 (describing 
the problems of misallocation). 
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instances be quite difficult. Nevertheless, it is generally feasible, 
particularly if taxpayers are given reasonable latitude in estimating fair 
market value. 372 Moreover, it is a task that is already deeply imbedded 
in the tax law. Any time that a taxpayer purchases a bundle of assets for 
a single price, it is necessary, at least in theory, to separately allocate the 
cost of the acquisition among the assets purchased. 373 For example, in 
372 . It is of some help in allocating payments that , in general, the two sides of a financial 
transaction will have adverse interests. The holder of the instrument will ordinarily prefer to allocate 
as much dS possible of the issue price to the short-term components of the instrument so as to max.imize 
the portion of the early returns to the instrument that are characterized as return of capital as opposed 
to interest. Correspondingly, the issuer will ordinarily prefer to minimize the allocation of the issue 
price to the short-term components so as to front-load income. Of course, this analysis assumes that 
both sides of the financial transaction are taxable at the same rate. If one of them is nontaxable, the 
assumption of adverse interests no longer holds. See supra text accompanying note 193. Moreover, 
even if they are both taxable, but at different rates, they can both be made better off by misallocating 
the issue price and adjusting the total issue price to compensate the loser for the misallocation. 
The proposed notional principal contract regulations provide an example of the latitude that 
can be given to the parties to a financial contract. Under the regulations, the parties to an interest rate 
cap are required to allocate the cap premium over the term of the cap agreement. The regulations 
provide that "the option pricing used by the parties to determine the total amount paid for the cap or 
floor will be respected, if reasonable." Prop . Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(3)(ii)(C), 56 Fed . Reg. 31350, 
31357 (1991). On the other hand, the proposed regulations also demonstrate the weakness of the 
assumption that the parties have adverse interests. If one of the parties is a dealer electing mark-to-
market treatment under§ 1.446-4, the allocation will have no effect on its tax liability and, therefore, 
neither party will have an incentive to correctly allocate the cap premium. !d. § 1.446-4, 56 Fed. Reg. 
31361 (l991). 
A second example of regulations providing latitude to parties in the allocation of purchase 
price is the investment unit rules under l.R.C. § 1273 (1988). Under those rules, if neither the debt 
instrument nor the property right making up an investment unit are publicly traded, the issue price of 
the debt instrument is determined by discounting the payments under the instrument at a rate agreed 
to by the parties. The rate must be based on yields of other recent debt instruments issued by the same 
issuer or of comparable debt instruments of other issuers. Prop . Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(d)(2)(iv), 51 
Fed. Reg. 12022, 12062 (1986). 
373 . See, e.g., I.R.C . § 338 (1988) (providing that a corporate purchaser of the stock of a target 
corporation is permitted to elect to treat the target as a new corporation that purchased all of the assets 
of the target corporation and must then allocate the purchase price among all of the assets of the target); 
id. § 1060(a) (requiring that a purchaser of a trade or business allocate basis among the assets 
purchased); id. § 1273(c)(2)(B) (requiring that the issue price of an investment unit must be allocated 
to each element of the unit on the basis of the relationship of the fair market value of such element to 
the fair market value of all elements in the unit); Treas. Reg. § 1.1234-2(d) (as amended in 1980) 
(stating that the grantor of multiple options is required to allocate the premium received among the 
options granted on the basis of the relative fair market value of such options at the time of their 
issuance or on any other reasonable and consistently applied basis that is acceptable to the 
Commissioner); Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that the seller of 
a business must allocate the purchase price among the individual assets sold); Rev. Rut. 78-182, 1978-1 
C .B. 265 (providing that the writer of a put and call for a single premium must allocate the premium 
between the put and call). 
In fact, even when a taxpayer purchases what appears to be a single asset, the taxpayer may 
have to allocate the purchase price to different parts of the asset. For example, if a taxpayer purchases 
a plot of land and later sells part of the land, the purchase price must be allocated between the part sold 
and the part retained, based on their respective fair market values at the time of purchase. Treas. Reg. 
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the case of a purchase of a business, the purchaser must allocate the 
purchase price among the assets, both tangible and intangible, of L"le 
business being acquired .374 As a result, allocating a total price among 
the various components of a purchase is familiar to taxpayers, the Service, 
and the courts . 
More specifically, in the context of financial instruments , taxpayers 
are required to allocate the issue price of an investment unit among the 
parts of the unit. 375 The recent proposed changes to the original issue 
discount rules extend this treatment to certain financial instruments where 
the different elements are imbedded in a single instrument. 376 The 
expected value approach merely extends this rule more generally to 
financial instruments. 377 
Finally, it is important to note that precision is not required in 
allocating the issue price any more than precision is required in the myriad 
other circumstances in which it is theoretically necessary to know the fair 
market value of some item or to allocate a total price by fair market value. 
§ I .61 -6 (as amended in 1960) (requiring allocation of basis upon the sale of a portion of land). 
Similar issues are raised, for example, when a person purchases property with debt. In that case, the 
total consideration must be allocated between the purchase price (principal) and interest. l.R.C. § 1274 
(1988). 
374. See l.R.C. § 1060(a) (1988) ; supra note 373. 
375. See l.R.C. § 1273(c)(2)(B); supra note 373. 
376. Prop. Treas . Reg.§ 1.1275-4(g) , 56 Fed . Reg . 8308,8310-11 (1991) . 
377. Allocating the purchase price of a financial instrument among its components assumes, of 
course, that it is possible to identify the various components. At least two conceptually separate 
difficulties arise. First, as a practical matter, it may be extremely difficult to identify the separate 
elements of a financial instrument . For example, consider a covenant to a debt instrument that restricts 
the corporation's ability to pay dividends if earnings fall below a specified level. In theory, the value 
of the covenant could be separately identified and accounted for. As a practical matter, it is unlikely 
to be worthwhile to do so. 
Second, as a theoretical matter, in general there will not be a unique way of dividing up a 
financial instrument into components. Consider, for example, a debt instn1ment with an imbedded 
forward. Obviously, the debt instrument could be div ided into a pure debt instrument and a forward. 
On the other hand, a long forward position is equivalent to the purchase of a call option combined with 
the sale of a put option. Thus, the instrument could be divided up into a debt instrument plus a call 
plus a put. More generally, there are broad equivalences across different types of financial instruments. 
For example, as between buying or selling an asset, buying or selling a call on the asset, buying or 
selling a put on the asset, and borrowing or lending, any one of the four can be created with 
appropriate combinations of the three others. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 488-90. 
One of the consequences of the expected value approach is that the taxation of the instrument should 
be as similar as possible however the instrument is constructed or deconstructed. 
The flip side of the fact that there are multiple ways to deconstruct an instrument is that there 
are multiple ways to actually enter into any given economic arrangement. See supra note 189. T o the 
extent that, for example, creating a synthetic call involves continuous trading in the underlying good , 
absent a mark-to-market system, a synthetic call will inevitably be taxed differently than an actual call 
option (the synthetic call will be effectively marked to market by virtue of the constant trading and the 
realization doctrine, while unanticipated gains and losses on the actual call will be deferred). 
Nevertheless, absent mark-to-market taxation, l believe that expected value taxation provides the best 
general principle to determine taxation of financial instmments. 
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In particular, when the expected future value of a component is known or 
can be estimated, its fair market value can be estimated by discounting the 
future value back to the present. 378 
Once the issue price has been allocated among the various com-
ponents, it is necessary to determine the expected future value of each such 
component. In theory, this requirement would necessitate knowing the 
expected future value at each point in time. Thus, for example, if the 
instrument has a two-year life, it would be necessary to know, as of the 
creation of the instrument, the expected value for each day in the two-year 
period. As a practical matter, however, it would be far simpler and 
without serious loss in accuracy to simply determine the expected future 
value at maturity and to assume a constant yield growth. This calculation 
is precisely how the OlD rules work with a zero-coupon bond. 379 
As discussed above, the expected future value should be based on 
an objective market valuation, not on the subjective expectations of the 
participants to the transactions. Thus, just as the current fair market value 
of each component should be based on what a willing buyer would pay a 
willing seller, the expected future value is best measured by what a willing 
buyer would promise to pay a willing seller in the future. In other words, 
the best measure of the expected future price is the forward price for the 
instrument. 380 
Unfortunately, in many cases forward markets for the underlying 
goods will not exist, or will not be sufficiently established to provide 
reliable prices. 381 It may, however, often be possible to estimate a 
hypothetical forward price, even when no actual forward market exists. 
In general, in a competitive market in equilibrium, the forward price for 
a good is equal to the spot price plus the cost of carrying the good.382 
Thus, even when there is no forward market, it may be reasonable to 
378. Obviously, a key question is the choice of a discou!lt rate . Here again, it should be 
emphasized that precision is not of paramount importance. For example, I.R.C. § 1274 (1988) permits 
the determination of the issue price of a bond issued for nonpublicly traded property to be determined 
based on the average rate of government securities with comparable maturities. On the other hand, 
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e)(3)(ii)(D)(l), 56 Fed. Reg. 31350, 31357 (1991), uses the overpayment 
rate established under I.R.C. § 6621(a)(1) (1988) (using the federal short-term rate plus three 
percentage points) to amortize nonperiodic swap payments . Finally, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-
2(d)(2)(iv), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12062 (1986), uses a discount rate agreed to by the parties (subject 
to certain guidelines) to allocate issue price of an investment unit. 
379. See supra text accompanying note 93 (discussing-the OID rules). 
380. See supra section VII(A)(2). 
381 . One of the reasons for the development of new financial products is to help bridge the gaps 
between existing financial markets . For example, the maximum term of LIBOR futures on the 
International Monetary Market at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is approximately six months. See 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1991, at C-16 (reporting LIBOR futures quotes). Interest rate swap contracts, 
however, routinely extend well beyond this period. 
3 82. See supra note 263. 
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estimate forward prices by reference to spot prices and an estimated cost 
of carrying the underlying commodity. 383 
As compared to a full accrual system, the information requirements 
for the expected value approach may be either more or less burdensome. 
Under a full accrual system, valuation of the entire instrument is required 
as of the end of each accrual period. Under the expected value approach, 
more information is required initially because each component of the 
instrument must be separately valued and the expected future values of each 
such component must be estimated . On the other hand , after the initial 
valuations , no further valuations are required as the instrument 
matures. 384 
Although the information requirements of a full accrual system are 
the single most persuasive argument against its adoption, full accrual 
accounting has also been criticized on other grounds, including liquidity 
problems and the resulting fluctuations in federal tax revenues. 385 On 
these grounds, the expected value approach is clearly superior. Regarding 
liquidity, an investor in a financial instrument taxed under the expected 
value approach would know the taxation of the instrument prior to her 
investment, and would presumably be able to plan around any liquidity 
problems. With respect to fluctuations in federal revenues, revenues under 
the expected value approach should prove no more volatile than revenues 
under the existing approach to financial instruments. 
IX. Conclusion 
The current taxation of financial instruments is unsatisfactory. It 
has developed as a hodgepodge of often inconsistent rules that frequently 
fail to tax financial instruments correctly, providing taxpayers with myriad 
opportunities to manipulate their income and to defer gains. It has long 
been recognized that the ideal solution would be to mark all such 
instruments to market on a periodic basis, thereby correctly taxing all 
parties on their income. For a variety of reasons this solution is likely to 
be adopted only slowly. 
Absent mark-to-market accounting, this Article suggests the need 
for a uniform framework to be used to develop rules for consistent 
383. See supra note 263 . 
384. Values are required when a contingency is resolved. Ordinarily, the resolution of a 
contingency involves a cash payment and valuation should not present a problem. In some cases, when 
the resolution of the contingency triggers a transfer of property or a future payment, valuation will be 
an issue . In particular, if, for example, income is to be recognized upon the exercise of an option 
settled in property, valuation may be an issue. 
385. See H.R. REP. 432 , 98th Cong. , 2d Sess . 1254-57 (1984), reprinted in GRAETZ, supra note 
48, at 933-36 . 
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treatment of such instruments . In particular, the Art icle suggests that an 
appropriate set of timing rules would: (1) divide complex financial 
instruments into individual components consisting of a s ingle contingency; 
(2) accrue income with respect to each such component based on the 
expected future value of the component determined as of the time the 
instrument is created; and (3) tax the parties to the transaction on gain or 
loss whenever such a contingency is resolved. While in many circumstan-
ces the direct app lication of these proposed mles would be difficult, it is 
hoped that they will provide a generalized framewo rk against which rules 
dealing with specific instruments can be tested. 
! 
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Appendix A: The Amortization of an Option Premium 
In the body of the Article I argue that, in general, an option should 
be taxed as if the value of the option is expected to increase over time. 386 
"n1is point is not uniformly accepted in the tax literature. 387 One way to 
demonstrate that the market expects the value of an option to increase is to 
consider the forward price for an option. For example, an option that 
matures in two years and a day is currently selling for $100. Consider a 
forward contract to purchase the option in two years. Assuming an interest 
rate of ten percent, the forward price for the option must be $121. This 
can be proved by a standard arbitrage argument. Assume, first, that the 
forward price is $120. In that case, I could write an option currently for 
$100, buy an option forward for $120, and invest the $100 in a two-year 
zero-coupon bond. At the end of two years, the bond would pay me $121. 
I would use $120 to purchase the option. I would then be long and short 
in the same option, which would effectively cancel, and I would have $1 
left over. Such arbitrage transactions would be continued until the spot 
price for the option was bid down and the forward price bid up. Conver-
sely, if the forward price was in excess of $121, the arbitrage function 
could be similarly performed by borrowing money, buying options i.n the 
spot market, and selling options forward. 
Thus, the forward price of an option is equal to the spot price plus 
the carrying cost-primarily the interest cost of carrying the premium. 388 
Given that the forward price is in excess of the spot price when the option 
is purchased, it is anomalous to argue that the holder of the option should 
be entitled to amortize her purchase price. 
The confusion may arise out of the notion of the "time value of an 
option." This expression refers to the fact that, all else being equal, the 
value of an option increases with its term (i.e., the length of time between 
the purchase and exercise dates). 389 This is true because of the interac-
tion of two factors: (1) the volatility in the price of the underlying asset; 
386. See text accompanying note 279 . The caveat, "in general" is very important. Consider, for 
example, an option to purchase a $100,000 face, self-amortizing 30-year mortgage bearing a market 
rate coupon at any time over the next 30 years for $80,000. Initially, the option should be worth at 
least $20,000, the difference between the face of the mortgage and the strike price . Over time, 
however, as the mortgage pays down, it must be the case that the option becomes less valuable. In 
particular, consider the value of the option immediately before the final payment is made on the 
mortgage. The option must then be worthless . 
387 . See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 279 (discussing alternative methods of 
amortizing cap premiums and concluding that the method recommended in the text is incorrect and that 
an alternative method, which they refer to as "economic amortization," should be used). 
388 . See supra note 263. 
389. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 
J. POL. ECON. 637, 638 (1973). 
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and (2) the asymmetric nature of an option .390 The longer the term of 
the option, the more opportunity for the price of the underlying asset to 
reach extreme values. The value of the option, however, is asymmetric 
around these values. In other words, at the maturity of a call option, if the 
price of the underlying asset is very high, the option is very valuable, 
increasing on a dollar-for-dollar basis with the price of the underl ying 
asset. If, however, the price of the under! ying asset is very low , the option 
is already worthless and suffers no decline in value as the value of the asset 
drops. As a result, at any given point in time the value of a long-term 
option is greater than the value of an otherwise identical option w ith a 
shorter term. 391 Consequently, it is possible to draw the erroneous 
inference that the value of the long-term option is expected to decline over 
time. As the arbitrage argument above demonstrates, this conclusion is not 
accurate. 
Another way to approach the same question is to look at the basic 
valuation formula for an option, the Black-Scholes option pricing formula: 
where: 
V = _l_[p X N(x) - S X N(x - aVt)] 
(l+rY 
x = log(P/ S) + Ia{t 
a/t 2 
P = the forward price of the good, S = the strike price, r = the discount 
rate, a = the standard deviation of price changes, N(x) = the cumulative 
normal distribution function, s = time between payment and exercise, and 
t = time between entering into contract and exercise. 392 Notice that time 
enters into the valuation equation in two ways. First, as s, time appears 
in the term, 11(1 + r)' (the "discount term"), and second, as t, time appears 
in the remaining term (the "value term") . The value term provides an 
estimate of the value of the option at maturity, while the discount term 
adjusts the value back to the time of payment.393 
390 . !d. at 638-39. 
391. /d. at 638. While this sta tement is generally true, it is not always true. T o see this result, 
consider a commodity whose price is fixed at $100. Consider two options, one to purchase the 
commodity for $90 in one year and the other to purchase the/commod ity fo r $90 in two years . The 
value of the two-year option would simply be the present value of $10, the difference between the 
option price, $100, and the strike price, $90 . Assuming a 10% discount rate, the two-year option 
should be worth approximately $8.26 ($8.26 = ($100- $90)/(1 .1)'). Similarly, the value of the one-
year option would be $10, discounted by only one year, or approximately $9.09. Thus, when there 
is no price volatility, the value of a short-term option exceeds the value of a long-term option. /d . at 
638-39 . 
392. The Black-Scholes formula originally appeared in Black & Scholes , supra note 389. 
393 . The value of an option at any time is equa l to its discounted exp;:cted futu re va lue in a risk-
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Consider now a contract to purchase the option at some point in the 
future. Assuming that prices for the future purchase are set at time zero, 
the value term will be unchanged. In other words, it will still be based on 
current values of P, S, cr, and t. The discount term, however, is a function 
of the time between payment and maturity of the option. Therefore, the 
later that payment is made, the smaller s and the greater the discount term 
and, correspondingly, the value of the option. 
neutral world. See Cox & Ross, supra note 277. A possible source of error in working with options 
is to confuse the expected future value of an op tion with the future value of the option given the 
expected future price. Because the value of an option is a nonlinear function of price, these two 
numbers are not the same. See Black & Scholes, supra note 389, at 638-39 . For example, consider 
a good that can have three possible prices , $7, $10, and $13 , each with equal probability. The 
expected future price of the good is $10 , the average of the three prices. Consider, however, an option 
to purchase the good at $10. If the future price is the expected price of $10, the option will be 
worthless. The expected future value of the option, however, is not zero. If the price is $13, the 
option will be worth $3, while if the price is $10 or $7, the option will be worthless. Therefore, the 
expected value of the option is $1. q. New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 279 (discussing a 
"static" mark-to-market approach); K.Jeinbard, supra note 196, at 950-52 (analogizing caps to options 
in that both share in the up-side but not the down-side risks). 
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Appendix B: Forward Interest Rates 
To prevent the possibility of arbitrage, forward interest rates must 
bear a specific relationship to the term structure of interest rates. In other 
words, given any particular term structure of interest rates, there is only 
one set of forward rates that is consistent with that term structure. 394 To 
see this relationship, define ri.J as the zero-coupon interest rate which 
applies at the present time to a borrowing from time i until time j. For 
example, :-0 .1 and r0.2 are the current (time=O) interest rates for a one-
period and a two-period borrowing, respectively. Similarly, r 1,2 is the 
current interest rate available for borrowing from time 1 until time 2. In 
other words, r1•2 is the forward interest rate for a one-period borrowing 
starting one period in the future. The assertion that the term structure of 
interest rates implies a set of forward interest rates is equivalent to the 
assertion that given {r0 •1 , r0 •2 , ••. , r 0 ·"' •.. }, it is possible to determine 
all remaining interest rates, ri.J· 
The formula for the equilibrium forward rate from period i to 
period} (j>i) is: 395 
[ 
(1 + r0 .)i] u ~ i) 
= .; - 1. 
(1 + ro.Y 
r .. 
1,) 
Thus, for example, if the one-period spot rate, r[O,l], is 6.0% and 
the two-period spot rate, r[0,2], is 6.5%, the forward rate for a one-period 
borrowing beginning in one period is 7. 0%: 
7.00% = 1.0652 - 1. 
1.06 
To see that 7.0% must be the current forward rate, consider what would 
happen if the forward rate was in excess of 7.0%. For example, assume 
the forward rate is 8. 0%. It would then be possible to conduct the 
following arbitrage operation. First, borrow $94.34 for two periods (Loan 
#1). At the spot two-period rate of 6.5%, you will be obligated to repay 
$107 in two years. Second, lend $94.34 for one period at the spot one-
period rate of 6.0%, receiving back $100 at the end of the first period 
(Loan #2). Finally, enter into a forward contract to lend $100 between 
394. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 570 (showing that forward rates are "implicit" 
in the term structure); SARKIS J. KHOURY, SPECULATIVE MARKETS 217-21 (1984) (showing the 
relationship between forward rates and the term structure). 
395. See WILLIAM F. SHARPE & GORDON J. ALEXANDER, INVESTMENTS 93-94 (4th ed. 1990). 
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periods one and two at the forward rate of 8. 0% (Loan #3). Your net cash 
flows from this transaction will be as follows (in dollars): 
I Time !!Loan 1 I Loan 2 I Loan 3 I Net I 
0 94.34 (94.34) -- 0 
1 -- 100.00 (100.00) 0 I 
I 2 II (1 07 .00) -- I 108.00 I 1 I 
In other words, you will have a guaranteed income of $ 1 at the end 
of two periods. Similarly, if the forward rate is less than the equilibrium 
rate of 7. 0%, you can make a certain arbitrage profit by lending for two 
periods at the two-period rate and borrowing at the spot rate and the 
forward rate. Similar arbitrage arguments can be used to prove the general 
equation for forward rates given above . 
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Appendix C: Further Comments on the Treatment of Uncertainty Under 
the OlD Rules 
As noted in the body of the Article, the original issue discount rules 
generally ignore contingent payments until they become fixed. Once a 
contingent payment is fixed it is generally immediately taken into taxable 
income. 396 If, however, such a fixed payment is not due for at least six 
months, the present value of the now-fixed contingent interest is taken into 
income and additional interest income is accrued based on the difference 
between the present value of the payment and the amount of the future 
payment. 397 
In general, the contingent interest rules have the effect of deferring 
the accrual of expected income. 398 When the contingency relates to a 
future event, however, the accrual of income can be accelerated. Consider 
again Example 3A. 399 In that example, Diva pays David $100 today in 
exchange for either $100 or $142 in two years, the amount to be deter-
mined by an immediate flip of a coin. Assume that David's obligation to 
Diva is a debt instrument covered by the OlD rules. Under the OlD rules, 
the transaction would be bifurcated into a noncontingent debt instrument 
issued for $100 with a stated redemption price at maturity of $100, and a 
contingent debt instrument providing for a payment of either zero or $42 
at maturity. 400 The noncontingent instrument would have a zero yield 
and, as a result, there would be no income imputed to the holder of the 
instrument. 401 
The treatment of the contingent debt instrument is more 
complicated. Under the regulations, the parties are treated as if the 
borrower had issued a separate debt instrument on the date the amount of 
the payment becomes fixed, maturing on the date that the payment is 
due. 402 The stated principal amount of this separate debt instrument is 
396. Prop. Treas. Reg.§§ 1.1275-4(e)(3)(i), -4(f)(2), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091-92 (1986); id. 
§ 1.1275-4(g)(2), 56 Fed. Reg . 8308, 8310-11 (1991); see supra text accompanying note 106. If the 
instrument is governed by the Paragraph (f) rules, a portion of the now-fixed contingent payment may 
be treated as a return of principal. 
397. Prop. Treas. Reg.§§ 1.1275-4(e)(3)(ii), -4(f)(2)(v), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091-92 (1986); 
id. § 1.1275-4(g)(4)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308, 8311 (1991). If the instrument is governed by the 
Paragraph (f) rules, a portion of the present value of the now-fixed contingent payment may be treated 
as a return of principal. 
398. See supra text accompanying note 109 . 
399. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
400. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1275-4(e)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986). The application of 
the Paragraph (e) rules assumes that the contingency is not determined in whole, or in part, by 
reference to the value of publicly traded property. !d. § 1.1275-4(g)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12094 
(1986). 
40 I. See supra text accompanying note I 08. 
402. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ l.l275-4(e)(3)(ii)(A), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986). 
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the amount of the payment that has become fixed (either zero or $42 in our 
example).'~m An amount equal to the issue price of the deemed debt 
instrument is then accounted for as if an amount of interest equal to the 
issue price had been paid by the borrower to the lender as interest on the 
date that the amount of the payment became fixed. 404 The issue price of 
the deemed debt instrument (and, therefore, the amount of interest treated 
as paid) is determined by discounting the fixed payment at the applicable 
federal rate determined as of the time of the original debt issuance.405 
Thus, assume that after paying $100 in exchange for the promise to be paid 
either $100 or $142 in two years, Diva wins the coin toss and David 
becomes obligated to pay $142. Under the proposed regulations, Diva 
would be treated as having immediately received $35 in contingent 
interest. 406 Furthermore, Diva would be required to accrue an additional 
$7 of OlD over the remaining two-year period . The following table 
compares the amount that the holder of such a debt instrument would be 
required to accrue under the contingent interest rules to the amount such 
a holder would accrue under a full accrual regime: 
Income under Income under 
contingent full accrual 
Time of accrual interest rules regime 
Immediately after the coin toss $35 $17 
During the first year 3 12 
During the second year 4 13 
As can be seen from the above table, in this example the contingent interest 
rules overaccrue, rather than underaccrue income. 
The deferred contingent interest rules do not always overaccrue 
income. The problem is that the rules require the immediate accrual of all 
previously contingent interest at the time that the interest becomes fixed, 
without regard to the period to which such interest relates. In general, to 
the extent that the newly fixed interest relates to prior periods, the rules 
403 . /d . 
404. !d. 
405. /d .§ 1.1275-4(e)(3)(ii)(B), 51 Fed . Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986). It is not clear from the text 
of the regulation what date is used for determining the applicable federal rate . The choice of date is, 
however,madeclearbyExample3 intherules. Seeid . § 1.1275-4(e)(4),51 Fed . Reg. 12022,12091 
(1986) (discounting all payments under the separate debt instrument at the rate in effect on the date the 
debt instrument was issued). 
406. The calculation assumes the applicable federal rate is 10 %. 
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properly require its accrual. Conversely, to the extent that the newly fixed 
interest relates to future periods, the rules improperly require its ac-
crual.407 
The OID rules have a couple of other features worth noting. While 
the OID rules do not generally accrue income based on expected amounts 
of future payments, the rules do require the accrual of income based on the 
expected time of future payments in at least two circumstances. The first 
concerns debt instruments subject to puts by the holder or calls by the 
issuer. Consider first a call on a debt instrument issued at a discount. In 
light of the existence of the call, it is not known when the instrument will 
be retired and, therefore, it is not possible to compute a yield or the 
amount of discount allocable to each period. The regulations solve this 
problem by assuming that the call will be exercised (or fail to be exercised) 
at such time so as to minimize the yield paid by the issuer.408 Similarly, 
in the case of a put by a holder, the regulations assume that the put will be 
exercised (or fail to be exercised) at such time so as to maximize the yield 
received by the holder. 409 If in fact the call or put is exercised at other 
than the assumed time, adjustments are made at that time. 410 
In other words, the regulations take the approach of treating the 
instrument as if it provided for certain timing of payments, even though the 
actual timing of payments is uncertain. Conceptually, this is no different 
from treating contingent payments as if they were fixed and making 
adjustments when the assumption turns out to be untrue. An even more 
sophisticated example of the same overall approach can be found in section 
1272(a)(6), which deals with the timing of income in the case of debt 
instruments whose payments may be accelerated by reason of prepayments 
of other obligations securing such debt instruments .411 For example, 
consider a pool of thirty-year mortgages that serve as collateral for debt 
that is issued at a discount. The debt has a nominal term of thirty years, 
but is prepayable as the individual mortgages are prepaid. Under section 
407. To see this distinction, compare the following two debt instruments, both with ten-year terms 
and no noncontingent interest. Assume that the first instrument provides that at the end of each year, 
L~e interest rate for the prior year will be determined by reference to a nonqualified interest index (i.e. , 
un index that would not qualify as an objective interest index within the meaning of Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ l.l275-5(b), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12094 (1986)), and that such interest will be payable at maturity. 
Assume that the second instrument provides that a week after issuance, an interest rate will be set on 
the bond. Once set, interest will be payable annually at the fixed rate. 
In the first example, the fixing of the contingent interest relates to the already elapsed year 
and is properly accrued under the rules. In the second example, the fixing of the contingent interest 
relates to interest that has not yet accrued and should not be taken into income until such time as it has 
properly accrued. 
408. Id. § l.l272-l(f)(4)(iii)(B), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12052 (1986) . 
409. Id. § 1.1272-l(f)(4)(iii)(A), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12052 (1986). 
410. /d.§ 1.1272-l(f)(4)(iv), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12052 (1986). 
411. I.R.C . § 1272(a)(6)(C) (1988) . 
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1272(a)(6), the accmal of discount in each period would be computed by 
reference to an assumed prepayment rate for the pool of mortgages 
determined as of the time of the issuance of the debt and the actual 
prepayment behavior to date. 412 Thus, section 1272(a)(6) can be viewed 
as a highly sophisticated approach to estimating the timing of income and 
adjusting the estimates as facts prove to be inconsistent with the initial 
assumption. 
412. !d. § 1272(a)(6)(A)-(B). 
346 Texas Law Review [Vol. 7 1:243 
Appendix D: The Treatment of Correlated Events 
In general., this Article recommends dividing a financial instrument 
into components, each with a single contingency, and taxing each 
component based on the expected future value of the contingency. While 
this approach clearly makes sense when the contingencies are independent, 
it is less obviously correct when the contingencies are correlated. In 
Example 7, which deals with a bet on the next two presidential elec-
tions,413 I suggested that one approach was to value the second contingen-
cy at the time the first contingency was resolved based on the conditional 
probabilities determined at the time the contract was initially entered in-
to.414 That approach was rejected based on its additional information 
requirements, namely the conditional probabilities. In this Appendix, the 
question of the correlation between contingencies is explored further in a 
more ngorous manner. 
Consider two bets concerning events a and b, which may or may 
not occur at time t 1 and time t2 , respectively.
415 At t0 , the probability of 
the events are p0(a) and p0(b), respectively. If events a and b are 
uncorrelated, the probability of event b occurring will be unaffected by 
whether or not event a occurs. In other words: 
Pt(b I a) = Pt(b I -a) = p/b ). 
Assume now that events a and b are correlated so that: 
Pt(bla).,:: p/b). 
Consider the extent to which this information should be used at different 
points in time. 
Time 
t = t 0 
Discussion 
The initial estimate of the probability of event b should 
take into account all information that is available at t0 , 
whether or not event b is correlated with event a. 416 
Thus, whether or not the events are correlated, the 
procedure at t0 should be the same, i.e., the best 
estimate should be made of the probability of event b. 
413. See supra text accomoanying note 239. 
414. See supra text accompanying note 242. 
415. The term tn will be used to refer to the point in time where time is equal ton. 
416. By the term "all information," I really mean all reasonably available information, taking into 
account the transaction costs of obtaining the information. 
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This is the period from when the bet is entered 
into until the outcome of the first event is known. 
By observing the behavior of event a during this 
period , we would obtain more information about 
event b. Hence, it would be possible to update 
our probability estimates and accrue income 
accordingly. To do so would , however, be incon-
sistent with our general decision to avoid updating 
our information about event a. If we had an 
updated estimate of p(a) , the first step should be to 
adjust the accrual of income with respect to event 
a, not event b . Moreover, it is not necessarily the 
case that it is easier (i.e., cheaper) to obtain 
updated information about event a than it would be 
to obtain such information about event b. 417 
Given that it would be more accurate to directly 
update the estimate of the probability of event b, 
the fact that such a course of action has been 
rejected suggests rejecting the indirect updating of 
the estimate. 
At t = t1, the occurrence or nonoccurrence of 
event a is known with certainty. It would 
therefore be possible to determine either: 
p,(bJa), 
the probability of b given the now known value of 
a and all other information known at time t 1, or: 
Po(b l a), 
the probability of b given the known value of a, 
but otherwise taking into account only information 
known at t 0 . 
As for the first alternative, it is exactly the 
same as p,(b) (the probability of event b given all 
information known at t1) , because all of the infor-
mation known at t1 includes the outcome of event 
a. The alternative of periodically re-evaluating 
p(b) has , however, already been rejected. 
The second alternative , adjusting the accrual 
of income with respect to event b based on the 
initial probability of event b conditioned on the 
417. Although this may often be the case because event b is , by hypothesis, furth er in the future 
than event a . 
348 
t = t2 
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outcome of event a , takes into account only infor-
mation known as of t0 plus the known outcome of 
event a. It is, therefore, not inconsistent with the 
overall approach. On the whole, however, this 
adjustment seems to reach an undesirable level of 
complexity, although it may be reasonable under 
some circumstances. This possibility, which I will 
refer to as adjusting for related outcomes, is dis-
cussed more fully below. 
This is the period between the outcome of event a 
and the outcome of event b. Whether or not the 
estimate of the probability of event b was adjusted 
at time t 1 , the correlation between events a and b 
should have no further relevance after time t 1 • 
Accordingly, there is no reason to vary the general 
rule that probabilities will not be updated until the 
underlying contingency is resolved. 
Event b is no longer contingent. 
As discussed above, a case can be made for adjusting the estimate 
of the expected value of a future event based on the resolution of inter-
mediate contingencies and their expected interactions as determined at the 
initiation of the transaction. In general, however, such an approach is 
unlikely to be cost effective. The most significant problem is that it would 
require determining the conditional probabilities at the initiation of the 
transaction. Such a determination is likely to be much more difficult than 
determining unconditional probabilities. In particular, while reasonable 
estimates of unconditional expectations can frequently be inferred from 
market prices, it is unlikely that estimates of conditional probabilities will 
be so determinable. 
More broadly, there is no intrinsic reason why updating expected 
values based on conditional probabilities would have to be limited to events 
that are themselves connected with the financial instrument. For example, 
consider a six-month forward contract on corn and assume that the key 
determinate of the price of corn in six months is the amount of rainfall 
over the next three months. In particular, assume that in February the 
August forward price for corn is $2.00 per bushel, but that if there is less 
than one inch of rain in April, all else being equal, it is expected that 
August corn will be $3.00 per bushel. Finally, assume that there is in fact 
less than one inch of rain in April. A possible approach would be to 
revalue the forward contract on May 1 assuming that nothing else has 
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changed other than the low rainfall. While it might enhance accuracy to 
adjust for such extrinsic outcomes, it is unlikely that it would be worth-
while to do so. 
The failure to adjust for extrinsic outcomes, however, suggests an 
additional problem with updating based on intrinsic outcomes: the taxation 
of any component of a financial instrument would then become dependent 
on the other components of the instrument. For example, the taxation of 
the corn forward in the previous example would depend on whether or not 
it was tied to a separate bet on the amount of rainfall or perhaps a bet on 
wheat prices (assuming that wheat prices are themselves correlated with 
rainfall). 418 
For all of the above reasons, I would reject using conditional 
probabilities to update estimates of future contingencies. Accepting this 
conclusion as a general rule, the question remains as to whether there are 
special cases where there is so much information contained in either 
intrinsic or extrinsic events that it seems foolish to ignore such information. 
Such a case is presented when the two events are perfectly correlated, 
either negatively or positively. 419 
The problem of perfectly correlated events can be demonstrated by 
a simple example. Consider a jar with two balls, one red and one white. 
Assume that one ball will be removed at t 1 and the other ball will be 
removed at t2 . Consider a pair of bets where the first bet pays $100 if the 
red ball is removed at t1 and the second bet pays $100 if the red ball is 
removed at t2• Ignoring the time value of money, each bet should be worth 
$50.420 Assume that you have paid $100 for the pair of bets and that the 
white ball is drawn at t 1 • Since your basis in the first bet will be $50, you 
will have a loss of $50 on the first bet. Economically, however, your loss 
of $50 on the first bet is exactly offset by your certain gain of $50 on the 
second bet. 421 It would seem undesirable to permit the loss on the first 
bet without taking into account the certain gain on the second bet. A 
solution to this dilemma is to re-evaluate the expected outcome of the 
second bet based on the first bet, in other words, to use the conditional 
probabilities. A simpler approach, however, is to simply observe that the 
second bet is no longer contingent once the first bet has been resolved. 
418. If probability were updated based on intrinsic outcomes, it would no longer be true that the 
timing of income with respect to a financial instrument is independent of whether or not the instrument 
is bifurcated into its component parts. See supra subpart V(A). 
419. By a perfect positive correlation I mean that the occurrence of event a implies the occurrence 
of event b. Perfect negative correlation means that the occurrence of event a implies the nonoccurrence 
of event b. 
420. There is a 50% chance that the red ball will be drawn at t1 • The value of the first bet is 
therefore .5 times $100, or $50. The argument is exactly the same fort,. 
421. You will receive $100 when the second ball is drawn and you have a basis in the second bet 
of $50. 
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Thus, under the general rule that income is recognized when contingencies 
are resolved, a gain of $50 should automatically be recognized with respect 
to the second bet without any need to formally consider conditional 
probabilities. 422 Similarly, if a red ball is drawn at t1, a loss should be 
permitted with respect to the second bet, now a certai n loser. 
422. This result is achieved under the OlD contingent interest rules , which require immediate 
recognition of the present value of resolved future contingencies. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-
4(e)(3 )(ii), -4(f )(2)(v), 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12091 (1986); id. § I . 1275-4(g)( 4)(ii), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308, 
8311 (1991). 
